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Citizen sensor networks are open information systems in which members of the public act as
information providers. The information distributed in such networks ranges from observations
of events (e.g. noise measurements or monitoring of environmental parameters) to probabilistic
estimates (e.g. projected trafﬁc reports or weather forecasts). However, due to rapid advances in
technology such as high speed mobile internet and sophisticated portable devices (from smart-
phones to hand-held game consoles), it is expected that citizen sensor networks will evolve.
This evolution will be driven by an increase in the number of information providers, since, in
the future, it will be much easier to gather and communicate information at a large scale, which
in turn, will trigger a transition to more commercial applications. Given this projected evolution,
one key difference between future citizen sensor networks and conventional present ones is the
emergence of self-interested behaviour, which can manifest in two main ways. First, informa-
tion providers may choose to commit insufﬁcient resources when producing their observations,
and second, they may opt to misreport them. Both aspects of this self-interested behaviour are
ignored in current citizen sensor networks. However, as their applications are broadened and
commercial applications expand, information providers are likely to demand some kind of pay-
ment (e.g. real or virtual currency) for the information they provide. Naturally, those interested
in buying this information, will also require guarantees of its quality.
It is these issues that we deal with in this thesis through the introduction of a series of novel two-
stage mechanisms, based on strictly proper scoring rules. We focus on strictly proper scoring
rules, as they have been used in the past as a method of eliciting truthful reporting of predic-
tions in various forecasting scenarios (most notably in weather forecasting). By using payments
that are based on such scoring rules, our mechanisms effectively address the issue of selﬁsh
behaviour by motivating information providers in a citizen sensor network to, ﬁrst, invest the
resources required by the information buyer in the generation of their observations, and second,
to report them truthfully.
To begin with, we introduce a mechanism that allows the centre (acting as an information buyer)
to select a single agent that can provide a costly observation at a minimum cost. This is the ﬁrst
time a mechanism has been derived for a setting in which the centre has no knowledge of the
actual costs involved in the generation of the agents’ observations. Building on this, we theniii
make two further contributions to the state of the art, with the introduction of two extensions
of this mechanism. First, we extend the mechanism so that it can be applied in a citizen sen-
sor network where the information providers do not have the same resources available for the
generation of their observations. These different capabilities are reﬂected in the quality of the
provided observations. Hence, the centre must select multiple agents by eliciting their costs and
the maximum precisions of their observations and then ask them to produce these observations.
Second, we consider a setting where the information buyer cannot gain any knowledge of the
actual outcome beyond what it receives through the agents’ reports. Now, because the centre is
not able to evaluate the providers’ reported observations through external means, it has to rely
solely on the reports it receives. It does this by fusing the reports together into one observation
which then uses as a means to assess the reports of each of the providers.
For the initial mechanism and each of the two extensions, we prove their economic proper-
ties (i.e. incentive compatibility and individual rationality) and then present empirical results
comparing a number of speciﬁc scoring rules, which includes the quadratic, spherical, logarith-
mic and a parametric family of scoring rules. These results show that although the logarithmic
scoring rule minimises the mean and variance of an agent’s payment, using it may result in
unbounded payments if an agent provides an observation of poor quality. Conversely, the pay-
ments of the parametric family exhibit ﬁnite bounds and are similar to those of the logarithmic
rule for speciﬁc values of the parameter. Thus, we show that the parametric scoring rule is the
best candidate in our setting. We empirically evaluate both extended mechanisms in the same
way, and for the ﬁrst extension, we show that the mechanism describes a family of possible
ways to perform the agent selection, and that there is one that dominates all others. Finally,
we compare both extensions with the peer prediction mechanism introduced by Miller, Resnick
and Zeckhauser (2007) and show that in all three mechanisms the total expected payment is the
same, while for both our mechanisms the variance in the total payment is signiﬁcantly lower.Contents
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Introduction
Advances in technology have made real-time information about the state of the world increas-
ingly available through distributed online systems that are owned by different stakeholders and
can be accessed by multiple users. An emerging application of these systems are citizen sen-
sor networks (Goodchild, 2007; Sheth, 2009), a computing paradigm whereby large numbers of
citizens share observations and information through mobile devices, in real-time, within open
information systems1. Examples of such networks include social networking sites and the bl-
ogoshpere, where people post anything from their everyday routine to signiﬁcant events they
experienced such as ﬁres2, terrorist attacks3 and aeroplane crashes4.
Such networks typically consist of members of the public acting as information providers com-
municating observations which they acquire either directly through ﬁrst hand experience, or
indirectly through the control of portable devices such as mobile phones which have multiple
uses (e.g. GPS navigator and on-line messaging through GPRS). For example, NoiseTube5 is a
project that monitors noise pollution across a city through the assignment of noise observations
to members of the public. These contributors use their mobile phones to measure the noise lev-
els in their surroundings and then communicate their measurement to a central agency which is
responsible for the compilation of these observations into noise pollution maps (Figure 1.1). In
both NoiseTube and the aforementioned applications of citizen sensor networks, the acts of the
information providers are mainly altruistic since their contribution is voluntarily. In this context,
the common characteristics of NoiseTube, the mapping of the Victoria ﬁres and the reports dur-
ing the terrorist attacks in Mumbai and the aeroplane landing in Hudson river, is that ordinary
1ArecentGartnergroupreportpredictedthatby2012physicalsensorswillcreate20percentofnon-videointernet
trafﬁc see http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=876512.
2In the Victoria ﬁres in 2009, people could contribute by pointing ﬁre locations in the Ofﬁcial Google Australia
Blog: http://google-au.blogspot.com/2009/02/mapping-victorian-fires.html.
3GroundReport, an on-line organisation responsible for the coordination of 5000 amateur and profes-
sional reporters claimed that it had coverage of the Mumbai attacks before any of the mainstream media
http://www.groundreport.com/World/Terrorists-attack-Mumbai-target-posh-hotels/2874167.
4‘There’s a plane in the Hudson. I’m on the ferry going to pick up the people. Crazy.’ jkrums on Twitter
http://twitpic.com/135xa.
5http://noisetube.net/
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FIGURE 1.1: Noisemap of a neighbourhood of Paris generated by NoiseTube.
people offer information on extraordinary events, without expecting anything in return, even
if their observations bring revenues to the media networks that use them (for example through
advertising).
Such citizen sensor networks are easy to deploy and offer advantages over traditional means of
gathering information, such as their ability to employ a large and diverse pool of information
providers. Nevertheless, this expansion is likely to bring certain drawbacks. For example, it is
expected that there will be a certain cost attached to the generation of the observation which
reﬂects the effort a citizen puts into its generation. Furthermore, since costs are dependent on
the speciﬁc resources available to each provider they represent private information. In terms
of the noise pollution monitoring application, the cost of the observations is represented by the
time the information providers invest in making their measurements. Contributors who invest a
signiﬁcantamountoftime, producemeasurementswhicharemorerepresentativeofthesituation
around their location, hence more useful to those interested in acquiring it.
In this context, it is the existence of costs that signals a transition to more commercial appli-
cations of citizen sensor networks. Examples of commercial applications of citizen sensor net-
works are rare at present and focus primarily on trafﬁc monitoring services such as trafﬁc.com
and Inrix, and services offering advice such as optimal routes to destinations (e.g. TrafﬁcCast6),
where the companies receive payments for the information they offer. The connection between
6http://trafficcast.com/Chapter 1 Introduction 3
these applications and citizen sensor networks is not straightforward, since the roles for the
citizens and those interested in acquiring their observations appear to have been inverted. In
more detail, in this particular case members of the public do not act as information providers but
instead as information buyers, since they are willing to pay for the estimates they will receive.
The role of the information providers is undertaken by private companies, which face costs when
generating their estimates of trafﬁc routes depending on their computational resources, statisti-
cal methods and infrastructure. Indeed, they may well acquire information from citizens’ mobile
devices, and effectively act as aggregators of information. Therefore, in both existing altruistic
applications such as NoiseTube and commercial citizen sensor networks such as TrafﬁcCast,
having knowledge of the involved costs is a challenge of signiﬁcance importance since it is in
every buyer’s best interest to identify the provider that can provide an observation at a minimum
cost.
Furthermore, costs have an impact on the quality of the observations, since they depend on the
effort and resources invested in generating them. Indeed, contributors may choose to provide
observations of low quality in order to minimise their costs. Therefore, it is important to develop
processes that can evaluate the information provided to those interested in acquiring it (referred
from this point as information buyers) and provide guarantees on its quality. This challenge
becomes more signiﬁcant when information providers have different motives, which may con-
tradict each other and may exhibit selﬁsh behaviour (i.e. by not investing sufﬁcient resources in
the generation of an observation, or by misreporting it). Selﬁsh behaviour is a common problem
in other open information systems, such as email protocol and the world wide web. For exam-
ple, it has been estimated by the National Technology Readiness Survey that in 2004 the cost of
email spam in the US economy alone, was more than $21.9B (Aalberts et al., 2007). In this con-
text, Sir Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the World Wide Web, considers the lack of processes
that can address selﬁsh behaviour within the original email protocol as the main cause behind
spam’s dominance; ‘the people who designed the email system designed it for a world in which
everyone was friendly with each other’ (Berners-Lee, 2008). Likewise, current citizen sensor
networks (both altruistic and commercial applications) do not deal with the issue of selﬁsh be-
haviour, and most of the relevant literature has yet to recognise its existence7. Therefore, when
designing the protocols that will guide the interactions among information providers and buyers
in next generation citizen networks, which will emerge as current systems grow and become
more popular, it is crucial that selﬁsh behaviour is taken into consideration.
Inthisthesis, weconsiderselﬁshbehaviourthatcanmanifestintwoforms. First, theinformation
providers may be inclined to allocate less than the sufﬁcient resources, or even none, during
the process of acquiring the information, especially when there is a certain cost attached to the
generation of the information. More precisely, if a provider has the task of making and reporting
an observation which has certain requirements, it may choose to allocate less than the required
resources for the successful completion of the task, or even none by simply making up a report.
7In Section 2.1 we review current applications of citizen sensor networks and show that selﬁsh behaviour is not
addressed in any of the existing applications.Chapter 1 Introduction 4
Within the noise pollution monitoring example, a sound measurement may have little value to
the information buyer if it is measured from inside a vehicle, since the captured sound will be
unrepresentative of the true state. In this case, the information providers effectively trick the
buyers into believing that they have invested time in their observation, while in reality they have
produced a low quality measurement which is not representative of reality.
The second sign of selﬁsh behaviour for the information providers is opting to deliberately
misreport their observations if they can beneﬁt by doing so. For example, in the trafﬁc feedback
scenario, a company responsible for providing optimal routes to their subscribers may decide
to manipulate them into following a route that has been suggested by other companies even if
it knows that it may be congested. Indeed, it can be assumed that if multiple providers suggest
a particular route to their subscribers that route will become congested, since most drivers will
follow it. Therefore, if a company decides that it is more important to inﬂict losses on other
companies by congesting their routes, it can do so by misreporting their trafﬁc estimates to the
subscribed drivers acting as information buyers in this commercial application of citizen sensor
networks.
In addition to selﬁsh behaviour, information providers will typically have different capabilities,
and thus may only be able to provide information of a limited degree of precision. In terms of
the sound monitoring example, the precision of the observations depends on their overall quality
(i.e. clean sounds without any distortion are considered observations of high quality). In this
context, it is expected that the information providers will have different capabilities as all of
them are not able to invest the same amount of time in their observations, and therefore produce
observations of various precisions. Likewise in a trafﬁc feedback application, the companies act-
ing as information providers have different capabilities which depend on the prediction methods
they employ and the infrastructure (computational power and trafﬁc data) available to them.
A ﬁnal challenge commonly faced in citizen sensor networks is that information providers pro-
vide observations which are imprecise since they operate in environments where uncertainty
is endemic. These environments include the streets of a city, which is the setting for both the
noise monitoring and trafﬁc feedback applications we discuss in this section. Due to the nature
of the observed and reported information the information buyer cannot evaluate the received
observations unless it chooses to invest heavily in infrastructure that will allow her to do so.
For example, in the sound monitoring example, the agency responsible for the compilation of
the noise pollution maps, in addition to the members of the public providing observations, may
choose to refer to static stations with sophisticated microphones that could be used to evaluate
those information providers operating in the surrounding area. In a similar vein, in the traf-
ﬁc feedback application, a driver may choose to subscribe to other services that monitor trafﬁc
through airborne means, and thus eliminate the effects of uncertainty, since they will be able to
have a clear view of the trafﬁc. However, for both cases, these extras come at a certain high cost.
Indeed, one of the main reasons for using citizen sensor networks despite the drawbacks already
outlined, is that they can be cheap, easy to deploy and do not rely on any special infrastructure
besides equipment that can be available to most people in cities (i.e. mobile phones).Chapter 1 Introduction 5
Now, besides uncertainty, those interested in acquiring information need to take into consider-
ation another element of the environment in which the information providers operate: its dy-
namism. In dynamic environments the conditions change constantly as the environment around
the providers evolves. This is the case for both the examples we consider, since a random event
(i.e. a large vehicle passing near a provider’s location while she measures, or a trafﬁc accident)
can affect an observation or an estimate at any time. Due to this dynamism, there will always be
a delay between the event observed by the information provider, its evaluation and what actu-
ally happens. Therefore, the quality and accuracy of the reported observation cannot be veriﬁed
through external means (even if they are available to the information buyer) and those interested
in acquiring it must evaluate it based solely on the resources they ﬁnd within the network such
as the reports of the providers.
To address the above challenges of unknown costs, selﬁsh behaviour, constrained resources
and dynamic environments, we believe that citizen sensor networks should be viewed as multi-
agent systems (MAS) (Lesser et al., 2003). We believe MAS offer a natural framework for
describing such systems since citizens can be considered as self interested and autonomous
entities interacting with each other and making decisions in possibly dynamic environments
where uncertainty is endemic. Given this, in section 1.1 the aims of this research are explained in
more detail. Section 1.2 then goes on to describe the research challenges, outline the techniques
that currently exist for dealing with these challenges and explain how they are going to be
extended so they can lead to the solution which is summarised in the end of the chapter. Finally,
section 1.3 outlines the structure of the rest of the thesis.
1.1 Research Aims
In this research, our aim is to design the fundamental technologies that will govern the inter-
actions among rational and self-interested information providers and buyers in next generation
citizen sensor networks. The next generation citizen sensor networks will gradually replace
current systems as the number of commercial applications and their scale increases. The main
characteristic of the future networks will be the emergence of selﬁsh behaviour among informa-
tion providers and buyers, which will become apparent due to contradicting motives among the
involved parts. In an environment where uncertainty is endemic and resources are constrained,
this selﬁsh behaviour becomes a dominating factor. In more detail, we consider networks, in
which an information buyer (referred as centre) is interested in acquiring information (i.e. noise
monitoring or trafﬁc estimates) whose generation involves a certain cost. Now, as this cost is
private information, known only to each individual provider, it is important to develop a process
that would allow the information buyer to identify the agent that can provide it at a minimum
cost.
Moreover, given that the agents may have contradicting motives, their selﬁsh behaviour needs to
be addressed by ﬁrst incentivising them to allocate costly resources in generating an observationChapter 1 Introduction 6
that is sufﬁciently precise and then by incentivising them to truthfully report it. It is particu-
larly important to do so, in order to guarantee that the information buyer will receive accurate
information at its desired degree of precision and the information suppliers will receive a fair
reward that reﬂects their effort. Failing to do so, will result in the buyer receiving information
of questionable quality which would not be of any use.
In the same context, the effect of agents’ selﬁsh behaviour is increased in an environment where
they face constraints in the means they have at their disposal in order to produce the required
observation. These constraints are reﬂected in the maximum precision of the observations that
the information providers can provide, and therefore the information buyer may need to select
multiple agents and fuse their individual results in order to obtain a more accurate observation
at the precision it requires.
While the data fusion community has long studied the fusion of multiple noisy observations
(see Zhao and Guibas (2004) for an overview), the move to multiple stakeholders introduces
additional challenges. In more detail, fusing incorrect observations would degrade the network’s
overall performance since fusing deliberate erroneous observations would result in an incorrect
ﬁnal observation. This challenge becomes a dominating factor when the information buyer has
no external means of evaluating the observations reported by the agents. In this case it has no
accesstoknowledgeofthestateoftheworldandthereforehastoevaluateanagent’sreportbased
only on the reports of the other agents. This makes citizen sensor networks more vulnerable to
selﬁsh behaviour, since evaluating an agent using an incorrect observation would widen the gap
between the reported observations and the event that materialised, thus resulting in irrelevant
and non-realistic results.
Therefore, against this background, a number of key requirements which form the objectives of
this research become apparent. Speciﬁcally:
Requirement 1 Those interested in acquiring an observation need to elicit the costs of the var-
ious information providing agents, so they can identify those that can produce the estimate at a
minimum cost.
Requirement 2 Agents should be expected to act in their own best interest. Thus they need
to be incentivised to invest effort in the generation of the observation and report it truthfully to
the information buyer.
Requirement 3 Information buyers need to be able to operate in environments whereby the
information suppliers provide observations of limited precisions and hence combine multiple
observations of possibly low quality.
Requirement 4 Information buyers need to be able to operate without knowledge of the state
of the world and therefore develop processes to evaluate the agents based solely on their reports
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In this context, it is clear that the agents’ possible selﬁsh behaviour is interconnected with all
other requirements. Speciﬁcally, due to limited capabilities and lack of knowledge of the out-
come, the consequences of selﬁsh behaviour are magniﬁed, when inaccurate and erroneous ob-
servations are fused with accurate ones. Therefore it is natural to assume a lack of trust on
behalf of the information buyer towards the providers for two reasons. First, the information
buyer cannot be sure about the amount of the resources invested by the providers for the gen-
eration of an observation, since there is always the possibility of a provider investing minimum
resources and then after it is selected to provide that observation, to get paid for it disproportion-
ally. Second, the information buyer cannot be sure whether that reported observation is indeed
truthful, given that providers may misreport if they expect to beneﬁt by doing so. Therefore,
it is important to introduce trust between the information buyer and the providers through the
elimination of selﬁsh behaviour as a result of incentivising the information provider to not only
truthfully report their observations, but also to invest effort and costly resources when producing
them. In general, trust in an agent is an agent’s belief that the other agents will fulﬁl their task
as agreed (Dasgupta, 1988). This deﬁnition ﬁts well in a MAS framework where we expect that
some agents will attempt not to complete their task (i.e. an observation of an event) as a result of
the two aspects of the selﬁsh behaviour analysed earlier in this chapter. Therefore, trust-related
solution concepts are brieﬂy outlined in the next section and it is explained where existing ap-
proaches fail with respect to the above requirements. This, in turn, highlights the areas in which
the contributions of this research will be made.
1.2 Research Contributions
We have identiﬁed four requirements that must be satisﬁed in order to design effective citizen
sensor networks that can handle information providers’ possible selﬁsh behaviour and can face
challenges such as unknown costs, constraints in their available resources and lack of knowl-
edge of the outcome of the observed event. Now, since addressing selﬁsh behaviour involves
balancing this requirement against all others, the requirements cannot be addressed separately.
Therefore, we focus on trust in MAS in order to address selﬁsh behaviour, but we review existing
approaches against all our requirements.
1.2.1 The Introduction of Trust in MAS
Against this background, as noted by Ramchurn et al. (2004), there are two main lines of re-
search in trust within MAS. The ﬁrst is the ‘individual-level trust’ whereby each agent maintains
beliefs about the honesty or reliability of the other agents. Such trust models are often used
when deciding between a number of alternative interaction partners. For such models to work,
the agents must have access to a history of earlier interactions in order to make these decisions.
This history could be their own direct experiences or information gathered by other sources. In
either case, based on this information, an agent will decide whether it will or will not select aChapter 1 Introduction 8
particular agent to produce the required estimate of forecast. Both these processes introduce a
computational burden which results in additional complexity since now referring to the history
of interactions is part of the decision process.
Furthermore, in some of these computational trust models, agents require multiple encounters
with others in order to devise a strategy. However, this is inapplicable in the setting we consider,
where an agent may not have the available resources to evaluate its encounters with other agents.
This issue is magniﬁed when citizen sensor networks operate in dynamic environments with
constrained resources, since more resources are required to keep up with the constant change of
the observed parameters so the agents can calculate their actions fast enough in order cope with
their evolving surroundings.
Since several key requirements identiﬁed in section 1.1 are not met by this class of models,
we move to ‘system-level trust’ as identiﬁed by Ramchurn et al. (2004). In this approach, par-
ticipating agents are given incentives to be trustworthy by the rules of interactions governing
the system. In more detail, in most cases, system-level trust is based on specifying the pro-
tocols regulating the interactions among agents, as opposed to the agent speciﬁc approach of
individual-level trust. Given this, the use of mechanism design (MD) (Mas-Colell et al., 1995),
which is the branch of game theory concerned with the design of a set of rules of interactions
among agents in order to enforce desirable system-wide properties, is particularly appealing.
Speciﬁcally, MD is useful in this case because, as opposed to individual-level trust models, the
effects of an agent’s actions on another can be modelled without concerns about each single
agent.
In more detail, a common class of mechanisms are those based on auctions, such as VCG mech-
anisms (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973) and English and Dutch auctions (Krishna,
2002). Specially VCG mechanisms have a central role in mechanism design since they motivate
truthful reporting on behalf of the agents through carefully selected payments and they have
been widely used in resource or task allocation scenarios (see Section 2.4.2 for more details).
However, they have also several negative aspects and cannot be directly applied in the cases we
consider. In particular, they are not applicable in cases where an agent holds information which,
if known to another, will affect its valuation (i.e. there is interdependent information). Now,
this is often seen in citizen sensor networks, particularly in cases where agents have no precise
knowledge about the state of the environment in which they operate. For example, in a noise
pollution monitoring example, some of the participating members of the public are expected to
be located within short distance from each other. The fact that multiple providers can generate
an observation of the same event simultaneously without speciﬁc infrastructure is one of the
main reasons that citizen sensor networks are preferred for these tasks over conventional sen-
sor networks. However, since the observations are of the same event but from multiple angles,
they will be dependent on each other and an information provider may be inclined to change its
observation so it is similar to the observation of another agent if it expects to beneﬁt by doing
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This particular issue is being addressed to some extent by several mechanisms (Mezzetti, 2004,
2007; Ramchurn et al., 2009) that are closer to our aims. However, these mechanisms, either
ignore the costs in the generation of an observation, or assume that agents will invest the max-
imum resources available to them for the completion of their task. In addition, all the above
approaches assume that the information buyer will be able to determine whether an agent has
successfully fulﬁlled its contract or not.
The latter assumption regarding agents’ access to knowledge about the state of the world, is also
found in mechanisms where payments are calculated with the use of scoring rules (Hendrickson
and Buehler, 1971). Scoring rules incentivise an agent to truthfully reveal a probabilistic esti-
mate of some future event. For example, in meteorology an agent that makes accurate sea-level
pressure forecasts (Gneiting and Raftery, 2004) will get a higher score than an agent that did
not. So far scoring rules have primarily been used in weather forecasting as a tool of eliciting
truthful reports. In particular, a very popular scenario is that of rain prediction discussed in de-
tail by Hendrickson and Buehler (1971) . In this case, a number of agents are asked to predict
whether it is going to rain the next day and each agent is assigned a score depending on whether
the event they predicted and reported materialised or not. Using this score as the basis of a
payment in a mechanism, the agent is motivated to be truthful since the payment will be larger
if his prediction is close to the truth. Such a scheme should therefore encourage rational self
interested agents to be truthful in their reports if they want to maximise their proﬁt.
While the above standard approaches based on scoring rules have several of the features we
desire, it is assumed that all participating agents have access to information relevant to the state
of the world. To overcome this, more recent work, for example (Miller, Resnick and Zeckhauser
(2007); Jurca and Faltings (2005b) and Zohar and Rosenschein (2008)), estimate the true in-
formation from the existing reported observations. In so doing, however, they introduce less
robust and generic solutions since they are based on a number of additional assumptions such
as common priers among all agents, common knowledge of each agent’s measured precision or
knowledge of the distribution of the cost involved in the generation of the estimates (see Section
2.4.3 for more details).
1.2.2 Contributions
Against this background, we use the above general line of work and speciﬁcally Miller et al.’s
(2007), as a point of departure in order to deal with self-interested agents making imprecise
observations in a dynamic environment. In so doing, we contribute to the state of the art and
address gradually all four requirements by developing three novel two-stage mechanisms.
1.2.2.1 Dealing with Unknown Costs
The ﬁrst group of contributions in this thesis addresses requirements 1 and 2 by introducing the
ﬁrst mechanism that elicits both effort and truthful reporting of a single agent’s observation, inChapter 1 Introduction 10
a setting where the centre has no information about the agents’ costs involved in the generation
of that observation. In more detail:
• We describe a novel two-stage mechanism in which a centre uses a reverse second price
auction in the ﬁrst stage to elicit the true costs of the agents, and hence identify the agent
that can provide an observation with a speciﬁed precision at the lowest cost. An appropri-
ately scaled strictly proper scoring rule is then used in the second stage of the mechanism
to incentivise this agent to generate and truthfully report its observation.
• We formally prove that this mechanism is incentive compatible in both costs and obser-
vations revealed, and that it is individually rational. That is, agents will truthfully report
both costs and observations to the centre, and willingly participate within the mechanism.
• We are the ﬁrst to empirically evaluate a parametric family of strictly proper scoring rules
by comparing them to the standard quadratic, spherical and logarithmic scoring rules.
We show that for certain values of the parameter, the resulting payment is similar to the
logarithmic (optimal scoring rule) but also has ﬁnite lower bounds (as opposed to the
logarithmic rule, which is potentially unbounded). Hence, the parametric scoring rule is
the most appropriate choice for an information buyer who wants to minimise the payments
it issues, while maintaining ﬁnite bounds.
Chapter 3 concentrates on this topic and the following work resulted in the following publica-
tion:
A. Papakonstantinou, A. Rogers, E. H. Gerding, N. R. Jennings (2008) A Truthful
Two-Stage Mechanism for Eliciting Probabilistic Estimates with Unknown Costs,
In Proceedings of the 18th European Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (ECAI
2008), pages 448-452, Patras, Greece.
1.2.2.2 Dealing with Multiple Agents
In extending our initial mechanism we additionally address requirement 3 by presenting the ﬁrst
class of mechanisms that elicits private observations from multiple agents in a setting where the
centre has to combine several observations of possibly low precision due to agents’ restrictions
in the quality of the observations they provide. In more detail:
• We present a novel two-stage mechanism in which a centre in the ﬁrst stage asks the
agents to report their costs and uses these costs to pre-select M agents. In the second stage
the centre sequentially asks the M pre-selected agents to report their maximum precisions
until it achieves its required precision (or it has run out of agents, in which case the
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selected through that process are asked to generate an observation of precision equal to
their reported maximum precision, and then are paid for it using an appropriately scaled
strictly proper scoring rule.
• We prove that our mechanism is incentive compatible in costs, maximum precisions and
observations revealed, and that it is individually rational. Furthermore, we show that the
agents maximise their expected utilities by generating observations of precision equal to
their reported maximum precisions.
• We introduce a family of processes by which the centre may pre-select the M from N
agents. Within this family, the centre divides the agents into groups of n ≤ N agents, asks
themtorevealtheircosts, andthenselectsthemcheapestagents. The(m+1)th costisthen
used within the subsequent scoring rule payment. We empirically evaluate this family for
various values of the parameters n and m, and we calculate the total expected payment
made by the centre, and the probability that it actually achieves its required precision,
P(θ0). We show both empirically and analytically that if the centre forms a single group
of agents such that n = N and m = M, it minimises its expected total payment.
This work is discussed in Chapter 4 and has produced the following publication:
A. Papakonstantinou, A. Rogers, E. H. Gerding, N. R. Jennings (2009) Mechanism
Design for Eliciting Probabilistic Estimates from Multiple Suppliers with Unknown
Costs and Limited Precision, Proceedings of the Eleventh Workshop in Agent Me-
diated Electronic Commerce (AMEC 2009), pages 111-124, Budapest, Hungary.
1.2.2.3 Dealing with the Centre’s Lack of Access to Knowledge of the Outcome
Finally, in extending the above mechanism we address requirement 4 and introduce a novel
mechanism in which the centre does not rely on knowledge of the realised outcome when cal-
culating payments to the agents reporting their observations. Furthermore, we modify strictly
proper scoring rules accordingly so they can motivate agents to truthfully report their observa-
tions, under the knowledge that they will be evaluated based on the other agents’ reports. In
more detail:
• We present a novel two-stage mechanism that is similar to that above in which a centre
in the ﬁrst stage pre-selects M agents from the available N agents by eliciting their costs.
However, in the second stage, after it randomly selects the agents it needs to achieve its
required precision, it uses a modiﬁed scoring rule to calculate the payment to each agent
using the fused estimates of all the other selected agents.
• We prove that in our mechanism truthful reporting of costs is a dominant strategy, while
truthful reporting of observations and maximum precisions is a Nash equilibrium. Finally
we show that the mechanism is individually rational.Chapter 1 Introduction 12
• We compare both this mechanism with the previous one and the peer prediction mech-
anism introduced by Miller, Resnick and Zeckhauser (2007) and show that the agents
derive the same payment in all three mechanisms, hence the centre derives no additional
penalty as a result of the lack of knowledge. However, we show that our approach yields
signiﬁcantly smaller variance in the total payments than the peer prediction in this case,
and therefore it has more reliable and robust payments.
This work is discussed in Chapter 5 and has produced the following publication:
A. Papakonstantinou, A. Rogers, E. H. Gerding, N. R. Jennings (2009) Mechanism
Design for the Truthful Elicitation of Costly Probabilistic Estimates in Citizen Sen-
sor Networks, Submitted in Artiﬁcial Intelligence, review pending
1.3 Thesis Structure
The remainder of this thesis progresses as follows:
• In Chapter 2 relevant literature is discussed and analysed. We discuss citizen sensor net-
works related literature against our requirements set in this chapter and introduce and
detail two applications of citizen sensor networks central to this thesis. We then review
against the same requirements relevant research on trust by initially focusing on agent-
level trust. After analysing various trust models and identifying their positive and negative
aspects, we review the system-level trust models. We focus in particularly on Mechanism
Design Trust and mainly on the class of second price auction based mechanisms due to
its truth elicitation property. During that process, key deﬁnitions from mechanism design
are introduced. An introduction to scoring rules and the review of existing mechanisms
based on them follows and concludes the chapter.
• In Chapter 3, we describe and analyse the single agent two-stage mechanism with un-
known costs. After a detailed description of our model, we introduce the mechanism and
provide proofs of its economic properties. Finally, we present empirical results, where we
compare the parametric scoring rule with the quadratic, spherical and logarithmic.
• In Chapter 4, we extend our mechanism, and present a class of mechanisms where mul-
tiple agents can provide estimates of limited precisions. We empirically compare several
approaches to perform the pre-selection, hence the class of mechanisms, and identify one
that minimises the centre’s expected total payment.
• In Chapter 5, we further extend our mechanism so the centre does not have to rely on
knowledge of the actual outcome when calculating payments. We introduce a new set
of strictly proper scoring rules, prove the economic properties of a mechanisms based on
them, and empirically evaluate that mechanism.Chapter 1 Introduction 13
• In Chapter 6, the conclusions and future directions of the research are presented.Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter we examine how trust is addressed initially in citizen sensor network and then in
multi-agent systems in general. In particular, we ﬁrst deﬁne citizen sensor networks and then
proceed to discuss their applications and how they currently deal with the requirements that
were identiﬁed in Section 1.1. In so doing, we identify the issues associated with trust as one
of the key areas that requires further work. Given this, we then analyse the literature related to
trust in MAS against the requirements we have set for this research. In this context, in Section
2.2 we review computational trust models and specify the main areas of research in that ﬁeld. In
Section 2.3 we adopt a more systematic approach to trust in MAS and review several reputation
models that motivate participating agents to provide true feedback about the services they have
experienced though a carefully selected set of global rules. We then consider the notion of trust
within the mechanism design literature (section 2.4) and focus on auction and strictly proper
scoring rule based truth elicitation mechanisms, as they provide the main point of departure
for this Thesis. Finally, we conclude in section 2.5 and discuss which aspects of the existing
research are going to be used in this work and how they need to be extended in order to ﬁt the
requirements identiﬁed in chapter 1.
2.1 Citizen Sensor Networks
As discussed in Chapter 1, advancements in science and technology have led to an unprece-
dented rise in communications and, as a consequence, to the emergence of citizen sensor net-
works, in which members of the public can share their observations over a vast network of
personal computers, mobile phones, game consoles and home entertainment devices. In such
networks, citizens typically act simultaneously both as information gatherers and processors
as they collectively observe, report and analyse information regarding a vast range of activities
from every-day trivial tasks (such as commuting and shopping) to world changing events that af-
fect thousands of people (such as natural disasters and terrorist attacks), or instead communicate
observations that can be used for commercial (such as weather forecasting services and trafﬁc
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monitoring) or scientiﬁc purposes (such as astronomic and geographic observations or noise
pollution monitoring). To this end, in Section 2.1.1 we discuss applications of citizen sensor
networks related to observations of ongoing events, while in Section 2.1.2 we discuss applica-
tions related to scientiﬁc observations. Furthermore, in Section 2.1.3 we thoroughly describe
two speciﬁc applications of citizen sensor networks, and ﬁnally in Section 2.1.4, we discuss
how selﬁsh behaviour is addressed in citizen sensor networks related literature.
2.1.1 Citizen Journalism
The increased participation of citizens in the process of gathering information has led to the
appearance of a new, more direct, type of journalism, which describes events as they unfold and
as they are experienced by ordinary people and not specialised journalists. Bowman and Willis
(2003) deﬁne this type of journalism as ‘participatory journalism’ and use it to describe the act
of a citizen who takes part in the process of gathering, communicating and ﬁltering news, in or-
der to provide reliable and accurate news from multiple angles. Now, examples of participatory
journalism include community powered news websites (Wikinews and Newsvine), social net-
working websites such as Facebook and Twitter and web portals belonging to mainstream media
corporations such as BBC and CNN, where members of the public report their experiences.
In participatory or ‘citizen’ journalism, as opposed to traditional sensor networks, people are
responsible for gathering and ﬁltering the observed information. This is a signiﬁcant improve-
ment, since, even if human operators gather information through devices such as mobile phones
and videocameras, we are still better at reacting to what we observe, due to our ability to identify
what is interesting and put it into context. In addition to that, through citizen sensor networks it
is possible for an event to be covered from multiple angles as many citizens may contribute to
its coverage (e.g multiple reports in Flickr and Twitter of the Mumbai terrorist attacks). Subse-
quently, this satisﬁes the research requirement regarding the combination of multiple observa-
tions, since through that process the accuracy of the observation (in citizens journalism a report
about an event) can be increased.
However, citizen journalism faces a number of drawbacks, which are closely connected with the
reliance on humans as information suppliers and processors. Indeed, according to Sheth (2009),
off-topic comments and disambiguity as a result of poor grammar and syntax sensitive to de-
mographic characteristics such as nationality, race, religion and gender, are a common source
of incomprehensible observations. Now, although these issues do not affect directly any of our
research requirements, they do compromise the robustness of the citizen networks. Indeed, com-
bining ambiguous observations with more accurate ones will decrease the overall performance
of such a network, since the produced observation will not be an accurate representation of re-
ality. Therefore, it is crucial to review literature that addresses this drawback by developing
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2.1.2 Citizen Science
Sheth et al. (2008) discus citizen sensor networks in which the gathering of the observations
is performed from machine sensors being controlled by humans and not directly from humans
as in typical citizen journalism networks. In so doing, they primarily address the issue of dis-
ambiguation as the observations can now be represented numerically and hence are impervious
to poor grammar and syntax. Secondarily, they highlight the importance of machine sensors in
cases where data cannot be collected otherwise; due to hazardous environment or extreme con-
ditions such as ﬂoods (Zhou and De Roure, 2006), glaciers (Martinez et al., 2004) or volcanoes
(Werner-Allen et al., 2005). However, they identify the issue of lack of integration and com-
munication among various sensor networks that often measure similar parameters in the same
or neighbouring systems, that may occur in such systems. This, in turn, leads to the problem
of isolation and neglect of important data which Sheth et al. (2008) deﬁne as the problem of
‘too much data and not enough knowledge’. They address this problem though the introduction
of a ‘semantic sensor web’ whereby sensor data is digitally enriched with semantic metadata in
order to make sensor data from a particular network easier to interpretate and allow it to be com-
bined with data from other sensor networks. These methods can be applied even in cases where
sensor data from a particular network follows a distribution, but it is not consistent with the
distributions of sensor data in other networks. As a consequence, these signiﬁcant contributions
result in citizen sensor networks in which data is consistent and therefore make it possible to
combine multiple sources of information (Requirement 3). However, all these techniques create
an additional overhead by introducing an extra layer of complexity through the manipulation
of the existing data. This could make it impossible to deploy such citizen networks in dynamic
environments where a sensor may not be able to both adapt in the constantly evolving conditions
and process incoming data, thus contradicting requirement 4 of our research regarding dynamic
environments of endemic uncertainty.
This issue is addressed in another application of citizen sensor networks. Goodchild (2007) refer
to ‘citizen science’ to describe groups (networks) of enthusiastic amateurs who enjoy taking part
in scientiﬁc activities such as astronomy or noise pollution monitoring, in their free time. In such
cases the issue of observations being of poor quality that bedevils citizen journalism applications
appearstohavebeensolvedthroughtheestablishmentandenforcementofuniﬁedstandards(e.g.
the use of standardised metrics to deﬁne distances among planets and probability distributions
to measure physical parameters). Moreover, this is also ameliorated by the restricted nature
of these communities which require if not a high level of skill, certainly a strong commitment
before joining them. That is, it is more difﬁcult for an individual to join an amateur science
society, than it is to blog about a random experience.
In this context, Goodchild et al. (2007) focus on collecting and sharing geographic informa-
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(GOS8), which provides access to geographic information services through directories that con-
tain metadata harvested by an automated process from speciﬁc registered websites. Like all
previous work, they also identify the need for interoperability among different sources of geo-
graphic information for each system they discuss. In a similar approach to this issue with the
already reviewed literature, they propose the association of current data with extra information
(metadata), or the conversion of all available data to more consistent forms that can be shared
among various sources. However, as opposed to the literature reviewed so far, Goodchild et al.
are the ﬁrst to identify the costs attached to this process. Speciﬁcally, they acknowledge that the
system designers may be inclined to limit their platform to a single source of information if the
cost is passed to them, while if the costs are passed to the end users they may be discouraged
from contributing their information. In both cases the result will be the same, the potential user
base of such networks will be reduced to a minimum size. That does not contradict directly any
of the research requirements we have set in Chapter 1, but it will reduce the effectiveness of a
citizen sensor networks, as less sources of information may result to observations of low qual-
ity, given that it will not be possible to increase accuracy through the combination of multiple
observation.
Against this background, we have given several applications of of citizen sensor networks both
from citizen journalism and citizen science9. In this research, we will combine elements of both.
That is, we intend to use an open large scale application where everybody is free to participate
with no restrictions of citizen journalism networks, but, with observations of a standardised and
uniformal format which can be modelled as probability distributions. In this context, in the fol-
lowing section we present and analyse two applications of citizen sensor networks. Through this
analysis we intend to demonstrate which of the properties we seek in citizen sensor networks,
as described in the Introduction, are met by the current state of the art applications of citizen
sensor networks. Furthermore, these two applications will form the basis of the running exam-
ples which will be used throughout the rest of the thesis. Through these two examples we intend
to establish how our contributions signal the move towards the next generation citizen sensor
networks.
2.1.3 Applications of Citizen Sensor Networks
The ﬁrst application considers a network responsible for the monitoring of noise pollution in
urban areas. Under European Union regulations, each member state is responsible for the moni-
toring of sound levels in busy city areas such as airports, train and coach stations and motorways,
in order to identify and document the sources of noise pollution and therefore improve the living
8http://gos2.geodata.gov/wps/portal/gos
9Further related literature to citizen sensor networks and in particularly to those related to geography, can be
found in Maguire and Longley (2005), where there is a review of a number of web-portals that specialise on content
and services related to geographic observations (‘geoportals’), and several government initiatives that provide the
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standards of European citizens by reducing noise in those busy areas. Their efforts are concen-
trated in the project NOISE10 which is responsible for accumulating and managing data from
the member states.
However, in the above project there are many restrictions. Most notably, the datasets are re-
stricted to speciﬁc areas such as airports and coach stations which although suitable for some
EU cities, are not suitable for others (i.e. Athens Airport is in a secluded area with no settlements
around it, while Heraklion Airport is situated within a dense residential area). Therefore, the ac-
cumulated data is not accurate or representative of a city’s true noise levels. Furthermore, data
often is found to be outdated as the measurements are sporadic and not very frequent. Finally,
budget constraints and other bureaucratic reasons occasionally halt the project.
TheseissuesappeartobeaddressedbyaresearcheffortwhichintroducedNoiseTube. Noisetube
monitors noise throughout a city and not just in speciﬁc places. Noisetube gives an insight to
citizen sensor networks of the future, as members of the public can easily download and install
an application in their smartphones which uses the devices’ microphones to record sounds and
combine their GPS capabilities and internet access to apply a speciﬁc tag which ties the signal to
a location through Google Maps. In this network none of the disambiguity or lack of integration
issues, discussed above, are faced since the observations have a consistent format (sound decibel
and a GPS tag). However it is based on the participation of a closed group of volunteers who
are not concerned by the time involved in making a recording and communicating it. It is easy
to see though, that if more people are to be involved, and thus utilise the true strength of citizen
sensor networks, a payment as a way of covering the potential contributors’ costs in time, could
incentivise more to participate.
The second application involves monitoring of trafﬁc conditions in cities. In particular Hous-
ton, Texas has deployed on top of trafﬁc signs and under bridges, devices which collect real
time information about trafﬁc (denoted as receivers). The relevant trafﬁc data is transmitted by
transponders which belong to drivers subscribed in an automatic toll collection system using
electronic tags. However, this system11 has very limited functionality. It is restricted to spe-
ciﬁc motorways as the receivers have ﬁxed position. Furthermore, the receivers are visible and
therefore vulnerable to trafﬁc accidents or vandalism. Finally, only a selected group of drivers
(those who commute through the speciﬁc tolled road) are equipped with the transponders, so the
system cannot create an accurate and realistic representation of the trafﬁc conditions throughout
the city. Therefore, it is not possible to produce estimates of trafﬁc and suggestions of optimal
routes.
The latter issue, has been addressed by the commercial application TrafﬁcCast12. TrafﬁcCast
demonstrates how a commercial citizen sensor network could operate in the near future by col-
lecting and combining various sources of information, from ﬁxed sensors, to GPS smartphones
and bluetooth transmitters. Although this application satisﬁes our requirement regarding the
10Noise Observation and Information Service for Europe http://noise.eionet.europa.eu/
11HoustonTranStarAVITrafﬁcMonitoringSystem: http://traffic.houstontranstar.org/aviinfo/avi-tech.html
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combination of multiple sources of observations, it does not satisfy our requirement regarding
selﬁsh behaviour. In more detail, to the best of our knowledge TrafﬁcCast, and other similar ser-
vices such as trafﬁc.com and Inrix, are not in a position to provide robust and simple methods
to guarantee the quality of the services they provide. Instead, they rely on statistical models and
heuristics13, which even if they are effective in particular cases, they cannot provide any guar-
antees of their overall effectiveness. Therefore, it is impossible for a subscribed driver, acting as
the information buyer, to establish the difference between a misreporting information provider
and a provider who produces a poor observation as a result of physical obstacles or limited re-
sources. As a result of this, they are vulnerable to selﬁsh behaviour on behalf of the providers,
since they cannot identify whether an information provider has invested its maximum resources
in the generation of that estimate or not. This is particular important in a commercial citizen sen-
sor network, as failing to provide a service accessed through subscription will probably result in
ﬁnancial losses.
2.1.4 Discussion
In summing up, in this section we have reviewed existing literature regarding aspects of citizen
sensor networks (citizen journalism, citizen science and geographical information databases)
and have introduced and detailed two speciﬁc applications (noise and trafﬁc monitoring). Now,
although these approaches address the need for multiple sources of information and, in some
cases, the existence of costs in the process of making this information accessible by multiple
platforms, it does not consider the issue of selﬁsh behaviour. In more detail, current applications
of citizen sensor networks fail to cope with information providers who may choose to deliber-
ately misreport their observations, or to not allocate sufﬁcient resources in the generation of that
information if they expect to gain beneﬁts from it. As commercial applications of citizen sensor
networks are still in embryonic stages, the implications of not addressing selﬁsh behaviour are
not visible and they appear not to be seriously affecting existing networks which are primarily
based on the participants’ enthusiasm and self imposed discipline. However, as commercial
citizen sensor networks ﬁnd increasingly more applications, and the number of the information
providers increases, the emergence of selﬁsh behaviour will severely degrade the efﬁciency and
performance of such networks, since erroneous observations will be of minimal practical use
anybody interested in acquiring them.
Given these consequences of selﬁsh behaviour, it has become apparent that it is of great impor-
tance to address both aspects of selﬁsh behaviour when designing the protocols that will guide
the interactions among information buyers and providers in the next generation citizen sensor
networks. Therefore, and after having identiﬁed the links between selﬁsh behaviour and the ab-
sence of trust in Chapter 1, in the following section we proceed to explore the main approaches
to trust in multi-agent
13In Section 2.2 in this chapter we provide several statistical approaches and identify their drawbacks with respect
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2.2 Individual-Level Trust Models
From this section we start our discussion regarding trust in MAS. Speciﬁcally, we review and
discuss individual-level trust models. In these models, an agent has two alternatives when at-
tempting to choose which agent it should trust from a pool of available agents. First, it has the
option of directly interacting with the other agents in order to learn their behaviour after several
encounters. Second, it can indirectly interact with other agents by referring their opinions, and
based on third-party information, make a decision. In the ﬁrst case the agent decides whether
to trust an agent or not after it learns through its interactions, while in the second case an agent
relies on external reputation sources. In addition to that, recently, elements of both approaches
have been combined in order to introduce more theoretical foundations based on a probability
theory framework. As a result, individual or agent-level trust models can be classiﬁed into learn-
ing and reputation models, based on an agent’s intention to interact directly or indirectly with
other agents and their combination, the probabilistic trust models.
2.2.1 Learning Models
In learning models, trust is considered to be a property that comes from direct interactions
among agents. In this case, trust is achieved on the basis that if an agent systematically chooses
to defect by not completing an agreed task (such as producing a probabilistic estimate), other
agents learn to avoid it. Therefore, an agent tempted to defect in a single interaction (e.g. cheat
and not pay the agreed sum in an on-line transaction), should reconsider in order to avoid the
loss of proﬁt that will come if the other agents stop referring to it.
In this context, Wu and Sun (2001) have developed a model in which trust emerges among
agents using reinforcement learning if they are left to adapt in the environment. In such learning
problems, agents choose their next state so they can maximise the feedback they receive after
each action. In particular, Wu and Sun showed that the evolution of strategies helps good agents
who want to cooperate to eventually isolate the malicious agents that do not have any intention to
do so. However, this takes time and there might be a short term loss of proﬁt when cooperating
with third parties. Some of these issues were dealt by Sen and Sajja (2002) who showed that
collaborating liars have more to gain after a few iterations in environments with large numbers
of philanthropic agents. Furthermore, Mui et al. (2002) extend the previous work by designing a
probabilistic model that identiﬁes the number of interactions needed for achieving trust. Another
approach is followed by Mukherjee et al. (2001), who allow their agents to reveal their strategies
to their opponents in advance, and therefore possibly develop mutual trust in fewer interactions.
Now, although learning models satisfy some of the research requirements we set out in Chapter
1, since they deal with selﬁsh behaviour, they fail to satisfy other requirements. In particular,
the reviewed learning models promote trust among agents, and hence satisfy the requirement
regarding selﬁsh behaviour, by identifying which agents will be completing an agreed task and
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to evaluate a large number of available actions and interactions in order to adapt their strategies,
something that is not possible for citizen networks since they operate in constantly changing
environments. In such environments, due to their dynamism, agents do not necessarily have the
opportunity of using learning in order to discover a trustworthy source. Indeed, in a dynamic
setting an agent does not have the option of reﬁning its strategy through multiple encounters,
since the initial conditions may change after each interaction. Besides that, in cases where
agents do not have the opportunity to verify if an encounter was successful or not (like those
we consider), they must take into consideration, and therefore evaluate, all possible outcomes.
Doing so, will add an overhead and will make such models less able to adapt to real time events.
2.2.2 Reputation Models
In order to address problems like those mentioned above, we consider reputation systems as
another way of achieving trustworthy behaviour when there are few encounters among agents or
there is a lack of prior information about an agent’s incentives. In such cases, an agent does not
refer to its own direct history of interactions with a particular agent, typically because it is im-
possible due to lack of previous interactions or perhaps because it is too computationally intense
due to a very large number of agents. Although this is particularly prevalent in on-line markets
and services, where someone must choose a product without relying on any prior information or
experience, it can be also seen in citizen sensor networks where often it is impossible to iden-
tify the most accurate information provider based on previous reported observations. In such
cases, reputation models attempt to provide a solution to this problem by providing third-party
information, to which agents may refer during their decision making process.
Now, one speciﬁc line of research in reputation models is based on the idea of social networks.
Suchmodelsdrawananalogybetweenthearrangementofagentsinnetworksandthatofhumans
in societies. In these networks, each agent is able to validate the result of each interaction and
act as a reputation source by sharing these results with their neighbours. In this vein, Singh et al.
(2001) introduce the use of ‘referrals’ to devise a distributed reputation model. In an agent-based
referral network, agents can either give referrals to each other or follow referrals given to them
by others. Nevertheless, as this approach requires knowledge about the result of the interaction
after it is ﬁnished, it contradicts the requirement, regarding the uncertainty in the environment,
which we have explicitly discussed in section 1.1. In particular, requiring precise information
about the state of the world after an interaction is complete is often not feasible in citizen sensor
networks, as the information buyer may not be able to have access to that information in order to
evaluate the providers. For example, in a trafﬁc or a noise monitoring scenario, the information
buyer has no other means of acquiring the information it requires, and that is the reason it has to
rely solely on the citizens’ sensors.
Another line of research, within reputation trust, is based on aggregating ratings about an agent’s
or a service’s performance. However, this generates problems which have to do with misreport-
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provide incorrect ratings or not provide any ratings at all as a way of inﬂicting losses or adding
pressure (i.e. extract forcefully good feedback) to other agents. This is a common practise on
eBay for example, where ratings are values of +1 or -1 summed up to give an overall proﬁle. To
this end, eBay’s reputation system can be exploited when people do not report their bad experi-
ences, since the absence of ratings cannot be regarded as a good or bad overall rating and thus
it cannot be used in the decision process. Yu and Singh (2002) deal with this by considering
the lack of belief as a state of uncertainty where all beliefs have an equal probability of being
true. All possible states of an agent’s reputation can be combined and mapped into two states
(trustworthy or not). However, their approach relies on a large number of agents in order to cope
with those who discredit others so that they can gain beneﬁt by appearing more reliable, and
does not consider the aspect of selﬁsh behaviour related to lack of effort.
2.2.3 Probabilistic Trust Models
A common characteristic of the so far reviewed learning and reputation based trust models
is that they do not have sound foundations in statistics or probability theory. Although this
is not necessarily a negative aspect, it can be claimed that these models are restricted to the
speciﬁc cases they consider. In a more general approach, Josang and Ismail (2002) propose
a probabilistic centralised computational trust model in which the users of an on-line system
rate the performance of the other members of an on-line community. They propose the use of
beta probability density functions to combine users’ feedback which again takes two values (i.e.
positive and negative) and provide reputation ratings. However, this model does not take into
consideration misleading feedback from users. This algorithm is extended by eliminating the
unfair ratings by identifying the statistical pattern of the users’ ratings, based on their previous
feedback (Whitby et al., 2004). In so doing, Whitby et al. introduce elements from learning
trust models, but still do not cope with cases where there are no previous interactions, or a user
is systematically unfair. Therefore, it is clear that these models do not address effectively the
issue of selﬁsh behaviour.
This trend of combining elements from both learning and reputation models is continued by
Yuan and Sung (2004) who propose a model that is appropriate for dynamic environments such
as virtual and real markets and can take into account both public reputation available to all
agents and private interaction history common in the learning trust models mentioned above.
Thus allowing potential trading partners to be evaluated before the interaction. Then, and based
on real experiences, the initial opinion can be modiﬁed or not. However, they contradict the
requirements we set in Chapter 1 regarding costs and selﬁsh behaviour, as they assume that
there are no costs involved in the generation of the participating agents’ ratings of the traded
service or object and consequently assume that all agents will invest the maximum resources in
the generation of their observations.
This appears to be a common problem in all the individual-trust models we have considered so
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more detail, in TRAVOS, agents base their decisions on their previous experiences with the other
agents, as well as on third-party experience with the trusters having a binary approach about a
trustee’s decision. That is, a truster makes the assumption that a trustee can only cooperate or
defect, andthereforecompletetheassignedtaskornot. Thesamebinaryapproachisfollowedby
Wang and Singh (2007) who try to estimate a reputation rating when there is a lack of previous
positive or negative feedbacks. This model also takes into consideration existing feedback when
it is available in order to produce more accurate ratings when it is possible. Still it is restricted to
the binary space and therefore may not be applicable in citizen sensor networks where often the
observations have the form of continuous distributions. This particular shortcoming is addressed
by Teacy (2006) and their extended TRAVOS-C model. In this, trustees have continuous action
spaces, for example, the delivery time of a service or a metric about the quality of a product.
Furthermore, there is an improvement in the assessment of the accuracy of the reputation sources
by combining different sources and ignoring deliberately misleading reports. However, trusters
can deliberately ‘over-trust’ a trustee if they have a large number of observations available and
therefore the requirement of selﬁsh behaviour is not fully satisﬁed, since the opinion of an agent
is dependant on the quantity of the observations and not necessarily on their quality.
More recently, Jones et al. (2009) proposed a framework to address this issue by combining mul-
tiple trust models and not just one as commonly seen in the relevant literature. Furthermore, they
propose the use of ‘trust communities’ whereby groups of agents can combine their observations
and provide collective information of increased quality. Although this is directly relevant to our
requirement regarding the fusion of multiple observations of possibly low quality, this work
does not satisfy other requirements and speciﬁcally the one regarding the application of citizen
sensor networks in dynamic environments, since a protocol that would have to use multiple trust
models would not be able to monitor the constantly changing parameters in a dynamic system
such as the streets of a city.
In total, these probabilistic trust models can be viewed as a signiﬁcant improvement, given that
they don not rely on the evaluation of a large number of actions in order to identify if an agent
should be trusted or not, and hence are more robust than the learning models. Nevertheless,
like all the reputation models we reviewed in this section, in relying on precise information or
knowledge about the state of the world after the interaction is ﬁnished, they contradict our key
requirement of outcome uncertainty.
In this context, there are advanced probabilistic trust models such as TRAVOS-C (Teacy, 2006)
and IHRTM (Rettinger et al., 2008) that do not rely on this assumption as they use statistical
methodstoapproximatethestateoftheworldaftertheinteractionisﬁnished. However, although
they acknowledge the existence of costs in the communication of the observation, they do not
consider the costs involved in the generation of that observation. By doing so, they assume
that agents will be willing to invest their maximum resources in giving their feedback regarding
their experiences, which contradicts one element of selﬁsh behaviour. Furthermore, they assume
that agents would always be able to report their observations, which is something that does not
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this is impossible due to physical obstacles or random events, or even, given their rational and
self-interested nature, by choice in order to save resources such as bandwidth or power.
2.3 System-Level Trust Models
From the analysis of all aspects of individual-level trust models, it is clear that they do not
cover some of our key requirements identiﬁed in the introduction (section 1.1). Speciﬁcally,
although they address some aspects of selﬁsh behaviour, they either rely on a large number of
agents or on precise knowledge about the outcome of the interactions among agents. Even the
probabilistic trust models, which represent an improvement since they combine elements from
bothlearningandreputationmodelsandaddresssomeoftheaboverequirements, allowagentsto
exhibit selﬁsh behaviour and are limited to minimising the effects of this behaviour. Given these
limitations, we need to move to a more systematic approach in trust that focuses on the design
of protocols that guide the interactions among agents. Therefore, in this section we analyse and
critique reputation models that introduce trust through a set of rules that endeavour to provider
favourable global properties such as the investment of sufﬁcient resources in the generation of
an observation, or the truthful reporting of that observation. Although it may seem that by doing
so we depart somewhat from the standard deﬁnition of trust in MAS presented in introduction
(section 1.1), we do not, since truthful reporting of an agent’s observation and trust are closely
connected. In particular, if an agent’s task is to produce and report an observation of an event,
it successfully fulﬁls it, when it invests the necessary resources into that process and truthfully
reports its observations.
In this context, Zacharia and Maes (2000) apply their models (SPORAS and HISTOS) in on-line
communities like forums, mailing lists and chatrooms which can be regarded as citizens sensor
networks (although their work precedes this term). Speciﬁcally, in SPORAS they propose a
reputation mechanism in which new agents start with a minimum reputation value which is
increased based on the ratings they receive. Also, the reputation of an agent already in the
system can never be lower than the reputation of a new agent which just entered the system.
Therefore, since they assume that two agents interact only once, it will always be better to trust
the agent with the higher reputation which is always the agent that was in the system before
the other agent. Zacharia and Maes claim that this biased treatment is a necessary trade-off for
achieving anonymity in an on-line system. HISTOS is an extension where a more personalised
reputation is used. In more detail, in HISTOS the reputation of each agent depends on how
an agent rates other agents. HISTOS captures the common belief that in on-line communities
people tend to value more the opinions of people they already know. The drawback of this
system is that it does not penalise an agent that may lie and give good reports in an attempt to
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Another system-level reputation model which motivates agents to be truthful in their reports,
is proposed by Jurca and Faltings (2005a). In their model, they motivate agents to be truth-
ful through payments they receive when sharing feedback. This model is applied in a setting
where service (i.e. P2P, grid computing, broadband) providers repeatedly offer their service to
prospective clients. Providers can see whether the task was delivered or not, but those who con-
stantly fail to deliver the task are not excluded from the market. However, like SPORAS and
HISTOS, this model does not motivate agents to participate and act as reputation sources, which
directly contributes one aspect of selﬁsh behaviour, as agents do not invest any resources into
the generation of their feedback.
To this end, in order to motivate a client agent to supply information after an interaction with a
supplier, Jurca and Faltings (2006) extend their existing mechanism and guarantee that a truthful
reporting agent will not lose utility and that those who report incorrect reputation will gradually
lose utility. They achieve this by proposing a payment to the agents whose opinion about a
provider matches with the opinion another agent gives about the same provider based on a
Chi-square Independence test that examines the correlation between the two parties’ opinions.
So far, this model is the ﬁrst model we consider within system-level reputation trust that does
not rely on knowledge about the result of an interaction since it evaluates agents, based on
other agents’ subjective opinions. Furthermore, it guarantees that these subjective opinions are
honest. However, they assume that all agents that share the same supplier, also have identical
perception of the quality of this supplier’s service. This assumption is not realistic in many
citizen sensor networks where information providers make imprecise observations and hence
can have different beliefs while observing the same event. Furthermore, they do not consider
costs in the generation of the observation, and therefore contradict our requirement of selﬁsh
behaviour by subsequently assuming that given that there are no costs involved in the generation
of an observation, agents will invest all their resources.
As it can be seen, the last two models we consider signal a transition to a more fundamental
approach which is no longer restricted to a set of rules that can be applied only in speciﬁc
scenarios. That is, through the application of techniques from the ﬁeld of mechanism design
(Mas-Colell et al., 1995), truthful reporting and voluntary participation of the agents in the
reputation system can be guaranteed simply through an appropriately designed payment scheme.
Thus, this provides the main point of departure for our work so we will expand upon it in more
detail in the next section.
2.4 Mechanism Design based Trust
In this context, mechanism design is particularly appealing since it can be used as a tool to guar-
antee not only truthful reporting of an agent’s observation, but also the fact that an agent will
make the observation and invest sufﬁcient resources in doing so. Although there are several in-
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by Jurca and Faltings (2006)), we use auction-based14 mechanisms as a starting point of our
review. We do so because they have diverse applications from for task allocation problems that
occur in MAS (Dash, Rogers and Jennings, 2004; Czumaj and Ronen, 2004), to information
distribution in sensor networks (Klein et al., 2008) and allocation of multiple items in markets
through sequential or simultaneous auctions (Fatima et al., 2005; Fatima, 2006) and also induce
truthful reporting and voluntary participation. However, before we proceed into discussing and
analysing relevant approaches in mechanism design, we need to deﬁne the fundamental terms
in this area.
To this end, in Section 2.4.1 we provide the basic deﬁnitions that will be used in the rest of this
chapter, while in Section 2.4.2 we review mechanisms based on incentive compatible auctions.
After identifying which of the research requirements are met and which are not we introduce
scoring rule based mechanisms (Section 2.4.3). Finally, since scoring rules are central in our
work, we provide relevant background and a simple application that demonstrates how they can
be used in mechanism design in order to induce effort on behalf of the agents in generating their
observations and their truthful reporting (Sections 2.4.3.1 and 2.4.3.2 respectively).
2.4.1 Basic Deﬁnitions
Consider a set of n individual agents I which must make a joint choice from a set X of possible
outcomes. Prior to the choice, each agent i ∈ I privately observes its preferences over the set of
possible outcomes X. This is formally modelled by supposing that agent i observes a parameter
or a signal θi that determines its preference. Although θi represents private information available
only to i, we assume, as it is standard, that it is drawn from a commonly known joint distribution.
From now on we refer to θi as an agent’s private type and to the set of possible types for agent
i, as Θi, with Θ = Θ1×···×Θn being the set of all the possible types of all agents.
In this context, a social choice function (SCF), is a function f : Θ → X, that for each possible
set of agents’ types, determines a joint choice f(θ1,...,θn) ∈ X.
Deﬁnition 2.1. Strategy
A strategy si is a complete contingent plan for an agent i. That is, a plan that speciﬁes how agent
i will act for every possible type in set Θi. Formally, a strategy for agent i is a mapping from Θi
to Mi (si : Θi → Mi), where Mi, is the message set for agent i, and includes any messages that
this agent communicates.
Deﬁnition 2.2. Strategy Proﬁle
If si(θi) is one available strategy for agent i based on its type, the vector of agents’ strategies is
a strategy proﬁle s(θ) ∈ M, with M = M1×···×Mn being the set of joint messages.
14According to McAffe and McMillan (1987), an auction is a market institution with an explicit set of rules for
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Now, the function g : M → X that determines how agents’ messages get turned into a social
choice is called an outcome function, and the function t : M → Rn that calculates monetary
transfers issued to agents based on their messages, is called a transfer action.
Deﬁnition 2.3. Utility Functions
Now, ∀x ∈ X an agent’s utility function is deﬁned as the function ui(x,θi), with ui : X ×Θi → R.
Each agent’s utility function is publicly known and it represents a preference relation (%i (θi))
over pairs of outcomes given the type θi. We also assume that each agent intends to maximise it
utility in expectation.
Based on the above deﬁnitions of transfer and utility functions, we can deﬁne a speciﬁc type of
utility function, which we will be using in the rest of this research, that is the quasilinear utility
function. We focus on the quasilinear utility, given that it has been widely used in Auction
Theory, since it ensures that agents can transfer utility through monetary side payments.
Deﬁnition 2.4. Quasilinear Utility
Given agent i’s type θi, its quasilinear utility is denoted as follows:
ui(x,θi) = v(y,θi)+ti (2.1)
where outcome x deﬁnes a choice y ∈ Y from a discrete choice set and ti is agent’s payment
(∑ti ≤ 0). The function vi(.) is known as valuation function, and it represents agent i0s value
for each choice y ∈Y. In example 2.1, where we analyse the second price auction, y represents
allocation and ti are the payments made to the auctioneer.
Deﬁnition 2.5. Mechanism
A mechanism Γ = hI,X,M,Θ,g(.),t(.))i is a collection of agents, outcomes, agents’ messages
and types, together with an outcome and a transfer function.
In this context, the mechanism Γ is said to implement a SCF f :Θ→X if there is an equilibrium
strategy proﬁle15 s∗(θ), such that g(s∗(θ)) = f(θ), with any θ = (θ1,··· ,θn) ∈ Θ.
Now, a special class of mechanisms are the direct revelation mechanisms, in which the only
strategy available to the participating agents’ is to report their types (b θi = s(θi), where b θi is
agent i’s reported type). From a mechanism designer’s perspective, these mechanisms are a
valuable tool, as they can simplify the task of identifying the social choice functions which are
implementable because it restricts the number of the possible mechanisms we have to consider
(Mas-Colell et al., 1995).
Deﬁnition 2.6. Direct Revelation Mechanisms
A direct revelation mechanism is a mechanism in which Mi = Θi for all i and g(θ) = f(θ) for
all θ ∈ Θ.
15Later in this section we will introduce notions of equilibrium proﬁles such as dominant and ex post equilibrium
proﬁles.Chapter 2 Literature Review 28
Although it is not explicit in the deﬁnition of a mechanism (Deﬁnition 2.5), many mechanisms
not only consider transfers (payments or penalties) to the participating agents, but also the al-
location of a good or a task (i.e. an observation of a physical parameter such as temperature or
wind velocity). In order to show how allocations can be part of a mechanism, we provide an
example of a second price auction mechanism16.
Example 2.1 Second Price Auction Mechanism
Suppose that there is a single unit of a good that is to be allocated to one of n agents by applying
a second price auction. In a second price auction, the good is allocated to the agent with the
highest bid17, bi ∈ Mi with bi being si(θi) for notational convenience. The winning agent then,
is asked to pay the value of the second highest bid.
A particular element of the set of possible outcomes X in this particular case is represented by
a vector x = (y1,...,yn), where yi = 1 if agent i receives the good and yi = 0 if it does not. In
more detail, if Yi = {0,1} is the set of possible results of the allocation for agent i and M−i =
M1×...×Mi−1×Mi+1×...×Mn is the set of joint messages of all agents besides ith, the function
yi : Mi×M−i →Yi that allocates the goods to each agent based on its bid and the other agents’
bids, is the allocation function and is denoted as follows:
yi(bi,b−i) =



1 if bi > maxj6=ibj or bi = maxj6=ibj and i < j
0 otherwise
(2.2)
Moreover, in a second price auction agent i’s transfer function ti : Mi×M−i → R depends on its
bid and the other agents’ bids and is denoted as follows:
ti(bi,b−i) =



−maxj6=ibj if bi > maxj6=ibj or bi = maxj6=ibj and i < j
0 otherwise
(2.3)
In line with the general deﬁnition of the mechanism (Deﬁnition 2.5) and given that an el-
ement of X can be deﬁned as x = (y1,...,yn), the outcome function of the mechanism Γ =
hI,X,M,Θ,g(.),t(.)i is the following:
g(b) = (y1(b),...,yn(b))
where b = (b1,...,bn) is a vector of all agents’ bids.
Now, in many cases (including the second price auction mechanism) the participation of the
agents in the mechanism is voluntary, and therefore the mechanism must incentivise agents to
participate in it. This property is known as ‘individual rationality’ and for a mechanism to be
16Due to the central role of second price auction mechanisms in this research, we analyse and critique several
variations of second price auction based mechanisms in section 2.4.2.
17Note that according to the literature (Krishna, 2002), we can safely ignore ties (when two or more bidders have
the same highest bids), as it can get resolved by allocating the good to the agent with the lower indexChapter 2 Literature Review 29
individually rational, it must have an individually rational equilibrium strategy proﬁle s∗(θ). In
more detail, there are three individually rational strategy proﬁles based on which stage of the
mechanism the agent chooses to participate in.
Deﬁnition 2.7. Individual Rational (IR) Strategy Proﬁles
As detailed by Mas-Colell et al. (1995), these are: ex post, interim and ex ante. Given that
agents’ utilities are quasilinear, IR strategy proﬁles are deﬁned as follows:
• In ex post IR strategy proﬁle s∗(θ), agents choose whether to stay or leave after announc-
ing their types and learning an outcome from the set X of feasible outcomes. If ¯ u(θi) is
the utility for opting out18, then in an ex post IR mechanism: ui(g(s∗
i (θi),s∗
−i(θ−i)),θi) ≥
¯ u(θi) for all θi ∈ Θi and θ−i ∈ Θ−i with Θ−i = Θ1×...×Θi−1×Θi+1×...×Θn.
• In interim IR strategy proﬁle s∗(θ), the decision for each agent is made after learning its
type, but before the outcome is calculated: U(θi|g) = E[ui(g(s∗
i (θi),s∗
−i(θ−i)),θi)|θi] ≥
¯ u(θi) for all θi and θ−i ∈ Θ−i.
• In ex ante IR strategy proﬁle s∗(θ), the agent makes its decision before knowing its type,
thereforeitmustknowthetypes’priordistribution: U(θi)=E[ui(g(s∗
i (θi),s∗
−i(θ−i)),θi)]≥
E(¯ u(θi)) for all θi and θ−i ∈ Θ−i.
An ex post IR strategy proﬁle satisﬁes both the interim and ex ante conditions without the
opposite being possible. Furthermore, interim IR is a stronger proﬁle than ex ante, as in interim
IR, agents agree to participate in the mechanism after learning their types, while in the ex ante,
agents don’t have access to this information when they consider participating in the mechanism
and rely on knowledge about their types’ prior distribution.
Whileindividual rationalityisa desirablepropertyfor amechanism, itisnot theonlyone. Often,
a mechanism designer may require agents to be incentivised to truthfully report their types. This
property is known as ‘incentive compatibility’ and in an incentive compatible mechanism, each
agent is motivated to reveal the truth about its type by having its utility function maximised.
Furthermore, a social choice function is incentive compatible if truth telling by each agent is an
equilibrium for mechanism Γ. More formally:
Deﬁnition 2.8. Incentive Compatible Mechanism
A mechanism is incentive compatible if it truthfully implements a social choice function. For
direct revelation mechanisms, the social choice function f(.) is truthfully implementable, if the
mechanism has an equilibrium s∗(θ) ∈ M in which s∗(θi) = θi for all θi ∈ Θi.
As our work progresses, we will encounter two types of strategy equilibrium proﬁles: dominant
strategy and ex-post Nash. Therefore, we deﬁne them:
Deﬁnition 2.9. Dominant Strategy Equilibrium
In a dominant strategy equilibrium, an agent has the same utility maximising strategy to every
18The utility of an agent opting out from the mechanism does not depend on the outcome.Chapter 2 Literature Review 30
collection of strategies of other agents. Formally, the strategy proﬁle s∗(θ) = (s∗
1(θ1),...,s∗
n(θn))
is a dominant strategy equilibrium of the mechanism Γ=hI,X,M,Θ,g(.),t(.)i if for every agent
i ∈ I and type θi ∈ Θi and θ−i ∈ Θ−i:
ui(g(s∗
i (θi),s−i(θ−i)),θi) ≥ ui(g(s0
i(θi),s−i(θ−i)),θi), (2.4)
for all s0
i(θi) ∈ Mi and for all s−i(θ−i) ∈ M−i, with M−i = M1×...×Mi−1×Mi+1×...×Mn
Deﬁnition 2.10. Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility
A direct revelation mechanism Γ is dominant strategy incentive compatible (or strategy proof)
if truth revelation is a dominant strategy equilibrium.
Now, in an ex post Nash equilibrium, each agent’s chosen strategy is a best response to the
strategies used by the other agents. In other words, no one can proﬁtably deviate, given the
actions of the other agents. In this particular case, it is required by the agents to select their
strategy after they have knowledge about the strategies of all other agents, and therefore this
equilibrium is weaker than the dominant strategy (Deﬁnition 2.9) which does not depend on
other agents’ strategies. A formal deﬁnition of ex post Nash equilibrium is the following:
Deﬁnition 2.11. Ex post Nash Equilibrium
The strategy proﬁle s∗(θ) = (s∗
1(θ1),...,s∗
n(θn)) ∈ M is an ex post Nash equilibrium of the mech-
anism Γ = hI,X,M,Θ,g(.),t(.)i if for every agent i ∈ I and type θi ∈ Θi and θ−i ∈ Θ−i:
ui(g(s∗
i (θi),s∗
−i(θ−i)),θi) ≥ ui(g(s0
i(θi),s∗
−i(θ−i)),θi), (2.5)
for all s0
i(θi) ∈ Mi.
Deﬁnition 2.12. Ex post Nash Incentive Compatibility
A direct revelation mechanism Γ is ex post Nash incentive compatible if truth revelation is an
ex post Nash equilibrium.
Finally, incentive compatibility in conjunction with direct mechanisms (deﬁnition 2.6) lead to a
very important result in mechanism design: ‘the revelation principle’. According to the revela-
tion principle, for any mechanism there exists a direct and incentive compatible mechanism that
implements the same social choice functions in equilibrium.
2.4.2 Incentive Compatible Auction Mechanisms
Having given the basic deﬁnitions in mechanism design, now we start reviewing auction based
mechanisms in order to identify whether they satisfy our research requirements or not. We
focus on second price sealed auctions (Vickrey, 1961) (already described in Example 2.1) which
have been widely used to incentivise truth-telling in dominant strategies, since bidders submit
their sealed bids and the auctioneer allocates the resource to the highest bidder, who pays the
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as English, Dutch, ﬁrst price, second price), which introduce trust in mechanism design from
various perspectives. For example, some auctions motivate all agents to participate (i.e. second
price auctions are individually rational), while other auctions incentivise the auctioneer (i.e.
English and Dutch auctions) or the participating agents (second price auctions) to bid honestly
based on their true valuation of a traded item. However, in this section we focus on second price
auctions, since they are both incentive compatible and individually rational and therefore are a
valuable solution to the relevant aspect of selﬁsh behaviour in citizen sensor networks.
Nevertheless, besides the favourable properties of incentive compatibility and individual ratio-
nality for mechanisms that belong in this family, (i.e. the class of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves/(VCG)
mechanisms (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973)) there are several shortcomings that
are relevant to the context of this research.
First, second price auctions cannot prevent the auctioneer from lying. Speciﬁcally, since the
bids are sealed and private, the auctioneer could ask for a higher price than the second price.
The winner will pay the requested price, because he has no access to the bids of the other
players. There are ways to address this, for example Hsu and Soo (2002) solve this without
endangering the privacy of bids, just by randomly assigning the task of the auctioneer to one
of the bidders and with the use of a public blackboard for agents to publish their bids, so the
ﬁrst and second highest winners can verify the results. Now, this solution introduces additional
complexity and compromises the robustness of a citizen sensor network as the information buyer
would have to constantly update this external source and the providers will have to refer to it.
Although this does not directly contradict any of our research’s requirements, it is a negative
aspect of second price mechanisms which could be addressed by assigning the role of the centre
randomly to a different agent. However, this is not viable in our setting, since the role of the
centre is ﬁxed to the agent interested in acquiring the information. In another approach, Suzuki
and Yokoo (2004) propose an encryption method that will guarantee secure bidding without the
participating agents knowing each others bids. Still, this method introduces multiple overlays
of calculations which involve a new representation of the bids, an algorithm to identify the
maximum bids, encryption and decryption processes distributed among different servers. Due
to the complexity that is introduced as a direct result of these additional processes, this is not
a suitable solution for a citizen sensor network which often has to rely on fast observations
made by members of the public with portable devices and not dedicated computers with large
processing power. Therefore, we leave this as an open question which will attempt to address in
our future work.
The second, and perhaps most signiﬁcant, drawback of VCG mechanisms, is the necessary
assumption that agents can only hold valuations which do not depend on the valuations of other
agents. However, this is often contradicted in the cases we consider. Speciﬁcally, in citizen
sensor networks agents make noisy and uncertain observations, which lead to the possession of
partial information about the value of the observed parameter. In such cases an agent may hold
information, which if known to another agent might affect its valuation. For example, in a trafﬁc
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may be improved if it considers information from another company producing estimates about
the trafﬁc in the same area, but using different prediction methods. This type of information is
called interdependent information (Krishna, 2002).
In this context, Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) have shown that it is not only VCG mechanisms
that are affected by this negative result, but that there can be no standard one-stage mechanism
which is both efﬁcient and incentive compatible for the procurement of estimates from multiple
sources in an interdependent valuation setting. This is addressed to a certain degree by Mezzetti
(2004) who shows that efﬁciency can be achieved in a two-stage mechanism, where in the ﬁrst
stage the ﬁnal outcome is determined (i.e. the allocation of an observation), while in the second
stage agents observe their payments and receive the ﬁnal transfers from a centre, which acts as
the information buyer in relevance to a citizen sensor network scenario. However, this work con-
tradicts our requirements since it takes no consideration of the costs involved in the generation
of an observation.
A solution to this problem comes from the sensor network related literature (Porter et al., 2008).
In particular, they develop a mechanism which uses VCG payments in an interdependent infor-
mation setting, where each agent reports its probability of failing to complete its assigned task,
given that it will invest full effort into the completion of the task. Still, they restrict their mech-
anism by considering agents that can only report their own probability. In so doing, they do not
consider the case where agents may observe the same probability from different perspective and
combine them into one more accurate observation, thus contradicting our requirement regarding
the combination of multiple sources of information. In addition to that, although agents’ actions
have costs, these costs do not depend on the success of their attempts and in all cases that they
consider, they assume that the agents will attempt to complete the task without taking into con-
sideration its cost. However, this assumption does not hold in our setting, where the agents are
expected to invest less costly resources in a task, if they can increase their beneﬁt by doing so
(e.g. by being rewarded for a more precise measurement than the one they actually provide).
This particular shortcoming is addressed by Dash, Ramchurn and Jennings (2004), who pro-
posed a mechanism in which a centre allocates suppliers to consumers based on the consumers’
preferences. In this mechanism, consumers’ preferences depend on their perception about the
suppliers’ actions. In more detail, consumers’ decisions are inﬂuenced by others’ opinions about
the probability suppliers have of successfully fulﬁlling their assigned task. Consumers also pro-
vide all the information they possess about potential suppliers and, based on the effects of that
information in the overall utility of the system, the reward or penalty for the agents is calculated
by the centre. However, suppliers could possibly over report their costs or under report their
valuations in order to increase their utilities since payments do not depend on whether a supplier
succeeded or failed in completing its allocated task, and thus again this contradicts our require-
ment of selﬁsh behaviour. Furthermore, it is assumed that buyers and sellers will have access to
the full information about the state of the world after the task is allocated and completed, and
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The issue of under-reporting valuation is addressed by Klein et al. (2008) who consider the allo-
cation of shared bandwidth in a data network where participants are self interested and prefer to
receive rather than share data. Although their mechanism copes with agents which under report
their quality of information in order to avoid sharing it, it cannot handle reports of poor quality
as agents can degrade their measurements without any implication. In more detail, agents may
still report truthfully their information, but there is no means of identifying whether an agent
has invested any resources in making this observation. This directly contradicts one of our re-
quirements regarding selﬁsh behaviour. Furthermore, the payments issued to the participants are
based on the realised outcome, rather than the expected one, hence contradicting the requirement
regarding uncertainty.
The latter requirement is fulﬁlled by a recent extension of the work of Dash, Ramchurn and
Jennings (2004) by Ramchurn et al. (2009). In their work, they address both issues of under-
reporting and uncertainty, by designing a payment scheme that ensures that over reporting costs
or under reporting valuations is not a viable strategy. Now, regarding uncertainty about the
execution of the task, they introduce a reputation system that contains information concerning
the suppliers’ performance that can be referred by the consumers. However, like all the previous
work reviewed in this section, they assume full effort on behalf of the agents. In more detail,
they assume that an agent responsible for completing an assigned task, will invest the maximum
resources available to it for the completion of the task, without considering the involved costs.
Hence, by not dealing with cases where agents are expected to invest less costly resources in
a task, if they can increase their beneﬁt by doing so, they don’t address the relevant aspect of
selﬁsh behaviour as it was identiﬁed in Section 1.
A ﬁnal negative aspect of VCG mechanisms is that the centre operates with a surplus, meaning
that funds must be injected constantly in order to maintain wealth for the agents. In a citizen
sensor network this will decrease the network’s robustness, as it will depend on an external
source for the support of the agents that may run out of funds. In terms of economics, this is
called lack of budget balance. In more detail, there are several different types of budget balance,
speciﬁcally in strict budget balance the total payments of agents should be equal to zero, while a
weak budget balance only requires a non-negative total payment in order to achieve surplus and
notdeﬁciency. Furthermore, anexantebudgetbalancemechanismisbalancedonaverage, while
an ex post budget balance is balanced all times, for all instances (Dash et al., 2003). Although
budget balance is not in the requirements identiﬁed earlier, it is a desirable property, speciﬁcally
in cases where citizen sensor networks cannot rely on external sources and must operate without
human intervention (e.g. in a citizen science application where humans control sensors deployed
in areas not accessible to them such as volcanoes and ﬂooded rivers). Therefore, we review
several methods of introducing budget balance, which will prove useful later in the analysis of
our proposed model.
In particular, Cavallo (2006) has modiﬁed the standard VCG mechanism in order to achieve
budget balance asymptotically by applying a redistribution mechanism after the centre makes
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bundles of products, and for more than ten agents it can achieve redistribution of more than 70%
of the VCG surplus. However, the whole implementation is dependent on the existence of a
centre to calculate the payments submitted back to the agents, which contradicts our research’s
requirements.
In this context, Petcu et al. (2006) expand the existing M-DPOP model which faithfully im-
plements a distributed VCG outcome in order to achieve budget balance. They propose two
distributed mechanisms which achieve different degrees of budget balance: R-M-DPOP reaches
weak budget balance by redistributing the VCG tax, while BB-M-DPOP reaches exact bud-
get balance at the expense of optimality. These distributed models implement a VCG payment
which motivates agents to report truthfully and achieve a form of budget balance. However,
they assume that agents have precise and perfect valuations, thus contradicting our requirement
of operating in the presence of uncertainty.
As a conclusion, in reviewing several auction based mechanisms, we identiﬁed their ﬂaws and
showed which of our requirements are not satisﬁed. Therefore, we move from the realms of
auction-based mechanism design. Speciﬁcally, we consider an alternative approach, still within
the MD research domain, where agents are motivated to truthfully report their observations and
invest effort into producing them through the use of strictly proper scoring rule to determine
payments.
2.4.3 Using Scoring Rules as Reputation Mechanism
A number of researchers have proposed the use of strictly proper scoring rules to address several
of the challenges (Matheson and Winkler, 1976; Friedman, 1983) that were not met by auction
based mechanisms and, in particular, those regarding the interdependent information and the
aspect of selﬁsh behaviour related to the resources the agents commit in the generation of their
observations.
In more detail, payments based on these rules reward accurate estimates or forecasts by de-
pending on the difference between an event’s predicted and actual outcome (observed at some
later stage). Such mechanisms have been shown to incentivise agents to truthfully report their
estimates in order to maximise their expected payment (see Section 2.4.3.1 for background on
scoring rules). More recently, strictly proper scoring rules have been used in computer science
to induce agents to report truthfully a probabilistic estimate and to commit costly resources into
generating it at any required precision (Miller, Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2007; Miller, Pratt,
Zeckhauser and Johnson, 2007). In more detail, Miller et al. apply a scoring system to assess
agents’ ratings against each other. In their mechanism, agents rate the quality of a service or a
product and send their ratings to a central processing facility. The centre calculates an agent’s
payment (score) based on how close its reports is to the expected rating that the centre has cal-
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models reviewed in this section, even if self-interest agents have the choice of revealing a differ-
ent signal than their privately owned one, the use of strictly proper scoring rules motivates them
to honestly report their private signal by maximising their expected utility, provided that all other
agents report honestly too. The latter makes truthful reporting a Nash equilibrium solution.
Likewise, Jurca and Faltings (2005b) adjust their reputation mechanism (reviewed in subsection
2.3) by using the continuous scoring rule proposed by Miller et al. for calculating the payments
to those agents that give feedback and therefore contribute to the reputation mechanism. Specif-
ically, they divide agents into pairs and make them rate each other (i.e. agent i rates agent i+1).
However both mechanisms still have more than one Nash equilibria in which agents collude
and do not give a true feedback. In (Jurca and Faltings, 2007) they attempt to eliminate the un-
wanted Nash equilibria by proposing a method for enforcing the selection of a truthful strategy
by introducing a small number of agents whose reports are always trustworthy. Although this
is a signiﬁcant contribution to the literature relevant to mechanism design reputation systems,
it cannot be considered in a citizen sensor network as it could compromise the robustness of
the network since it is not clear how these trustworthy agents would be selected or what would
happen to the overall performance of the system if these agents stop operating.
Furthermore, strictly proper scoring rules have also been applied in a number of other similar
contexts which, although different to ours, have similar objectives. For example, Zohar and
Rosenschein (2008) focus on the principal-agent problem (Grossman and Hart, 1983; Rogerson,
1985) which is a more broad term for the mechanism design problem we consider where there
is an asymmetry of information between two sides: a contractor who is interested in acquiring
informationitcannotevaluateitselfandacontracteewhoisassignedtoprovidethatinformation.
In this context, they propose two mechanisms in which agents attempt to elicit information
about each others’ beliefs. In the ﬁrst mechanism, they assume that each agent has access to
a privately owned variable which takes a ﬁnite number of values. The principal agent wants
to buy information from the rest and therefore motivates them to report truthfully by using a
strictly proper scoring rule for payment. Since the buyer has no other means of assessing the
information he receives, he evaluates the sellers based on his privately owned variable. In the
second mechanism, they weaken the assumption that the designer of the mechanism has precise
knowledge of the distribution of the probability of the event in question. Still, they rely on the
fact that agents have a common probability distribution which expresses as ‘close’ notions of the
governing probability distributions. This strong assumption has a severe impact since it restricts
the applications of their method, as it makes it unrealistic and infeasible in real life scenarios
where these assumptions rarely hold.
Now, although all the strictly proper scoring rule based mechanisms discussed in this section are
effective in the speciﬁc cases that they consider, they assume that the costs of the traded infor-
mation are known. Although our approach is similar, in our setting the costs represent private
information known only to each individual agent (as it is explicitly stated in the introduction,
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due to the dependence of agent costs on the speciﬁc resources available only to it, we cannot
apply any of these approaches directly.
Despite this drawback, the above mentioned mechanisms pose a signiﬁcant contribution to rel-
evant research. Speciﬁcally, they induce truthful reporting and effort on behalf of an agent even
when there is no access to knowledge about the realised outcome, by using the other agents’
opinions when calculating a payment to a particular agent. Furthermore, in the last two mecha-
nisms, distributions can be used as agents’ types, something that seems to be missing from most
of the mechanism design models already reviewed. Indeed, in the majority of the interdepen-
dent information mechanisms that we have discussed so far, agents report discrete probability
distributions (i.e. the probability of success or failure) and therefore cannot be applicable if
agents’ reports represent continuous probability distributions, which is the case in many citi-
zen science applications responsible for the monitoring of environmental parameters. This is
particularly important in our research, since the lack of interoperability and consistency of ob-
servations (common problem in citizen sensor networks, as mentioned in Section 2.1), can be
addressed by modelling the traded information as continuous distributions. In so doing, we re-
move the disambiguity in the citizens’ reported observations by applying a well deﬁned standard
of measurement such as the Gaussian distribution.
To this end, in the following section we provide the relevant background and key literature for
the better understanding of scoring rules which have a central role in this work. In more de-
tails, in Section 2.4.3.1 we deﬁne various types of strictly proper scoring rules, while in Section
2.4.3.2 we describe a simple application of a strictly proper scoring rule based mechanism where
agents’ costs are known to the centre. Finally, in Section 2.4.3.3 we describe other types of scor-
ing rules (not necessarily strictly proper) and how their applications satisfy or not our research
requirements.
2.4.3.1 Background on Scoring Rules
One of the major purposes of statistical analysis is to make estimations and forecasts about the
future. Although this is not directly relevant to our research, we are particularly interested in
a task of equal importance that is closely connected to the task of making an observation of
a current event or a forecast about a future event. These observations or forecasts (from this
point referred as probabilistic estimates) must be evaluated and assessed regarding their quality,
since poor estimates might lead to misleading actions. Many examples can be drawn from
meteorology where wrong predictions often have devastating effects. To this end, scoring rules
(Hendrickson and Buehler, 1971) are a system which assign a numerical score to a forecaster
depending on how accurate her prediction is. Indeed, the closer the forecast is to the actual
observation, the higher the assigned score. Thus, forecasters that seek to maximise their return
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TABLE 2.1: The most popular binary scoring rules.
Scoring Rule G( ˆ p) S( ˆ p,1) S( ˆ p,0)
Quadratic −2 ˆ p(1− ˆ p) −2 ˆ p2+4 ˆ p−2 −2 ˆ p2
Logarithmic ˆ pln ˆ p+(1− ˆ p)ln(1− ˆ p) ln ˆ p ln(1− ˆ p)
Spherical
√
ˆ p
p
(1− ˆ p) −
√
1− ˆ p
2
√
ˆ p −
2
√
ˆ p √
1− ˆ p
A rigorous deﬁnition of scoring rules can be drawn from Gneiting and Raftery (2004). In par-
ticular, if the forecaster quotes the predictive distribution P and the event x materialises, her
reward is a function S(P,x) which takes values from −∞ to ∞. Suppose that the forecaster’s best
judgementisthedistributionQandthattheexpectedvalueofS(P,·), Ex∼Q(S(P,x)), isdenotedas
S(P,Q). Then the forecaster has an incentive to report the truth (i.e. P=Q) if S(Q,Q)≥S(P,Q).
A scoring rule with this property is deﬁned as strictly proper. It can be seen that this truth elicit-
ing property is equivalent to the incentive compatibility property in mechanism design, because
in both cases participants maximise their payoff if they report truthfully.
Having deﬁned strictly proper scoring rules, the simple rain prediction example presented in
the introduction (Section 1.2) can be extended and formalised. In this example, various data
aggregating on-line services quote a probability ˆ p ∈ [0,1] of rain and they are assigned a score
depending on whether it rained or not. Speciﬁcally, the assigned score is S(·,1) : [0,1] → R and
S(·,0) : [0,1] → R, with S( ˆ p,1) being the reward if a service succeeds in its forecast, and S( ˆ p,0)
the penalty if it fails.
However, we must choose the appropriate S(·,1) and S(·,0) in order to incentivise agents to
quote their true probability. Hence, we must assign them a strictly proper scoring rule. Savage
(1977) proved that strictly proper scoring rules can be generated if they satisfy the following
requirements:
S( ˆ p,1) = G( ˆ p)+(1− ˆ p)G0( ˆ p)
and
S( ˆ p,0) = G( ˆ p)− ˆ pG0( ˆ p)
where ˆ p is the agents’ reported probability, G : [0,1] → R is a bounded strictly convex function,
preferably differentiable in (0,1) and G0 is its derivative. If G is not differentiable, we must use
the subgradient of G in [0,1].
These scoring rules use a binary approach depending on whether the event materialised or not,
and therefore are called binary scoring rules. Different binary scoring rules can be created from
the function G : [0,1] → R with the most popular being the Brier or, as it is most commonly
known, the quadratic. Following the above process, the quadratic, and two other popular scoring
rules, the logarithmic and the spherical, listed in Table 2.1, can be derived.
A more general form for the binary scoring rules can be derived in order to apply them in
cases where an event has more than two possible outcomes. Thus, in Table 2.2 we deﬁne theChapter 2 Literature Review 38
TABLE 2.2: Discrete and continuous scoring rules.
Scoring Rule Discrete Continuous
Quadratic 2r(xi)−∑r(xi)2 2r(x)−
R ∞
−∞r2(x)dx
Logarithmic lnr(xi) lnr(x)
Spherical r(xi)/(∑r(xi)2)1/2 r(x)/(
R ∞
−∞r2(x)dx)1/2
discrete scoring rules and their continuous analogues which are useful when forecasters report
distributions (r(xi)) rather than probabilities. The continuous analogues (also found in Table
2.2) can be derived easily, if r(xi) which is the mass function of the discrete random variable x
is replaced by density function r(x) of the continuous random variable x.
Furthermore, the quadratic, spherical and logarithmic are not the only continuous strictly proper
rules. Indeed other strictly proper scoring rules include the power rule family, which have been
rigorously described more recently by Selten (1998). The discrete parametric scoring rule is
deﬁned as:
kr(k−1)(xi)−(k−1)∑rk(xi) (2.6)
while, its continuous analogue is:
kr(k−1)(x)−(k−1)
Z ∞
−∞
rk(x)dx (2.7)
where k is a real number with k > 1
In addition to these scoring rules, Matheson and Winkler (1976) proposed a family of continuous
scoring rules that can be derived from the binary case without being their analogues. In this
particular case, where agents reveal their cumulative probability distributions, R(x), instead of
their density functions, the quadratic scoring rule is denoted as following:
S(R(x∗),u)) =



S1(R(x∗)) = −2(1−R(x∗))2 if x∗ ∈ (−∞,u]
S2(R(x∗)) = −2R2(x∗) if x∗ ∈ (u,∞)
(2.8)
where, x∗ is the realised value of the outcome.
It is clear that the score S(R(x∗),u) does not only depend on the realised value of outcome, x∗,
but also on u. Although, u is just a random real number which divides the real line in two parts so
x∗ falls in one of the two intervals: (−∞,u] or (u,∞). In order to eliminate this dependency, we
integrate equation 2.8 over R. Therefore, according to the original scoring rule implementation
and after x∗ is revealed, the payment each agent receives is the following:
S∗(x∗) = −
Z x∗
−∞
2R2(u)du−
Z ∞
x∗ 2(1−R(u))2du (2.9)
Now, in this work we focus on the quadratic, spherical, logarithmic and parametric continuous
strictly proper scoring rules, for two reasons. First, in the citizen sensor networks we consider,Chapter 2 Literature Review 39
the distributed information is represented by continuous distributions (hence the use of binary
strictly proper scoring rules is not applicable). Second, for the four already mentioned strictly
proper scoring rules, as opposed to those introduced by Matheson and Winkler (1976), their
expected counterparts can be analytically derived and expressed in close forms. Therefore, by
using them, we will not restrict our analysis in solely empirical methods. In so doing, we will
be able to provide theoretical results in order to satisfy the four research requirements set in
Chapter 1, for a wide class of mechanisms and not just a speciﬁc instance.
2.4.3.2 An Application of Strictly Proper Scoring Rules in Mechanism Design
The purpose of this detailed example of strictly proper scoring rules, is to demonstrate their main
properties through an application where costs involved in the generation of an observation are
known to the centre. For this speciﬁc application, we assume that agents’ noisy private observa-
tion, x, are modeled as continuous distributions and in particular as Gaussian random variables
such that x ∼ N(x0,1/θ), where θ is the observation’s precision and x0 is the true state of the
parameter being estimated. After replacing the general probability density functions with the
Gaussian distributions, we derive new expressions for each of the four scoring rules (expressed
by S(x0;x,θ) in Table 2.3). From these new expressions, and due to strictly proper scoring rule
based payments being incentive compatible, we can simply integrate over the expected outcome
in order to calculate the score an agent expects to derive, S(θ), also shown in Table 2.3 given
that it has generated an estimate of precision θ and has truthfully reported it to the centre (as it
is incentivised to do).
Although incentive compatibility is one very desirable property, it is certainly not the only one.
Particularly, in citizen sensor networks, some information providers may commit less than the
required resources into the generation of the observation if they expect to increase their utility
functions by doing so. To combat this, Miller, Resnick and Zeckhauser (2007) elicit effort
through the use of appropriate scaling parameters, noting that any afﬁne transformation of a
strictly proper scoring rule does not affect its incentive compatibility property. Indeed, given
knowledge of an agent’s costs, they show that it is possible to induce an agent to make and
truthfully report an estimate with a speciﬁed precision, θ0. In this case, an agent’s expected
payment, P(θ), is given by:
P(θ) = αS(θ)+β (2.10)
where α and β are the scaling parameters, and the expected utility of the agent is given by:
U(θ) = αS(θ)+β−c(θ) (2.11)
The centre can now choose the value of α such that the agent’s utility (its payment minus its
costs) is maximised when it produces and truthfully reports an estimate of the required precision,Chapter 2 Literature Review 40
TABLE 2.3: Comparison of Quadratic, Spherical, Logarithmic and Parametric Scoring Rules
Scoring Rule: Quadratic Spherical
S(x0;x,θ) 2N (x0;x,1/θ)− 1
2
q
θ
π
 4π
θ
1
4 N (x0;x,1/θ)
S(θ) 1
2
q
θ
π
  θ
4π
1
4
S
0(θ) 1
4
√
πθ
1
4

1
4πθ3
 1
4
α 4c0(θ0)
√
πθ0 4c0(θ0)
 
4πθ3
0
 1
4
β c(θ0)−2θ0c0(θ0) c(θ0)−4θ0c0(θ0)
Scoring Rule: Logarithmic Parametric
S(x0;x,θ) log(N (x0;x,1/θ)) kN (x0;x,θ)(k−1)−
k−1
√
k

2π
θ
 1−k
2
S(θ) 1
2 log
  θ
2π

− 1
2
1
√
k

2π
θ
 1−k
2
S
0(θ) 1
2θ
k−1
2θ
√
k

2π
θ
 1−k
2
α 2c0(θ0)θ0
2c0(θ0)θ0
√
k
k−1

θ0
2π
 1−k
2
β c(θ0)−2c0(θ0)θ0

1
2 log

θ0
2π

− 1
2

c(θ0)−
2θ0
k−1
c0(θ0)
θ0. To do so, it solves
dU
dθ
 

θ0
= 0 to give:
α =
c0(θ0)
S
0(θ0)
(2.12)
In Table 2.3 we present this result, and the derivative of the expected score that is required to
calculate it, for each of the four strictly proper scoring rules presented earlier in the cells S
0(θ)
and α respectively.
Having deﬁned the α parameter of the afﬁne transformation that elicits effort and honest re-
porting, we calculate parameter β which motivates agents to participate in the mechanism by
ensuring that their expected utility is always positive. In more detail, we now note that in or-
der for a self-interested agent to incur the cost of producing a forecast, it must expect to derive
positive utility from doing so. Thus, the centre can use the constant β to ensure that it makes
the minimum payment to the agent, hence ensuring that the mechanism is individually rational.
When costs are known, the centre can do so by making the agents indifferent between producing
the forecast or not, by settingU(θ0) = 0, thus giving:
β = c(θ0)−
c0(θ0)
S
0(θ0)
S(θ0) (2.13)
Again, cells β in Table 2.3 show this result for each of the four scoring rules.Chapter 2 Literature Review 41
Finally, it should be noted that the expected scores of the quadratic, spherical and logarithmic
scoring rules are concave depending on the precision θ (expressed as S(θ) in Table 2.3). While
this property of the expected scores forms the basis of the calculations and proofs that we present
in the following chapters, it does not hold for any strictly proper scoring rule. For example, in
the parametric scoring rule for k > 3 the second derivative of the expected score (denoted by
Equation 2.14) becomes positive and therefore the expected score convex, which in turn, as
we will show in the following chapter, results in a payment that fails to incentivise an agent to
produce an estimate at the required precision, θ0.
S
00(θ) =
(1−k)(3−k)
4θ2√
k

2π
θ
1−k
2
(2.14)
Therefore, and in order to guarantee the concavity of the expected score we will restrict the
parameter k to the space (1,3).
2.4.3.3 Other Types of Scoring Rules
In the scoring rules literature, strictly proper scoring rules are emphasised, since their truth
elicitationpropertyisveryimportant. However, Savage(1977)suggeststhatscoringrulesshould
have a stronger monotonicity property which will motivate agents to reveal a distribution very
close to their true one, if dishonest reporting cannot be avoided. Friedman (1983) formalises
this property and refers to such scoring rules as effective scoring rules. In these rules, the
expected score is higher when the reported distribution is ‘closer’ to the distribution of the actual
outcome and therefore it can be easily proved that every effective scoring rule is strictly proper.
Speciﬁcally, FriedmanprovesthatwithinanEuclideanspace, thequadraticandsphericalscoring
rules are effective, while the logarithmic is not. Note that this is not the only difference between
the three most popular strictly proper scoring rules. In particular, the logarithmic scoring rule
has no lower bound which can result in inﬁnite payments. This may be problematic in a citizen
sensor network, as it may be impossible to constantly inject funds to citizens that have to face a
relatively large payment.
Despite this negative aspect, a variation of the logarithmic scoring rule has been used in predic-
tion systems in electronic markets. In more detail, market scoring rules (Hanson, 2003, 2007)
have found applications in systems where forecasters are allowed to change their initial reported
forecast and then get paid according to their new report after taking into account the beneﬁts
they gained from that change. This makes market scoring rules particularly appealing in dy-
namic systems with rich interactions among the participating agents (Guo and Penock, 2009;
Chen et al., 2009). Although we are interested in a similar setting where there is a lack of
knowledge about the state of the world, we adopted a less complex approach, in which agents
communicate their estimates to a centre and then receive their payments. This setting is more
amenable to strictly proper scoring rules than market scoring rules, since the centre can cal-
culate the agents’ payments in a single round simply by comparing it with the fused reportedChapter 2 Literature Review 42
estimates, instead of implementing a repetitive process which would allow each agent to modify
its reported observation.
2.5 Summary
This chapter has reviewed literature relevant to selﬁsh behaviour in citizen sensor networks and
has identiﬁed the lack of literature related to trust in such networks. This realisation motivated
our focus on trust applications in MAS. Therefore, the two principal lines of research in trust
were analysed: individual and system-trust. After discussing the main agent-based trust models,
and speciﬁcally, learning, reputation and combined probabilistic models, it was apparent that
they failed to satisfy one or more of the requirements of our research. For that reason, we
focused on the design of rules that regulate the interactions among agents, rather than on trying
to identify all the possible actions of each agent. In taking a more systematic approach in
reputation trust, we were able to address the issues of selﬁsh behaviour, more effectively than
thereputationsystemsinagent-leveltrust. However, wefoundthattheywereefﬁcientonlyinthe
speciﬁc scenarios they considered as they lacked theoretical foundations that would make them
suitable for open systems such as citizen sensor networks. Therefore we discussed mechanism
design based solutions and argued that although many of the attributes we desire in our solution
were met, there is still a number of issues that need to be resolved. Within the MD line of
research, we argued that scoring rules can be used to solve many of the problems identiﬁed in
this section. Given this, the next chapter presents our implementation of a mechanism based on
scoring rules, which elicits both effort and honest reporting of private signals, in a setting where
costs are unknown to the centre.Chapter 3
A Mechanism for Dealing with
Unknown Costs
In the previous chapter we discussed several applications of scoring rules in mechanism design.
Now, while these approaches are effective in the speciﬁc cases that they consider, they all rely
on the fact that the cost of the agent providing the observation or estimate is known by the
centre. However, in many citizen sensor networks, this is not the case, as these costs represent
private information known only to each individual information provider and not to the informa-
tion buyer. For example, in a noise monitoring network, the costs involved in the generation
of a sound observation represent the amount of time the citizen has invested in making the ob-
servation. Subsequently, if a contributor has spent a signiﬁcant amount of time in making her
observation, it will be more accurate and more realistic. Now, different people, have different
levels of commitment in a project like that, and it is not possible for the buyer to know in ad-
vance how much time the providers invest. In a trafﬁc information service, multiple companies
providing advice regarding trafﬁc conditions such as estimates of optimal routes of possibly low
congestion to subscribed drivers act as information providers. They face costs depending on
the their technological capacity and the statistical models used both for the the planning of the
optimal routes and the estimation of trafﬁc in locations where there are minimum reports. A
subscriber of such a service who acts as the information buyer is not expected to know these
costs.
To this end, we introduce a mechanism in which the centre (effectively the information buyer)
does not rely on any knowledge of costs involved in the generation of the agents’ (information
providers) observations or probabilistic estimates, and hence we address research requirement
1 identiﬁed in Section 1.1 regarding unknown costs. In so doing, we contribute to the state
of the art by developing a novel two-stage mechanism in which the centre in the ﬁrst stage
elicits the agents’ unknown costs and identiﬁes the agent that can provide an observation at the
minimum cost, while in the second stage, through appropriately scaled strictly proper scoring
rules, it incentivises that agent to invest sufﬁcient resources into generating an observation or a
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probabilistic estimate at a speciﬁc precision and report it truthfully (hence address Requirement
2 regarding selﬁsh behaviour). In the setting we consider, we assume that there are multiple
agents, all of which are capable of producing an estimate of at least the required precision
(we relax this assumption in Chapter 4, where we consider agents that have limitations in the
maximum precision of the estimate they produce), and that the centre has access to knowledge
about the state of the world after it receives the selected agent’s observation (we relax this
assumption in Chapter 5).
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: In Section 3.1 we describe our model, while in
Section 3.2 we proceed to describe our novel two stage mechanism. In Section 3.3 we prove
its economic properties (i.e. incentive compatibility and individual rationality). Furthermore, in
Section 3.4 we empirically evaluate our mechanism by comparing the quadratic, spherical and
logarithmic scoring rules with a parametric family of strictly proper scoring rules in a setting
where costs depend linearly on precision. We show that while the logarithmic rule results in the
centre making the lowest expected payment to the agent, this payment is unbounded. The other
rules are bounded, but result in higher expected payments. Hence, we ﬁnd that for certain values
of the parameter, the parametric scoring rule is preferred, since the resulting payment is similar
to the logarithmic both in its expected value and its variance, which has been identiﬁed as the
optimal rule, but with ﬁnite lower bound. Finally, in section 3.5 we summarise and particularly
discuss how to relax the assumption that a single agent can provide an estimate at any precision
the centre requires.
3.1 Eliciting Information from a Single Agent
We now describe the information elicitation problem, outlined in Chapter 1. Speciﬁcally, we
consider a citizen sensor network in which an information buyer wants to acquire an observation
or a probabilistic estimate of an event at a certain quality, denoted by a minimum precision θ0
(henceforth referred to as the required precision). In the context of the applications of citizen
sensor networks introduced in Section 2.1.3, in a noise monitoring scenario, the organisation
responsible for compiling the noise maps of European cities acts as information buyer and is
interested in acquiring noise observations of a certain standard (which reﬂects the precision of
the observation) from members of the public equipped with mobile phones with microphones,
who in turn act as information providers. In a trafﬁc report service, the role of information buyer
is undertaken by the subscribed drivers that receive information regarding trafﬁc conditions and
estimates of optimal routes, by multiple competing private companies acting as information
providers.
Against this background, we assume that an information buyer derives no additional beneﬁt if
the observation is of precision greater than θ0 and that there are N ≥ 2 rational, risk neutral
providers that can provide the buyer with a noisy observation, x, of precision θ. We model the
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x0 is the true state of the parameter being observed. Furthermore, as mentioned above, this
true state is unknown to both the buyer and the providers at the time that the observation is
requested, but becomes available to the buyer at some time in the future. We note that this
assumption is unrealistic, as the purpose of the citizen sensor networks we consider, is to provide
observations of events that could not be provided with conventional stationary sensors and we
hence intend to relax it in Chapter 5. However, there are examples where it is possible to
evaluate the observations, depending on whether the information buyers are willing to invest
a substantial amount of resources for this task. For example, in a noise monitoring scenario,
the information buyer may be able to deploy its own equipment in few speciﬁc locations to
verify the observations of some providers. Having assessed some of the providers it can use
these evaluations to identify whether they truthfully report their observations or not, and given
that information providers are not static, after some time we can reasonably assume that most
providers will have had their observations evaluated at some point. In a trafﬁc reports service the
subscribed drivers may have the ability of verifying the conditions on the streets by subscribing
into a service that gives live feed on the situation on the streets through airborne means. That is
why, this mechanism cannot be simply considered as a ﬁrst step towards a complete mechanism
presented at a later stage. Instead, it is a stand alone mechanism that can address speciﬁc issues
in speciﬁc settings19
As already mentioned, in the setting we consider, the providers incur a cost, c(θ), in producing
their estimate, which we assume to be a function of the estimate’s precision. In addition to that,
while the buyer has no information regarding the providers’ cost functions, we assume that all
cost functions are convex (i.e. c00
i (θ) ≥ 0), and we note that this is a realistic assumption in all
cases where there are diminishing returns as the precision increases. For example, in the noise
monitoring scenario, a contributing member of the public may dedicate more of her time and
provide an observation that will be an accurate representation of the noise pollution in that area.
Likewise, in a trafﬁc reports service, the cost of the service increases as more advanced models
are used for the generation of estimates of trafﬁc when there is scarce real time data, given that
after a certain level of precision, advancements are minimal and costs in processing power due
to the increased complexity are higher.
Finally, we do not assume that all providers use the same cost function, but we do demand
that the costs of different providers and their derivatives do not cross (i.e. the ordering of the
agents’costsandtheirderivativesismaintainedoverallprecisions). Althoughtheseassumptions
are not directly relevant to a speciﬁc citizen sensor network application, they are necessary in
order to prove incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the following mechanism and
hence address the research requirement regarding selﬁsh behaviour (Requirement 2). Indeed, in
Section 3.3 we show that these assumptions are necessary, since there can be no mechanism
based on scaled strictly proper scoring rules, that can be incentive compatible with respect to
19In Conclusions and Future Work, we provide a summary of Mechanisms 1, 2 and 3 described in Chapters 3, 4
and 5 respectively and explicitly mention that when the information buyer has access to such knowledge, it is better
to use Mechanisms 1 and 2 since truthful reporting is a stronger solution concept (dominant strategy, as opposed to
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costs revealed, and incentivise the selected agent to generate an estimate at the optimal precision,
without them being satisﬁed (Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2).
Given this model20, the challenge is to design a mechanism that enables an information buyer
to identify the provider that can provide the observation at the lowest cost, and to provide a
payment to this provider such that it is incentivised to generate the observation with a precision
at least equal to the required one and to report it truthfully.
3.2 The Mechanism
Given that Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) have shown that there is no one-stage mechanism that
can incentivise agents to truthfully report their valuations in an interdependent information set-
ting, we address the above mentioned challenges by designing a two-stage mechanism (Mech-
anism 1). In the ﬁrst stage of the mechanism, the centre incentivises agents to truthfully reveal
their costs and identify the agent with the lowest one, while in the second stage, the centre uses
an appropriately scaled strictly proper scoring rule in order to incentivise that agent to generate
an estimate at the required precision, and to truthfully report it.
In more detail, in the ﬁrst step (Step 1.1) of the ﬁrst stage of Mechanism 1 the centre announces
thatitrequiresanestimateataspeciﬁcprecisionandasksallagentstoreporttheircostfunctions.
In practise the centre only requires the cost function and its derivative at that required precision,
and not the entire functions. However, for notational convenience we request the agents to reveal
their entire cost function. Now, in the second step (Step 1.2), the centre uses a reverse second
price auction to elicit the agents’ costs, and hence identify the agent that can provide an estimate
with a speciﬁed precision at the lowest cost. The centre then allocates the estimate to that agent.
In the the second stage of the mechanism, in the ﬁrst step (Step 2.1) the centre announces a
payment based on a scaled strictly proper scoring rule and determines the scaling parameters α
and β:
α =
c0
j(θ0)
S
0(θ0)
and β = cj(θ0)−
c0
j(θ0)
S
0(θ0)
S(θ0) (3.1)
where S
0(θ0) is the derivative of expected score, S(θ), at the required precision, with S(θ) being
a strictly concave21 function, and cj(θ0) being the second lowest cost determined in step 1.2. To
this end, in step 2.2 the selected agent from step 1.2 generates the required estimate and ﬁnally
at step 2.3 it receives its payment from the centre.
20Note that in this research we restrict our model to continuous parameter distributions and continuous cost func-
tions, however, in our future work, we intend to extend the model so it can deal with discrete distributions and
costs.
21We note that the quadratic, spherical, logarithmic and parametric scoring rules satisfy this property (see row 2
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Mechanism 1 The mechanism for dealing with unknown costs:
1. First Stage
1.1 The centre announces that it needs an estimate of required precision θ0, and asks all agents
i ∈ {1,...,N}, where N ≥ 2, to report their cost functions b ci(θ).
1.2 The centre assigns the task of generating the estimate to the agent who reported the lowest
cost at the required precision, i.e., agent i such that b ci(θ0) = mink∈{1,...,N}b ck(θ0).
2. Second Stage
2.1 The centre announces a scoring rule αS(x0;x,θ)+β, where:
(i) S(x0;x,θ) is a strictly proper scoring rule,
(ii) S(θ) is strictly concave as a function of precision θ, and
(iii) α and β are determined using equations 3.1, based on the second-lowest reported
cost functions (i.e. b cj(θ) such that b cj(θ0) = argmink6=ib ck(θ0)).
2.2 The agent selected in the ﬁrst stage produces an estimate x with precision θ and reports b x
and b θ to the centre.
2.3 Once the actual outcome has been observed, the centre then gives the following payment
to the agent:
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Now regarding this mechanism, at ﬁrst glance it may appear that it is similar to a reverse second-
price or Vickrey auction, where the agents’ rewards are equal to the second-lowest reported
costs. This is certainly true. However, the mechanism here is more complex as the two stages
of our mechanism are interconnected and the selected agent’s reward in the second stage is
determined by the scaled scoring rule, with the scaling parameters depending on the second
lowest cost identiﬁed in the ﬁrst stage.
Having detailed the mechanism, in the next section we identify and prove its economic proper-
ties.
3.3 Economic Properties of the Mechanism
Speciﬁcally, in this section we show that:
1. The mechanism outlined above is incentive compatible in the ﬁrst stage regarding the
costs. In particular, truthful revelation of the agents’ cost functions is a weakly dominant
strategy.
2. The mechanism is incentive compatible regarding the selected agent’s reported estimate
and precision in the second stage.
3. There can be no incentive compatible mechanism regarding the agents’ cost functions
revealed when the cost functions overlap.
4. The mechanism is individually rational.
5. The centre motivates the selected agent to make an estimate with a precision which is at
least as high as θ0, the precision required by the centre. We refer to the actual precision
produced as the ‘optimal precision’ (from the perspective of the agent) θ∗, since for this
precision the expected payment is maximised.
6. For some concave cost functions, or for those cost functions whose derivatives overlap,
the selected agent will not be able to generate an estimate at the optimal precision. For
these cases, the centre will not be able to achieve the precision it requires.
We now prove these properties. To do so, we ﬁrst derive two lemmas which are then used in the
proofs that follow. The ﬁrst lemma shows that if the true costs of the agent making the prediction
are higher than the costs used for the scaling of the scoring function, then the agent’s utility will
always be negative. More formally:
Lemma 3.1. If ct(θ) and cs(θ) are convex functions with ct(θ)>cs(θ), c0
t(θ)>c0
s(θ) and ct(0)=
cs(0) = 0, where ct(θ) is the agent’s true cost function, cs(θ) is the cost function used to scale
the scoring function and c0
t(θ) and c0
s(θ) their respective derivatives, thenU(θ) < 0 for any θ.Chapter 3 A Mechanism for Dealing with Unknown Costs 49
Proof. Concavity of the expected score S(θ) implies:
S
0(θ0)(θ−θ0) ≥ S(θ)−S(θ0) (3.3)
Similarly, convexity of the cost function cs(θ) gives:
c0
s(θ0)(θ−θ0) ≤ cs(θ)−cs(θ0) (3.4)
Given that by deﬁnition S(θ) and cs(θ) are strictly increasing (as stated in the model description
in Section 3.1), dividing with S
0(θ0) and c0
s(θ0) maintains the sign in inequalities 3.3 and 3.4.
Therefore, from:
(θ−θ0) ≥
S(θ)−S(θ0)
S
0(θ0)
and
(θ−θ0) ≤
cs(θ)−cs(θ0)
c0
s(θ0)
it follows that:
S(θ)−S(θ0)
S
0(θ0)
≤
cs(θ)−cs(θ0)
c0
s(θ0)
or
c0
s(θ0)
S
0(θ0)
(S(θ)−S(θ0))+cs(θ0)−cs(θ) ≤ 0 (3.5)
Now, the expected utility, is given by: U(θ)=αS(θ)+β−c(θ) (Equation 2.11), with the scaling
parameters α and β already deﬁned using Equations 2.12 and 2.13 as α =
c0(θ0)
S
0(θ0)
and β =
c(θ0)−
c0(θ0)
S
0(θ0)
S(θ0), where θ0 is the centre’s required precision and S(θ) is the expected score.
Therefore, an agent’s expected utility is given by:
U(θ) =
c0
s(θ0)
S
0(θ0)
(S(θ)−S(θ0))+(cs(θ0)−ct(θ)) (3.6)
Therefore, since ct(θ) > cs(θ), for any θ the following holds:
c0
s(θ0)
S
0(θ0)
(S(θ)−S(θ0))+cs(θ0)−cs(θ) ≤ 0 ⇒
c0
s(θ0)
S
0(θ0)
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or
U(θ) =
c0
s(θ0)
S
0(θ0)
(S(θ)−S(θ0))+cs(θ0)−ct(θ) < 0
The next lemma shows that if the true costs of the agent performing the estimate are less than
the costswhich areused toscale thescoring rule, the optimalprecisionθ∗ will begreater thanθ0.
Lemma 3.2. If ct(θ) and cs(θ) are convex functions with ct(θ)<cs(θ), c0
t(θ)<c0
s(θ) and ct(0)=
cs(0) = 0, where ct(θ) is the agent’s true cost function, cs(θ) is the cost function used to scale
the scoring function and c0
t(θ) and c0
s(θ) their respective derivatives, then θ∗ > θ0.
Proof. The agent’s optimal precision, θ∗, which maximises its expected utility is formally de-
noted by θ∗ = argmaxθU(θ), withU
0(θ∗) = 0.
Now, the agent’s expected utility is already deﬁned by Equation 3.6 as:
U(θ) =
c0
s(θ0)
S
0(θ0)
(S(θ)−S(θ0))+(cs(θ0)−ct(θ))
Given that the optimal precision, θ∗, maximises the expected score, we have U
0(θ∗) = 0, and
hence, after replacing θ with θ∗ and calculating the derivative of the expected utility (Equation
3.6):
c0
s(θ0)
S
0(θ0)
S
0(θ∗)−c0
t(θ∗) = 0 ⇔
S
0(θ∗)
S
0(θ0)
=
c0
t(θ∗)
c0
s(θ0)
(3.7)
Let f(θ) = S
0(θ)/S
0(θ0) and g(θ) = c0
t(θ)/c0
s(θ0). In the model description (Section 3.1) it
is explicitly stated that S(θ) is (strictly) concave, strictly increasing and twice differentiable.
Therefore, f0(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ0.
In Section 3.1 we also listed the assumptions regarding the agents’ cost functions. In more
detail, we assumed that the cost functions are convex, strictly increasing and that they and their
derivatives maintain the same order, without overlapping for all θ. Now, since c00
t (θ) ≥ 0 (due to
costs’ convexity) and c0
s(θ) ≥ 0 (since cost functions are strictly increasing), g0(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ.
Furthermore, according to the initial assumptions regarding costs: c0
t(θ) < c0
s(θ) for all θ, and
hence g(θ0) < 1. Since g(θ) is strictly increasing and f(θ0) = 1, the functions f(θ) and g(θ)
must cross at θ0 > θ0 (i.e. f(θ0) = g(θ0)). Thus θ∗ > θ0
At this point it should be noted that although the lemma’s conditions regarding the derivatives
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proofs of the mechanism’s economic properties22. Indeed, there can be two cost functions ct(θ)
and cs(θ) such that ct(θ) < cs(θ) and c0
t(θ) > c0
s(θ) for which θ∗ < θ0.
Speciﬁcally, for ct(θ) =
3θ2
2
and cs(θ) = eθ−1, it is easy to show graphically that ct(θ) < cs(θ)
for every θ>0, while there are some values of θ such that c0
t(θ)>c0
s(θ) (i.e. for θ=1 c0
t(1)=3
and c0
s(1) = e−1).
Now, S
00(θ) ≤ 0, since S is convex, and therefore S0 is a decreasing function. That is, for θ∗ >
θ0 ⇒ S
0(θ∗) < S
0(θ0), hence Equation 3.7 will take the following form for θ0 = 1:
S
0(θ∗)
S
0(θ0)
=
3θ∗
e
< 1 ⇔ 3θ∗ < e ⇒ θ∗ < 1
which does not hold given that initially we have assumed that θ∗ > θ0 with θ0 = 1
Having presented these two key lemmas, we now proceed to prove the four economic properties
of our mechanism.
Theorem 3.1. Truthful revelation of agents’ cost functions in the ﬁrst stage of the mechanism is
a weakly dominant strategy.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Let ct(θ) and b c(θ) denote an agent’s true and reported
cost functions respectively. Furthermore, let cs(θ) denote the cost function used to scale the
scoring function if the agent wins (i.e. if b c(θ0) < cs(θ0)).
First, suppose that the agent misreports, but this does not affect whether it wins or not. In this
case, since the costs are based on the second-lowest costs, this does not affect the scoring rule
if the agent wins. Moreover, if the agent loses the payoff is always zero. Therefore, there is no
incentive to misreport.
Second, suppose that the agent’s misreporting affects whether that agent is pre-selected or not.
There are now two cases:
1. The agent wins by misreporting, but would have lost when truthful.
2. The agent loses by misreporting, but would have won when truthful.
In this context:
• Case (1) can be formally denoted as ct(θ0) > cs(θ0) and b c(θ0) < cs(θ0). Now, since the
true cost ct(θ0) > cs(θ0), it follows directly from Lemma 3.1 that the expected utility
U(θ) is strictly negative, irrespective of θ. Therefore, the agent could do strictly better by
reporting truthfully in which case the expected utility is zero.
22We intend to show that all our assumptions regarding the cost functions (i.e. non crossing condition and concav-
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• Case (2) can be formally denoted as ct(θ0) < cs(θ0) and b c(θ0) > cs(θ0). In this case the
agent would have won by being truthful, but now receives a utility of zero. To show that
this type of misreporting is suboptimal, we need to show that, when ct(θ0) < cs(θ0), an
agent beneﬁts from being selected and generating the (optimal) estimate (i.e. U(θ∗) > 0
when ct(θ0) < cs(θ0)). Now, since θ∗ is optimal by deﬁnition, then U(θ∗) ≥ U(θ0).
From the expected utility in equation 3.6, we have U(θ0) = cs(θ0)−ct(θ0) > 0 when
ct(θ0) < cs(θ0), and henceU(θ∗) > 0 at true costs reporting.
Corollary 3.1. Incentive compatibility with respect to agents’ reported costs and precisions does
not hold if the agents’ cost functions cross at θ0.
Proof. The proof regarding the agents’ reported costs comes directly from the above theorem, as
we need to show only one example where an agent is incentivised to misreport its cost function.
Against this background, following the notation of the above theorem, let ct(θ) and b c(θ) denote
an agent’s true and reported cost functions respectively, while cs(θ) denotes the cost function
used to scale the scoring function and θ0 is the point where two cost functions (suppose cs(θ) and
ct(θ)) intersect. In this context, we intend to show that an agent can do better by misreporting
and losing, rather than by reporting truthfully and winning. In more detail, since cs(θ) and ct(θ)
overlap at θ0, cs(θ) < ct(θ), for every θ > θ0. Therefore, according to Lemma 3.1, the expected
utility will be strictly negative. If the agent misreports its cost function so it is not selected, its
utility will be zero. Therefore, the mechanism is no longer incentive compatible with respect to
reported cost functions.
Now, regarding the agent’s reported precision, if at θ0 ct(θ) and cs(θ) intersect then ct(θ0) >
cs(θ0) and therefore U(θ0) < 0. Given that this agent is the cheapest one, at least for θ ≤ θ0 it is
in its best interest to report a precision lower that θ0 even if it makes an estimate with precision
greater than θ0, in order to maintain to positive utility. That is, b θ < θ0, while θ > θ0. Therefore,
the mechanism is no longer incentive compatible with respect to reported precision.
Theorem 3.2. The mechanism is incentive compatible regarding the agent’s reported estimate
and precision in the second stage.
Proof. Given the scaling of the scoring rules described in step 1 in the second stage of Mech-
anism 1, the expected utility of the agent, if it produces an estimate of precision θ, which it
reports with precision b θ, is denoted byU(θ,b θ), and is given by:
U(θ,b θ) =
c0
s(b θ)
S
0(b θ)

S(θ,b θ)−S(b θ)

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whereS(θ,b θ)istheagent’sexpectedscoreforproducinganestimateofprecisionθandreporting
its precision as b θ. Furthermore, S(b θ) is the agent’s expected score for producing and truthfully
reporting an estimate of precision b θ, ct(.) is the true cost function of the agent, and cs(.) is the
cost function used to produce the scoring rule (i.e. the second lowest revealed cost).
Now, the proof of mechanism’s incentive compatibility regarding the agent’s reported estimate
follows directly from the deﬁnition of the strictly proper scoring rule. Indeed, from the general
form of the utility function:
U(θ,b θ) = α(b θ)S(θ,b θ)+β(b θ)−ct(θ) (3.9)
it is clear that since the expected score, S(θ,b θ), is maximised when the agent reports truthfully
its estimate, the same will happen to the expected utility as it is an afﬁne transformation of the
expected score.
However, proving that the mechanism is incentive compatible with respect to agent’s reported
precision is not as straightforward since the scaling parameters α and β depend on the reported
precision. Therefore, we must explicitly show that the expected utility will be maximised at
b θ = θ.
In this context, taking the ﬁrst derivative of the expected utility (Equation 3.8) with respect to b θ
gives:
∂U(θ,b θ)
∂b θ
=
"
d
db θ
 
c0
s(b θ)
S
0(b θ)
!#

S(θ,b θ)−S(b θ)

+
c0
s(b θ)
S
0(b θ)

S
0(θ,b θ)−S
0(θ)

+c0
s(b θ)
or
∂U(θ,b θ)
∂b θ
=
"
d
db θ
 
c0
s(b θ)
S
0(b θ)
!#

S(θ,b θ)−S(b θ)

+
c0
s(b θ)
S
0(b θ)
S
0(θ,b θ) (3.10)
Now, since S is a strictly proper scoring rule, then S(θ,b θ) = S(b θ) and S
0(θ,b θ) = 023 when b θ = θ.
Hence:
∂U(θ,b θ)
∂b θ

 

b θ=θ
= 0 (3.11)
andthus, theutilityoftheagentismaximisedwhenitsreportedprecisionisequaltotheprecision
of the estimate that it subsequently produces (b θ = θ).
At this point, for completeness, we conﬁrm that the second derivative is negative at b θ = θ. To
this end, after deriving Equation 3.10, the second derivative of a selected agent’s expected utility,
is given by
∂2U(θ,b θ)
∂(b θ)2 =
"
d2
db θ2
 
c0
s(b θ)
S
0(b θ)
!#

S(θ,b θ)−S(b θ)

+
"
d
db θ
 
c0
s(b θ)
S
0(b θ)
!#

S
0(θ,b θ)−S
0(b θ)

+
23Note that for notational convenience we denote
∂S(θ,b θ)
∂(b θ) and
∂2S(θ,b θ)
∂(b θ)2 as S
0(θ,b θ) and S
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+
"
d
db θ
 
c0
s(b θ)
S
0(b θ)
!#
S
0(θ,b θ)+
c0
s(b θ)
S
0(b θ)
S
00(θ,b θ) (3.12)
Now, S is a strictly proper scoring rule, and therefore S(θ,b θ)=S(b θ) and S
0(θ,b θ)=0 whenb θ=θ.
Hence, Equation 3.12 takes a simpler form for b θ = θ:
∂2U(θ,b θ)
∂(b θ)2

 

b θ=θ
=
c0
s(b θ)
S
0(b θ)
S
00(b θ)−c00
s(b θ)+
c0
s(b θ)
S
0(b θ)
S
00(θ,b θ) (3.13)
Now, at b θ = θ the ﬁrst term of equation 3.13 is negative because S is strictly proper, and this
implies that S
00(θ,b θ) is negative at b θ=θ since S(θ,b θ) is maximised at b θ=θ. Furthermore, c00
s(b θ)
is positive, assuming convexity of the cost function, and S
00(b θ) is negative assuming concavity
of the scoring rule. Hence, the second derivative is negative at b θ = θ.
To this end, we have shown that an agent is incentivised to report a precision equal to the actual
precision of its estimate, and hence, the mechanism is incentive compatible with respect to
agent’s reported precision.
Theorem 3.3. The two-stage mechanism is individually rational.
Proof. Having shown in Theorem 3.1 that the true reporting of cost functions in the ﬁrst stage is
a weakly dominant strategy, we only have to examine whether the selected agent is incentivised
to participate into the the second stage of the mechanism and report its estimate and its precision
to the centre.
In more detail, since agents that do not win in the ﬁrst stage receive zero utility (Theorem 3.1),
we only consider the case of the selected agent. For that agent, its true cost function is less or
equal to the cost function used for the scaling of the expected score (ct(θ) ≤ cs(θ)).
Given that the selected agent’s expected utility is: U(θ) =
c0
s(θ0)
S
0(θ0)(S(θ)−S(θ0))+cs(θ0)−ct(θ)
(equation 3.6), it follows thatU(θ0) = cs(θ0)−ct(θ0) ≥ 0.
Furthermore, in Lemma 3.2, we have shown that the agent may produce an estimate θ∗ > θ0.
However, since θ∗ is optimal by deﬁnition, thenU(θ∗) ≥U(θ0), and thusU(θ∗) ≥ 0.
Theorem 3.4. For the agent selected in the ﬁrst stage of the mechanism, it is optimal to produce
an estimate with a precision equal or higher than the precision required by the centre, i.e., θ∗ ≥
θ0.
Proof. This proof follows directly from Lemma 3.2 where we show that there is an optimal
precision, θ∗, such that θ∗ ≥ θ0 if ct(θ) and cs(θ) are convex functions with ct(θ) < cs(θ),
c0
t(θ) < c0
s(θ) and ct(0) = cs(0) = 0.
In more detail, given that the agents reveal their true cost functions, we have ct(θ) ≤ cs(θ) and
from the model description we assume that ct(0) = cs(0) = 0 and that the order of the costChapter 3 A Mechanism for Dealing with Unknown Costs 55
functions is maintained for their derivatives ct(θ) < cs(θ) ⇒ c0
t(θ) < c0
s(θ). Therefore, and after
covering all Lemma 3.2’s conditions, it follows that θ∗ ≥ θ0.
Corollary 3.2. There can be no optimal precision, for certain concave cost functions.
Proof. We intend to show that our assumption regarding the convexity of the cost functions, is
not only a realistic one, driven by the nature of the information providers’ costs in citizen sensor
networks, but also critical for the achievement of one of the mechanism’s goals. In more detail,
by showing that there are certain concave functions, for which the optimal precision, θ∗, cannot
be deﬁned, we show, that concave cost functions cannot be considered in general, thus justify
our approach of employing convex cost functions.
In this context, we need to show that there are concave cost functions so that the optimal preci-
sion, θ∗, with θ∗ = argmaxθU(θ) does not exist. We will show this, by identifying at least one
type of concave cost functions so that U
00(θ) > 0, for any value of θ. As a result of this, U(θ)
will not be maximised at θ∗, or at any θ.
Against this background,U
00(θ) is derived by Equation 3.6 as:
U
00(θ) =
c0
s(θ0)
S
0(θ0)
S
00(θ)−c00
t (θ) = δS
00(θ)−c00
t (θ) (3.14)
Now, given that both cost functions and expected score are concave functions, c00
t (θ) < 0 and
S
00(θ) < 0,U
00(θ) > 0 for any concave functions, that satisfy the following assumption:
c00
t (θ) < δS
00(θ) (3.15)
Note that these proofs indicate that the two stages of the mechanism are inextricably linked
and cannot be considered in isolation of one another. Indeed, apparently small changes to the
second stage of the mechanism can destroy the incentive compatibility property of the ﬁrst stage.
For example, it is important to note that our mechanism is more precisely known as interim
individually rational (Mas-Colell et al., 1995), since the utility is positive in expectation. In any
speciﬁc instance, the payment could actually be negative if the prediction turns out to be far from
the actual outcome. An alternative choice for the second stage of the mechanism would be to set
β such that the payments are always positive, thus making the mechanism ex-post individually
rational. However, this would then violate the incentive-compatibility property since the agents
could then receive positive pay-offs by misreporting their cost functions. Likewise, it might be
tempting to imagine that the centre could use the revealed costs of the agents in order to request
a lower precision, conﬁdent in the knowledge that the selected agent will actually produce an
estimate of the required precision. However, by effectively using the lowest revealed cost withinChapter 3 A Mechanism for Dealing with Unknown Costs 56
the payment rule in this way, the incentive-compatibility property of the mechanism would again
be destroyed.
3.4 Empirical Evaluation
Having proved the economic properties of the mechanism in the general case for any convex
cost function, we now present empirical results for a speciﬁc scenario in which costs are linear
functions, given by ci(θ) = ciθ, where the value of ci is drawn from a uniform distribution
ci ∼ U(1,2) and θ0 = 1. This is the simplest scenario that satisﬁes our assumptions regarding
the cost functions and therefore, allows us to focus on the comparison of the four scoring rules’
performance in order to identify the differences between them and select the scoring rule that
minimises the centre’s expected payment and its variance. To this end, for a range from 2 to
20 agents participating in the ﬁrst stage, we simulate the mechanism 106 times and, for each
iteration, record the payment made to the agent that provided the observation and the precision
of this observation. Due to the number of iterations that we perform, the standard errors in
the mean values plotted are much smaller than the symbol size shown in the plot, and thus for
clarity, we omit them.
The payment the agent expects to derive, P, and its actual precision, θ∗, for every value of
N ∈ [2,20] are shown in Figure 3.1. Initially we restrict our analysis to the quadratic, spherical
and logarithmic scoring rules for a varying numbers of agents, N. In so doing, we are able
to observe the expected payment and required precision as the number of agents increases and
then chose a speciﬁc value of N in order to focus on the parameter k and how it affects the
mechanism’s payments. Now, ﬁrst note that as expected, as the number of agents increases,
the mean payment decreases toward the lower limit of the uniform distribution from which the
costs were drawn. Furthermore, note that there is a ﬁxed ordering over the entire range, with the
payment resulting from the quadratic scoring rule being the highest, and that of the logarithmic
scoring rule being the lowest.
In this ﬁgure, we also show the mean of the lowest and second lowest costs evaluated at the
required precision θ0 (denoted by c1θ0 and c2θ0 respectively). The ﬁrst cost represents the
minimum payment that could have been made if the costs of the agents were known to the
centre. While, the second represents the payment that would have been made, had the agent
produced an observation of the required precision θ0 rather than its own optimal precision θ∗.
The gap between c1θ0 and c2θ0 is the extra amount that must be paid as a result of the costs
being unknown and is the same regardless the scoring rule used. On the other hand, the gap
between c2θ0 and the mean payment of any particular scoring rule, depends on the choice of
the scoring rule as it represents the loss that the centre has to cover, as a result of the agent
producing an estimate at its optimal precision, θ∗. The goal in selecting scoring rules is clearly
to minimise this gap, and it can be seen that the logarithmic scoring rule is closest in succeeding
in this. The reason for this can be seen in Figure 3.2 where the precision of the observations thatChapter 3 A Mechanism for Dealing with Unknown Costs 58
TABLE 3.1: Analytical calculation of Quadratic, Spherical, Logarithmic and Parametric Scor-
ing Rules with linear cost functions for an instance of the mechanism
SR: Quadratic Spherical Logarithmic Parametric
P(θ0) c2θ0
 
2
c2
c1 −1

c2θ0
 
4

c2
c1
 1
3
−3

c2θ0
 
1+log

c2
c1
 c2θ0
k−1
"
2

c2
c1
 k−1
2
+k−3
#
θ∗

c2
c1
2
θ0

c2
c1
 4
3
θ0

c2
c1

θ0

c2
c1
 2
3−k
θ0
Costs are given by linear functions, c(θ) = cθ, and c1 and c2 are the lowest and second lowest costs.
and β and S(θ) from Table 2.3, after replacing ct(θ) and cs(θ) by the linear functions c1θ and
c2θ, with c1 and c2 being the lowest and second lowest cost function. For precision equal to the
optimal precision (θ = θ∗), we then calculated the expected payment P(θ0) = αS(θ0)+β as a
function of the costs c1, c2 and the centre’s required precision, θ0.
Against this background, in Table 3.1, we show that when the payment is based on the loga-
rithmic scoring rule, the agent’s expected payment is minimised in comparison to the other two
scoring rules, while its optimal precision is closer to the required one.
In Table 3.1 we also introduce the parametric scoring rule (already described in Section 2.4.3.1)
in our setting. It can be seen that for k = 2, k = 1.5, and k → 1 the expected payment and
optimal precision for the parametric scoring rule, is equal to those of the quadratic, spherical and
logarithmic scoring rules. Despite this similarity and the fact that the logarithmic scoring rule is
the best choice as it minimises the payment the centre expects to issue to the selected agent and
its optimal precision (as indicated by Figures 3.1 and 3.2 and Table 3.1), the parametric scoring
rule has a signiﬁcant advantage over the logarithmic. That is, the existence of ﬁnite lower bound
for k ∈ (1,3), since it is a polynomial expression of a distribution density function.
These results are analysed in Table 3.2, where we have analytically calculated the lower and
upper bounds of the scoring rules (S−,S+) and the scaled payments (P−,P+), based on the
principlethatthelowerboundisderivedfromthescoringruleS(x0;x,θ), astheprobabilityofthe
event is 0 (N (x0;x,1/θ) = 0), while for the upper bound, that probability is 1, (N (x0;x,1/θ) =
1). In this table it can be seen that the logarithmic scoring rule, as opposed to the parametric
scoring rule, does not have a ﬁnite lower bound (denoted as S− in row 1 in Table 3.2), which
means that if the agent’s estimate is far from the actual outcome (hence its p.d.f equal to 0), then
a payment (denoted as P− in row 3 in Table 3.2), based on the logarithmic scoring rule will go
to −∞ since the agent’s probability density function goes to 0.
However, as k → 1 the payment based on the scaled parametric scoring rule does not have
a ﬁnite lower bound since the scaling parameter α goes to −∞ (see rows 3 and 5 in Table
3.2). Therefore, if the centre requires ﬁnite payments, the parametric scoring rule is an equally
inappropriate choice to the logarithmic scoring rule. Nevertheless, for the parametric family the
effect of an agent’s imprecise estimate on its payment can be minimised, if the parameter’s value
is chosen appropriately.Chapter 3 A Mechanism for Dealing with Unknown Costs 59
TABLE 3.2: The upper and lower bounds for the parametric (k → 1) and logarithmic scoring
rules and their resulting payments
Scoring rule: k-power for k → 1 Logarithmic
S−: 0 −∞
S+: 1 0
P−: −∞ −∞
P+: cs(θ0)−2c0
s(θ0)θ0 c0
s(θ0)θ0
h
1−log

θ0
2π
i
+cs(θ0)
α: ∞ 2c0
s(θ0)θ0
β: cs(θ0)−∞ cs(θ0)−2c0
s(θ0)θ0

1
2 log

θ0
2π

− 1
2

cs(θ0) is the cost function of the agent with the second lowest cost.
In this context, and in order to determine that value of the parameter, we empirically evaluate
the parametric scoring rule for a parameter space (1,2.5]24 and compare it with the quadratic,
spherical and logarithmic scoring rule as the parameter k increases. We choose N = 10, since
the results of the simulations of the three other scoring rules have already indicated that for high
values of N the expected payments converge to the lower limit of the cost’s distribution and low
values of N are less likely to occur in the applications that we are targeting. The results of this
analysis are demonstrated in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, where we show the expected payment made
by the centre and its variance. We ﬁrst note that the expected payment that results from the
quadratic, spherical and logarithmic is equal to the expected payment based on the parametric
scoring rule, for k → 1, k = 1.5 and k = 2 respectively. This is also seen in the analytical results
after calculating the expected payment and the optimal precision for any values c1 and c2, given
linear cost functions (c(θ) = cθ) with c1 the lowest cost, and c2 the second lowest cost (as seen
in Table 3.1).
In more detail, as k → 1 the optimal precision and the resulting payment is asymptotically equal
to the optimal precision and payment of the logarithmic scoring rule, while for k = 1.5 the op-
timal precision and expected payment are equal to the optimal precision and expected payment
of the spherical scoring rule. Furthermore, the same results apply for k = 2 and the quadratic
scoring rule, as expected, given that for k = 2 the power scoring rule takes the quadratic scoring
rule’s form.
Now regarding Figure 3.4, we show that the logarithmic scoring rule results in the payment
with the lowest variance, while a payment based on the quadratic scoring rule has the highest
variance and the spherical is between them. Following the previous results, as k → 1 and for
k =2 the variance of a payment based on the parametric scoring rule is equal to the variance of a
payment based on the logarithmic and quadratic scoring rules respectively. However, as opposed
24We do not simulate the mechanism for k >2.5 since as k increases the expected payment increases exponentially
and the results are skewed towards inﬁnity.Chapter 3 A Mechanism for Dealing with Unknown Costs 60
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FIGURE 3.3: The mean of the centre’s payment.
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FIGURE 3.4: The variance of the centre’s payment.
to the expected payments and optimal precisions, the results are not the same for k = 1.5 and
the spherical rule, with the variance of a payment based on the spherical rule being greater.
To sum up, so far the logarithmic and parametric scoring rules appear to share both their ad-
vantages and disadvantages, and the large negative payments to the agents producing imprecise
observations cannot be avoided for these two scoring rules. However, the value of the parameter
can be chosen in order to minimise the lower bound of the centre’s payments which reﬂects the
maximum ﬁne imposed on an agent providing an extremely inaccurate estimate. In Figure 3.5Chapter 3 A Mechanism for Dealing with Unknown Costs 61
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4
−14
−12
−10
−8
−6
−4
−2
k
P
a
y
m
e
n
t
’
s
 
L
o
w
 
B
o
u
n
d
 
 
k−power
Quadratic
Spherical
FIGURE 3.5: The ﬁne the agent has to pay to the centre on the worst case scenario.
we plot the lower bound of the payments based on the quadratic, spherical and parametric scor-
ing rules (we omit the logarithmic scoring rule as it goes to −∞), and based on this result, we
select k to be equal to 1.2 in our future experiments. This value results in an expected payment
and variance that is close to the logarithmic scoring rule, whilst not penalising the agent exces-
sively in the worst case. The choice of parameter value here is is somewhat arbitrary, however,
in practise, it will depend on the details of the particular application domain.
3.5 Summary
This chapter introduced a two-stage mechanism based on strictly proper scoring rules that moti-
vates self-interested rational agents to invest sufﬁcient resources in making a costly observation
of a speciﬁed precision and report it truthfully to a centre, in a setting in which a centre is faced
with multiple agents but has no knowledge about the costs involved in the generation of the
observations. This mechanism can be applied in citizen sensor networks where the information
buyer has to elicit the costs the providers have to face when generating their observations and
hence addresses research requirement 1. Furthermore, by proving that the mechanism was in-
centive compatible in costs, estimates and precisions revealed and that the selected agent will
generate an estimate of at least the required precision, we showed that it can successfully address
the issue of selﬁsh behaviour in citizen sensor networks and satisﬁed research requirement 2.
It should be noted that although this mechanism fully satisﬁes the requirements regarding the
providers’ unknown costs and selﬁsh behaviour which occurs in a citizen sensor network, it only
partially satisﬁes our requirements regarding operating in an environment where the centre has
to combine several possibly inaccurate observations as we discussed in Section 1.1. Therefore,
in the next chapter we intend to extend this mechanism so it does not rely in the assumption that
a single agent is capable of producing an observation at the centre’s required precision. In soChapter 3 A Mechanism for Dealing with Unknown Costs 62
doing, we will be able to address the more realistic problem where information providers face
restrictions in the precisions of their observations or estimates due to their limited capabilities.
Indeed, in the noise monitoring scenario, it is not expected for the members of the public to have
the same level of commitment to the project, therefore some will invest less time than others,
resulting in observations of lower accuracy. Restrictions for the information providers may also
appear in a trafﬁc update service application, where companies offering such a service, may have
a limited source of available data due to budget restrictions and prediction models which are not
state of the art. In such cases, the produced estimates of the trafﬁc conditions in a particular
location, will have low quality and it is very likely to be inaccurate. Hence in the next chapter
we propose a mechanism where, the centre (acting as information buyer) will have to combine
multiple observations or probabilistic estimates of possibly low quality in order to achieve a
higher degree of accuracy.Chapter 4
A Mechanism for Dealing with
Multiple Agents that have a Limited
Degree of Precision
In the previous chapter we considered the case where a single agent is able to generate an esti-
mate of at least the precision required by the centre. Now, as already mentioned in Chapter 1,
this may not always be the case in many citizen sensor networks where information providers
face restrictions in the resources available to them for the generation of their observations and
therefore have a limited ability to produce estimates of arbitrary quality. In such cases the infor-
mation buyer may have to procure observations from multiple providers and fuse them together
in order to achieve a sufﬁciently high precision. For example, for the noise monitoring scenario,
where members of the public measure the noises around them with their mobile phones, it is not
expected for all them to invest the same time in producing the observations, hence there will be
some observations of low quality, which are not necessarily representative of the sound pollu-
tion levels in a particular area. Likewise, in a trafﬁc update service, where companies provide
optimal travel routes and estimates of the congestion on the streets based on data they collect
from various sources (such as stationary sensors in trafﬁc lights or mobile sensors in taxis), they
may have limited sources of incoming data or poor prediction methods. Therefore, they are not
able to provide estimates of the trafﬁc conditions that are of satisfactory precision.
To this end, we revise the mechanism in the previous chapter by relaxing the assumption that a
single agent is capable of estimates of any precision the centre may require and therefore address
research Requirement 3 set in Chapter 1. In so doing we contribute to the state of the art, by
proposing a parametrised iterative mechanism (Mechanism 2), which although it may appear
to be similar to the previous mechanism (i.e. two stages, ﬁrst stage to elicit costs, second to
calculate payments), it is signiﬁcantly different, speciﬁcally regarding the process used to elicit
those costs and calculate the payments.
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We ﬁrst describe the extension of the information elicitation problem outlined in Section 3.1
so it takes into consideration citizen sensor networks which consist of agents facing limitations
in the precisions of the observations they can provide (Section 4.1), while in Section 4.2 we
provide a two-stage mechanism that deals with this requirement effectively. In more detail, in
the ﬁrst stage the centre pre-selects M from N agents through a series of m+1 reverse price
auctions with m ≤ M, while in the second stage it elicits the pre-selected agents’ observations,
after sequentially approaching them in a random order. Having detailed the mechanism, we
formally prove that it is incentive compatible regarding the reported costs, maximum precisions
and observations, that pre-selected agents generate an observation at that maximum precision
and that it is an individually rational mechanism (Section 4.3). Furthermore, in Section 4.4 we
empirically compare several approaches by which the centre may pre-select M from N agents
and show both empirically and analytically that if the centre forms a single group of agents
in the ﬁrst stage it minimises its expected payment. Finally, in Section 4.5 we summarise and
discuss how to relax, and therefore address the ﬁnal requirement (Requirement 4), regarding the
centre’s access to knowledge about the observed event after it receives the agents’ observations.
4.1 Eliciting Information from Multiple Sources
We now extend the model described in Chapter 3, as we consider a citizen sensor network where
the information providers face restrictions in the precision of the observations they can provide.
As a consequence of these restrictions, there is now a limit in the maximum precisions of the
providers’ observations, denoted by θc
i. Thus, information providers can produce observations
of any precision up to and including this maximum value (i.e. 0 ≤ θi ≤ θc
i). We consider this
requirement very realistic as in many citizen sensor networks, information providers cannot
produce observations at any precision a buyer may require. In a noise monitoring scenario
this limit can be dictated by the time available to the member of the public making the sound
observation, while in the trafﬁc information service, the limit in the precision of the estimates of
trafﬁc congestion is deﬁned by the sources available to the companies and the statistical models
they use to estimate the trafﬁc.
In both these examples, restrictions enforce limitations on the quality and accuracy of the obser-
vations generated by the information providers, whether they collect this information themselves
or rely on external sources. In order to deal with these shortcomings, those interested in acquir-
ing this information have to combine multiple observations. That is in the noise monitoring
scenario several members of the public on nearby locations, while in the trafﬁc scenario drivers
can subscribe to multiple trafﬁc information services. In all these cases, combining several ob-
servations of possibly low quality, would result in an observation of satisfactory quality, which
would assist the information buyer in achieving its desired degree of accuracy. To this end, in
order to fuse k conditionally independent and unbiased probabilistic estimates, {b x1,...,b xk} of
possibly different precisions {b θ1,...,b θk}, into a single estimate with mean ¯ x and precision ¯ θ, theChapter 4 A Mechanism for Dealing with Multiple Agents that have a Limited Degree of
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information buyer uses the standard result (see DeGroot and Schervish (2002)):
¯ x =
∑
k
i=1b xib θi
¯ θ
and ¯ θ =
k
∑
i=1
b θi (4.1)
By fusing the providers’ reported estimates, the information buyer manages to acquire an esti-
mate of higher precision than the precision of any of the individual agents. Indeed, it can be
seen that ¯ θ ≥ θi for any agent i. However, note that for this fusion to be appropriate, agents
must be incentivised to truthfully report both their estimates and their precisions. Otherwise,
misreported estimates which are not an accurate representation of the state of the world, will
be fused with truthful estimates and thus the efﬁciency of the network will be degraded as the
estimated from the reports state of the world will not match the actual one.
To this end, given this model, the challenge is to design a mechanism in which the centre will be
able to initially identify those agents that can provide their estimates at the lowest cost (Require-
ment 1), then motivate these agents to truthfully report their maximum precisions and ﬁnally
generate and truthfully report their estimates with precisions equal to their reported maximum
precisions (Requirement 2) in an environment where agents have limitations in the precisions of
the observations they can provide (Requirement 3). By addressing these challenges, we will be
solving research requirements 1, 2 and 3 introduced in Section 1.1.
4.2 The Mechanism
In Mechanism 2 we extend the mechanism discussed in the previous chapter by relaxing the
assumption that the centre can select a single agent that can provide the estimate at the required
precisions. The centre can now elicit estimates from multiple agents which have limited pre-
cisions in the estimates they can provide. In order to address this issue, the centre in the ﬁrst
stage, iteratively pre-selects M of the N available agents based on their reported costs, while
in the second stage agents belonging in a subset of the pre-selected agents identiﬁed in the ﬁrst
stage are incentivised to generate an estimate at their reported maximum precision and truthfully
report it to the centre.
In more detail, in the ﬁrst step (Step 1.1) of the ﬁrst stage the centre divides all the available
agents, N, into groups of n ≤ N agents and asks the ﬁrst group of n agents to reveal their cost
functions. Then in Step 1.2 it implements a reverse m+1 auction in order to select the m
cheapest agents, with m < n. This procedure is repeated until all N agents have been asked to
report their cost functions and by the end of the ﬁrst stage M agents are pre-selected.
In the second stage, the centre initialises the iterative process by setting its required precision
equal to θr (Step 2.1) and in the next step asks a random agent from the M pre-selected agents
to reveal its private maximum precision (Step 2.2). In Step 2.3, the centre checks whether
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not, it sets the required precision equal to the remaining needed precision (θr = θr −b θc
j) and
repeats Steps 2.2 and 2.3 until it satisﬁes its required precision. In Step 2.4 those agents selected
through the iteration of Steps 2.2 and 2.3 are asked to produce an estimate at their reported
maximum precision and the centre announces the scaled strictly proper scoring rule. The scaling
parameters α and β are given by:
αj =
c0
s(b θc
j)
S
0(b θc
j)
and βj = cs(b θc
j)−
c0
s(b θc
j)
S
0(b θc
j)
S(b θc
j) (4.2)
where b θc
j is the reported maximum precision, and cs is the (m+1)th cost which was associated
with that agent at an iteration of Step 1.2. Then it proceeds to the ﬁnal step (Step 2.5) where
the agents that were selected during the iterations of Steps 2.2 and 2.3 to produce an estimate at
their reported maximum precision, produce these estimates at any precisions and report them.
Although in this step we could restrict agents to report their estimates with precisionb θc
j, we shall
show in Section 4.3, under this mechanism the agents are automatically incentivised to report
b θj =b θc
j anyway. Finally, those agents receive their payments after the centre observes the actual
outcome, while the rest of the M agents are discarded at Step 2.5.
We now proceed to prove that this mechanism leads the agents to truthfully reveal their costs in
the ﬁrst stage (so that those which can produce the estimate at the lowest cost can be identiﬁed),
and that the M pre-selected agents are incentivised to truthfully report their maximum preci-
sions to the centre and subsequently make and truthfully report estimates of these precisions
in the second stage. These properties are not obvious, and as in the single agent mechanism
(Mechanism 1 in Chapter 3), they depend rather subtly on the details of the mechanism. For
example, we note that if after asking all M agents for their maximum precisions, the centre does
not achieve its required precision, the mechanism must proceed to the payment phase (Step 2.5).
That is, the centre must commit to paying all pre-selected agents for their estimates at their re-
ported maximum precisions, even if it does not acquire its required precision. Failure to observe
this policy would lead agents to over-report their maximum precision, in order that some pay-
ment was received, and thus, the mechanism would no longer be incentive compatible in terms
of maximum precisions.
Furthermore, note that in Step 1.2, the centre chooses the m agents with the lowest reported
costs, and discards the remaining n−m agents. If these agents were not discarded, but were
placed back into the pool of available agents, then the mechanism would no longer be incentive
compatible in terms of costs; agents would have an incentive to over-report their costs, such
that when they are eventually pre-selected, their payment rule will be calculated using a higher
cost. Finally, in Step 2.2, the centre must randomly ask the pre-selected agents to report their
maximum precisions using an ordering which is independent of their reported costs. Failing to
dosowillundermineincentivecompatibilityintermsofcostsoftheﬁrststageofthemechanism,
thereby illustrating how the two stages interact.Chapter 4 A Mechanism for Dealing with Multiple Agents that have a Limited Degree of
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Mechanism 2 The mechanism for dealing with multiple agents that can provide estimates of a
limited precision:
1. First Stage
1.1 The centre selects n ≥ 2 agents from the available N and asks them to report their cost
functions b ci(θ) with i ∈ {1,...,n}.
1.2 The centre selects the m, (1≤m<n), agents with the lowest costs, associates the (m+1)th
cost with these agents and discards the remaining n−m agents.
1.3 The centre repeats the above two steps until it has asked all N agents to report their cost
functions. Note that when N is not exactly divisible by n and we have a single remainder,
it is discarded. Otherwise in the ﬁnal round the centre modiﬁes n and m such that n =
N mod n and m = min(m,n−1).
1.4 We denote the total number of the agents pre-selected in this stage as M and note that its
value depends on N, n and m.
2. Second Stage
2.1 The centre sets its required precision θ0 equal to θr.
2.2 The centre randomly selects one of the pre-selected agents and asks it to report its maxi-
mum precision b θc
k, with k ∈ {1,...,M}.
2.3 The centre sets θr = θr−min(θr,b θc
k) and if θr > 0 it repeats Step 2.2 of the second stage.
2.4 The centre asks agent j, belonging in the agents selected through the iteration of Steps
2.2 and 2.3, to produce an estimate at its reported maximum precision, b θc
j, and presents
it with a scaled strictly proper scoring rule with the scaling parameters αj and βj being
determined using equation 4.2.
2.5 Each of these agents produces an estimate xj with precision θj and reports b xj and b θj to
the centre, which after observing the actual outcome, x0, issues the following payments:
Pj(x0;b xj,b θj) = αjSj(x0;b xj,b θj)+βj (4.3)
with αj and βj being already determined in Step 2.4.Chapter 4 A Mechanism for Dealing with Multiple Agents that have a Limited Degree of
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4.3 Economic Properties of the Mechanism
Having detailed the mechanism, we now identify and prove its economic properties. Speciﬁ-
cally, we show that:
1. The mechanism is incentive compatible with respect to the pre-selected agents’ reported
estimates and maximum precisions.
2. The actual precision of the generated estimate is equal to the reported maximum precision.
3. The mechanism is incentive compatible with respect to the agents’ reported costs.
4. The mechanism is individually rational.
Theorem 4.1. The mechanism is incentive compatible with respect to the pre-selected agents’ re-
ported estimates and maximum precisions which is also the precision of the generated estimate.
Proof. Regarding the pre-selected agents’ reported estimates, the proof of incentive compatibil-
ityfollowsdirectlyfromthedeﬁnitionofthestrictlyproperscoringrules. AsperinTheorem3.2,
a pre-selected agent’s expected utility (Equation 4.4) is an afﬁne transformation of the expected
score which is maximised when a pre-selected agent reports truthfully its private estimate.
Now, regarding the pre-selected agents reported maximum precision, although the proof may
look similar to that of Theorem 3.2, in this case we intend to show that a pre-selected agent will
not only truthfully report its maximum precision, but that this will be the actual precision of its
generated estimate.
In this context, when the agent reports its estimate, it must do so with the precision that it
claimed was its maximum. Thus, ˆ θ = b θc. Now, given the scaling of the scoring rules described
in Step 2.4 the mechanism, the expected utility of the agent, if it reports its maximum precision
as b θc, and subsequently produces an estimate of precision θ, which it reports with precision b θc,
is denoted byU(θ,b θc), and is given by:
U(θ,b θc) =
c0
s(b θc)
S
0(b θc)

S(θ,b θc)−S(b θc)

+cs(b θc)−ct(θ) (4.4)
where S(θ,b θc) is the agent’s expected score for producing an estimate of precision θ and re-
porting its precision as b θc. Furthermore, S(b θc) is the agent’s expected score for producing and
truthfully reporting an estimate of precision b θc, ct(.) is the true cost function of the agent, and
cs(.) is the cost function used to produce the scoring rule (i.e. the (m+1)th lowest revealed
cost in the group from which the agent was pre-selected). Taking the ﬁrst derivative of this
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dU(θ,b θc)
db θc =
d
db θc
 
c0
s(b θc)
S
0(b θc)
!

S(θ,b θc)−S(b θc)

+
c0
s(b θc)
S
0(b θc)
S
0(θ,b θc) (4.5)
Now, since S is a strictly proper scoring rule, then S(θ,b θc) = S(b θc) and S
0(θ,b θc) = 0 when
θ = b θc. Hence:
dU(θ,b θc)
db θc

 

b θc=θ
= 0 (4.6)
and thus, the utility of the agent is maximised when it reveals as its maximum precision, the
precision of the estimate that it subsequently produces.
For completeness, we conﬁrm that the second derivative is negative at b θc = θ. To this end, the
second derivative is given by:
d2U(θ,b θc)
d(b θc)2 (b θc = θ) =
c0
s(b θc)
S
0(b θc)
S
00(θ,b θc)−c00
s(b θc)+
c0
s(b θc)
S
0(b θc)
S
00(b θc) (4.7)
Now, the ﬁrst term of equation 4.7 is negative because S is strictly proper, and this implies that
S
00(θ,b θc) is negative at b θc = θ. Furthermore, c00
s(b θc) is positive, assuming convexity of the cost
function, and S
00(b θc) is negative assuming concavity of the scoring rule. Hence, the second
derivative is negative at b θc = θ.
We now show that it will actually produce an estimate of precision equal to its reported maxi-
mum precision. To this end, we note that when b θc = θ, the expected utility of the agent is given
by:
U(θ) = cs(θ)−ct(θ) (4.8)
Since cs(.) and ct(.) and their derivatives do not cross or overlap and maintain their order (as
required by the initial model Section 3.1), then U(θ) is a strictly increasing function. Thus the
agent will maximise its expected utility by producing an estimate at its maximum precision, and
thus, θ = θc, and hence, b θc = ˆ θ = θc, as required.
Theorem 4.2. The mechanism is incentive compatible with respect to the agents’ reported costs.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction and consider two cases depending on whether or not an
agent is pre-selected in the ﬁrst stage of the mechanism as a result of its misreporting. Let ct(.)
and b c(.) denote an agents’ true and reported cost functions respectively. Furthermore, let cs(.)
denote the cost function used to scale the scoring rule if that agent is among the m agents with
the lowest reported costs in its group of n agents in the ﬁrst stage of the mechanism (i.e. cs(.) is
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First, suppose that the agent’s misreporting does not affect whether it is pre-selected or not. In
this case, had the agent been pre-selected, its payment would have been based on the (m+1)th
cost of its group and therefore independent of its own report. Conversely, had the agent not
been pre-selected, it would have received zero utility, since the remaining n−m agents, of a
group of initially n agents, that are not pre-selected are discarded. Hence, there is no incentive
to misreport.
Second, suppose that the agent’s misreporting affects whether that agent is pre-selected or not.
There are now two cases:
1. The agent is pre-selected by misreporting, but would have not been if it was truthful.
2. The agent is not pre-selected by misreporting, but would have been if it was truthful.
In this context:
• Case (1) can be formally denoted as ct(b θc) > cs(b θc) and b c(b θc) < cs(b θc). Now, since the
true cost ct(b θc) > cs(b θc), it follows directly from Theorem 4.1 that the expected utility
U(θ) = cs(θ)−ct(θ) is strictly negative, irrespective of θ. Therefore, the agent could do
strictly better by reporting truthfully in which case the expected utility is zero.
• Case (2) can be formally denoted as ct(b θc) < cs(b θc) and b c(b θc) > cs(b θc). In this case
the agent would have been pre-selected if it was truthful, but now receives a utility of
zero since it hasn’t been pre-selected due to its misreporting. To show that this type
of misreporting is suboptimal, we need to show that, when ct(b θc) < cs(b θc), an agent
beneﬁts from being pre-selected, since it may then be asked to generate an estimate at
its reported maximum precision, b θc. It follows directly from Theorem 4.1 that U(b θc) =
cs(b θc)−ct(b θc) > 0 when ct(b θc) < cs(b θc), and therefore there is no incentive for an agent
that would have been pre-selected to misreport its cost function.
Hence, wehaveshownthatapre-selectedagentisincentivisedtoreportitstruthfulcostfunction,
as required.
Theorem 4.3. The mechanism is interim individually rational.
Proof. Due to Theorem 4.2, we can assume that all agents, and consequently those pre-selected,
will report their true cost functions, and therefore ct(θ) ≤ cs(θ). In Theorem 4.1 we show that
the expected utility U(θ) = cs(θ)−ct(θ) is strictly non-negative, irrespective of θ. Therefore,
the expected utility of a pre-selected agent that generates an estimate of precision equal to its
reported maximum precision b θc, is strictly non-negative (i.e. U(b θc) ≥ 0), and hence the mech-
anism is interim individually rational. Note that the mechanism is interim individually rational,
since the utility is non-negative in expectation but there may be instances in which the payment
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the second stage, such that the payments are always positive, would make the mechanism ex-
post individually rational. However, this would then violate the incentive-compatibility property
since the agents could receive positive pay-offs by misreporting their cost functions in the ﬁrst
stage.
In this section we have proved the economic properties for the class of mechanisms that is
deﬁned by the different approaches in performing the pre-selection (i.e. the values of n and
m) in the mechanism’s ﬁrst stage. The mechanism’s economic properties are not affected by
the process followed in the stage of pre-selection, as long as some global rules are followed,
such as agents that are not pre-selected are discarded and do not end up in the initial pool of
agents. However, the same does not happen for the total payment issued by the centre, or its
probability of achieving it required precision, which depend on how the groups of n and m
agents are formed in Steps 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3. Now, the issued total payment and the probability
deﬁne the efﬁciency of a mechanism of that class. Therefore, in the following section, through
the empirical evaluation of Mechanism 2, we determine which are the optimal values of the
parameters n and m in order to identify those that minimise the payment and maximise the
probability of achieving the required precision.
4.4 Empirical Evaluation
Against this background, in this section we present empirical results for a speciﬁc scenario in
ordertoexploretheeffectthattheparametersnandmhaveonthecentre’stotalpayments, andon
the probability of achieving its required precision. In more detail, as before, the cost functions
are represented by linear functions, given by ci(θ) = ciθ, where ci are independently drawn
from a uniform distribution ci ∼ U(1,2). The maximum precisions of the selected agents, θc
i,
are independently drawn from another uniform distribution θc
i ∼U(0,1) and ﬁnally the centre’s
required precision, θ0, is equal to 1.7 in order to generate representative results whereby the
probability of achieving the required precision, P(θ0), covers a broad range of values in [0,1].
Finally, we restrict our analysis to the use of the parametric scoring rule for k = 1.2 as we have
shown in Section 3.4, that among the common rules and for various values of the parameter k,
this rule is a good choice for a centre intending to issue low payments with low variance, that
still remain bounded.
Given this, and for N = 7, we explore all possible combinations of n and m given the constraints
that 2 ≤ n < N and 1 ≤ m < n. We choose N = 7 since for this number of agents the difference
between the scoring rule based payment and the lower bound denoted by the average (m+1)th
cost is still signiﬁcant, as it can be seen in Figure 3.1, for the single agent case (Mechanism 1),
where it shows that as N increases the payments converge to that lower bound. In this context,
for each combination, we simulate the mechanisms 106 times and for each iteration we record
whether the centre was successful in acquiring an estimate at its required precision, and the sum
of all the payments it issued to those agents that were asked to produce an estimate. In FigureChapter 4 A Mechanism for Dealing with Multiple Agents that have a Limited Degree of
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are pre-selected (denoted by M) and many of these combinations result in the same number of
agents being pre-selected (e.g. if N = 7, both n = 4, m = 2 and n = 5, m = 3 result in M = 4). In
the following theorem, we show that this probability increases, as the number of the pre-selected
agents increases:
Theorem 4.4. The probability of achieving the required precision by the centre increases as M
increases.
Proof. Although in the empirical evaluation of the mechanism we rely on uniform distributions
for the reported precisions, in this proof we do not follow these restrictions, and show that the
probability of achieving the required precision increases as the number of agents increases for
any positive distribution of the reported precisions.
In this context, we consider M independent random variables to represent the M agents’ maxi-
mum precisions with support [a,b] such that a ≥ 0 and b > 0. If ΘM is a random variable such
that ΘM = θc
1+...+θc
M, then the probability, pM, of achieving the required precision, θ0, using
M agents is denoted as following:
pM =
Z ∞
θ0
fΘM(ΘM)dΘM (4.9)
where fΘM(ΘM) is the distribution of ΘM.
Likewise, the probability of achieving the required precision, if we consider M+1 independent
random variables is the following:
pM+1 =
Z ∞
θ0
fΘM+1(ΘM+1)dΘM+1 (4.10)
where fΘM+1(ΘM+1) is the distribution of ΘM+1.
However, fΘM+1(ΘM+1) takes the following form:
fΘM+1(ΘM+1) =
Z ∞
0
Z ∞
0
δ(ΘM+1−ΘM −θM+1)fθM+1(θM+1)dθM+1fΘM(ΘM)dΘM
Now, given that ΘM ≥ 0:
fΘM+1(ΘM+1) =
Z ∞
0
fΘM(ΘM+1−θM+1)fθM+1(θM+1)dθM+1
We apply this result in Equation 4.10, and hence pM+1 takes the following form:
pM+1 =
Z ∞
0
dθM+1
Z ∞
θ0
fΘM(ΘM+1−θM+1)fθM+1(θM+1)dΘM
=
Z ∞
0
fθM+1(θM+1)dθM+1
Z ∞
θ0
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However, since ΘM+1 ≥ 0:
Z ∞
θ0−θM+1
fΘM(x)dx ≥
Z ∞
θ0
fΘM(x)dx = pM
Hence,
pM+1 ≥
Z ∞
0
fθM+1(θM+1)dθM+1· pM ≥ pM
Second, note that for each possible value of M, the case where n = N and m = M dominates
all other combinations of n and m (i.e. it results in the lowest mean total payment). This case
corresponds to a single selection stage in which M agents are pre-selected directly from the
original N in a single step. This result is demonstrated empirically in Figure 4.1, and we present
an analytical proof for the speciﬁc case that we consider here:
Theorem 4.5. In a setting with linear cost functions, where agents’ costs and maximum preci-
sions are independently drawn from uniform distributions, for a given probability of achieving
θ0, the centre minimises its expected total payment when n = N and m = M.
Proof. Given the mechanism and setting described above, we ﬁrst note that when the costs of
the agents are represented by linear functions, then ci(θ)=ciθ, and hence, c0
i(θ)=ci. Using this
result within the scaling parameters of the payment rule described in Step 2.4, gives the result:
αj =
cs
S
0(b θc
j)
and βj = csb θc
j −
cs
S
0(b θc
j)
S(b θc
j) (4.11)
Thus, bothαandβareproportionaltocs, andhencethepaymenttoanyagentisalsoproportional
to the cost used in the calculation of the scaling parameters. Secondly, we note that due to
the random selection of agents within the second stage of the mechanism, the precision of the
estimate generated by any agent is independent of the cost used to generate its payment rule.
Hence, the expected total payment to the agents is proportional to the mean cost used to generate
their payment rules.
Now, the costs used to generate the payment rule of any agent is the (m+1)th lowest reported
cost when m agents are pre-selected from n. Thus, in order to show that setting n=N and m=M
minimisestheexpectedtotalpaymentofthecentre, wemustsimplyshowthattheexpectedvalue
of the (M+1)th cost when pre-selecting M agents from N, is lower than any other combination.
To do so, we note that if the costs of the agents are i.i.d. from the standard uniform distribution25,
and the agents report truthfully (as they are incentivised to do), then the density function that
describes the (m+1)th cost, denoted byCm+1:n, is given by:
cm+1:n(u) =
n!
m!(n−m−1)!
um(1−u)n−m−1, 0 ≤ u ≤ 1 (4.12)
25For notational simplicity we shall assume that the costs are drawn from U(0,1), but we note that the proof is
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and Arnold et al. (2008) show that cm+1:n(u) ∼ B(m+1,n−m) and therefore the mean of this
distribution is simply m+1
n+1. Thus, we now prove that the (M+1)th cost when pre-selecting all
M agents directly from N is less than the expected cost that results from ﬁrst pre-selecting m
agents from n and then pre-selecting the remaining M−m agents from N −n. Therefore, and
given that cM+1:N(u) ∼ B(M+1,N −M) and cM−m+1:N−n(u) ∼ B(M−m+1,N −n−M+m),
we must prove the inequality:

M+1
N+1

≤
m
M

m+1
n+1

+
M−m
M

M−m+1
N−n+1

(4.13)
subject to the constraints that M < N, m < n and N −n > M−m, and we note that if it holds in
this case, then it holds for all possible combinations of n and m.
A ﬁrst step towards the proof of equation 4.13, is performing the following substitutions:
a = m, b = M−m, c = n, d = N−n
and now equation 4.13 takes the following form:
(a+b)(a+b+1)
c+d+1
≤
a(a+1)
c+1
+
b(b+1)
d+1
(4.14)
with a,b,c,d ≥ 0, a < c, and b < d.
Now, by multiplying all fractions in equation 4.14 to obtain a common denominator,(c+1)(d+
1)(c+d +1), and noting that this denominator is positive, translates equation 4.14 into the
following condition:
(a+b)(a+b+1)(c+1)(d+1)
−a(a+1)(c+d+1)(d+1)
−b(b+1)(c+d+1)(c+1) ≤ 0 (4.15)
We can rearrange this expression into the form:
F1(a,b,c,d)+F2(a,b,c,d)+F3(a,b,c,d) ≤ 0 (4.16)
where:
F1(a,b,c,d) = −(d·a−b·c)2 (4.17)
F2(a,b,c,d) = −b(c−a)2−b2(c−a)−a(d−b)2−a2(d−b) (4.18)
F3(a,b,c,d) = a(b−d)+b(a−c) (4.19)
Now, it is easy to verify that F1, F2, and F3 are all negative given the initial constraints that
a,b,c,d ≥ 0, a < c and b < d. Hence, it follows that equation 4.16 is negative.Chapter 4 A Mechanism for Dealing with Multiple Agents that have a Limited Degree of
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Finally, we note that given that it is always preferable to set n = N, the choice of the value of m
is determined by the trade-off between the total payment made by the centre and the probability
of it acquiring an estimate of its required precision. If the distributions of cost and maximum
precisions are known, this can be evaluated prior to running the mechanism through simulation.
However, if these distributions are unknown, setting m = N −1 ensures that the probability of
acquiring the required precision is maximised (but doing so will also incur the greatest expected
payment).
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we extended our original two-stage mechanism introduced in Section 3 by re-
laxing the assumption that a single agent can provide an estimate of inﬁnite precision and intro-
duced limitations on the agents’ maximum precisions. As a result of this, we have introduced
an extended mechanism which, in addition to Requirements 1 and 2 regarding elicitation of
unknown costs and addressing selﬁsh behaviour, already satisﬁed by the previous mechanism,
successfully addresses research Requirement 3 regarding the need for multiple observations.
In so doing, this mechanism extends the state of the art by being the ﬁrst mechanism that in-
centivises agents to invest the maximum resources available to them for the generation of their
estimates, despite the involved costs, and in turn, report them truthfully to a centre. In addition
to that, the agents face restrictions in the precisions of the estimates they can provide, and the
centre does not have any knowledge of the costs of the estimates.
Against this background, this mechanism can be applied in citizen sensor networks where in-
formation providers might not be able to produce observations of a sufﬁcient precision to indi-
vidually meet the information buyer’s needs, hence leaving the buyer no option but to combine
multiple such estimates and fuse them into a more accurate one. However, although this mech-
anism solves research Requirements 1, 2 and 3 as introduced in Section 1.1, it does not deal
with the research requirement regarding the information buyer’s knowledge of the outcome of
the observed event (Requirement 4), since it relies on the assumption that the centre will ob-
serve the state of the world after receiving the agents’ estimates. Now, since this is not always
the case, in the following chapter we relax this assumption and hence satisfy the ﬁnal research
requirement. In so doing, we will be able to apply our mechanism in more realistic and efﬁcient
citizen sensor networks where the information buyer will not have spare resources available in
order to evaluate the providers’ observations, hence it will not have access to any information
about the state of the world after it receives the observations from the providers. For example,
for both the noise monitoring and trafﬁc information scenarios, it is rather unrealistic to assume
that the true state of the world is available to the centre at some time in the future in order to
calculate the agent payments, since for both cases it is very unlikely for the information buyers
to have access to the additional infrastructure needed to evaluate the providers.Chapter 4 A Mechanism for Dealing with Multiple Agents that have a Limited Degree of
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Therefore it is crucial, to design a mechanism which in not relying on external sources for the
evaluation of the actual outcome it will save the information buyer from an additional cost,
and by evaluating the observations as soon as they are reported, will result in fair payments
which reﬂect the providers’ efforts which do not depend on a delayed observed state of the
world . In order to address these issues effectively we will design a new mechanism based on
a modiﬁed strictly proper scoring rule which will evaluate each agent against all other agents’
fused observations immediately upon receiving their reports and not at some time the future
after receiving the actual outcome of the observed event. Thus this mechanism will lead towards
robust, effective and fair citizen sensor networks, which, ﬁrst, will not have to rely on external
sources of the evaluation of the providers’ observations, and, second, will be able to adapt in
dynamic environments where conditions evolve constantly.Chapter 5
A Mechanism for Dealing with the
Centre’s Lack of Access to Knowledge
of the Outcome
In each of the previous two chapters we have considered mechanisms whereby the centre has
access to the actual outcome of the estimated event which it can use to evaluate the agents’
reported estimates when calculating their payments. In Mechanism 1, where we introduced this
assumption, we clariﬁed that it is not realistic in general, but it can hold for speciﬁc cases we
described. Speciﬁcally, when the information buyer has enough resources available to invest
for the infrastructure needed to verify the providers’ reported observations. For example, in the
noise monitoring scenario, these resources may be sophisticated microphones being located in
numerous ﬁxed locations needed to assess the providers’ observations. Similarly, in terms of the
trafﬁc feedback service these extra resources may be services which provide live views of the
streets.
However, as already mentioned in Chapter 1, these cases are rare, since citizen sensor networks
are deployed and operate in dynamic environments (such as the busy streets of a city, in both
the examples we consider). In these dynamic environments, the state of the world constantly
changes and evolves. In our examples, these changes could be a result of a random and unpre-
dicted event that is likely to occur in a city such as a heavy vehicle passing next to a member
of the public generating a noise observation, or a trafﬁc accident that makes the estimate of an
optimal route obsolete. Now, unless the information buyers have a substantial amount of avail-
able resources to invest in evaluating the observations, the difference between the reported and
the observed outcomes will be substantial as there will be a time delay between the reported
observation and the realised outcome. Therefore, it is very important to develop a mechanism
that will not rely on knowledge of the actual outcomes of the observed or estimated events.
To this end, in this chapter we revise the previous mechanism by removing the assumption
that the centre (which represents the information buyer) will have knowledge of the estimated
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event, after receiving the estimates from the agents. In so doing we address the ﬁnal research
requirement (Requirement 4) set in Chapter 1, regarding operating in dynamic environments of
uncertainty where an information buyer cannot or is not willing to evaluate the received reports.
In satisfying this requirement, we also contribute to the state of the art by proposing a novel two
stage mechanism in which the centre uses the fused reported estimates to calculate the payments
to the pre-selected agents in the second stage, rather than the ﬁnal revealed outcome. In order
to ensure incentive compatibility for this mechanism too, we modify the standard strictly proper
scoring rules so they can cope effectively with the centre’s lack of knowledge of the estimated
event. Without this change, the standard rules would no longer motivate the agents to truthfully
report the precisions of their estimates.
In more detail, we ﬁrst update our initial model, introduced in Section 3.1, so it can now relate
to citizen sensor networks where information buyers have no means of evaluating the providers’
observations due a lack of knowledge about the outcome of the observed event. In this con-
text, in Section 5.1 we describe the updated information elicitation problem, show how standard
strictly proper scoring rules cannot address this problem effectively, and hence introduce the
modiﬁed strictly proper scoring rules that do not rely on knowledge of the outcome. In Section
5.2 we present a new two stage mechanism based on these modiﬁed scoring rules. In Section
5.3 we show that our mechanism is incentive compatible in maximum precisions and estimates
revealed. In more detail, we show that using the fused reported estimates instead of the outcome
when calculating the scaling parameters and the payments to the pre-selected agents in the sec-
ond stage of the mechanism, results in truthful reporting of these agents’ maximum precisions
and estimates being a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, in Section 5.4 we empirically evaluate
our mechanism and compare it with the one we introduced in the previous chapter, in which
the centre has access to the actual outcome and with a modiﬁed version of the ‘peer prediction
mechanism’ proposed by Miller, Resnick and Zeckhauser (Section 2.4.3) so that the centre has
no knowledge of the costs, in order to examine the effects of the fusion in the payments of the
pre-selected agents. We show both analytically and empirically that for all the mechanisms we
simulate, the agents expect to derive the same payment, which means that the centre incurs no
additional cost as a result of its lack of knowledge of the outcome. However, we identify a
signiﬁcant difference between the fusion and the peer prediction methods, by showing that in
our mechanism the variance of the total payment issued to the selected agents by the centre is
signiﬁcantly lower than the total payment’s variance in the ‘prediction mechanism’ for M > 2
(although both are greater than the case where the outcome is known). Finally, in Section 5.5
we summarise and conclude.
5.1 Evaluating Information without Knowledge of the Outcome
This model is the same as the model discussed in Section 4.1, where we introduced limits in the
precisions of the agents’ generated estimates. Due to these restrictions, the centre had to fuse
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However, here we additionally remove the assumption regarding the centre’s access to knowl-
edge of the outcome of the estimated event. As a consequence, the centre now has to rely solely
on the observations it receives from the agents. In relaxing this assumption, we satisfy the ﬁnal
requirement of this research and can now consider citizen sensor networks where information
buyers either cannot or do not want to necessarily evaluate the accuracy of the received infor-
mation. As already mentioned above, this is very likely to happen in real world applications of
citizen sensor networks deployed in dynamic environments. In such environments conditions
change constantly and information buyers need to have access to costly equipment in order to
evaluate the reported observations within minimum elapsed time before they become obsolete
and not relevant to the evaluation.
Against this background, an information buyer relying solely on the reported observations of the
providers, has two options when using these reports in order to shape its perception of reality:
peer prediction and fusion. In more detail, in the peer prediction mechanism (Section 2.4.3)
the centre’s perception of reality is represented by a single agent’s reported estimate. That
is, in this mechanism the centre scores an agent directly against each one of the rest of the
individual agents and then calculates its payment by averaging the scaled scores. However, in
the mechanism we introduce in this section, the centres uses the fused reported estimates and
precisions of all the other agents and excludes from the fusion process the agent that is currently
receiving the payment. This is necessary, since fusing its estimate with the rest would incentivise
that agent to report a very high precision in order to inﬂuence the ﬁnal result26.
In more detail, when there are K ≥2 available agents, the centre calculates the payment to agent
i, after fusing the K−i agents’ conditionally independent and unbiased probabilistic estimates,
{b x1,.., b xi−1,b xi+1,..,b xk}ofpossiblydifferentprecisions{b θ1,..,b θi−1,b θi+1,..,b θk}, intooneestimate
with mean x and precision θ by using the standard result (see DeGroot and Schervish (2002)):
x−i =
∑j∈K−i b xjb θj
θ−i
and θ−i = ∑
j∈K−i
b θj (5.1)
where K−i = {1,..,i−1,i+1,..,k} is the set that contains all k agents besides agent i, which is
the agent that is receiving the payment from the centre.
In this case, it is in any selected agent’s best interest to consider its belief about the fused obser-
vations of all the other agents when reporting its precision. Now, this means that agent i’s ex-
pectedscoreS(x;xi,θi)ismaximisednotat b θi =θi butatb θi =θi+θ−i. Indeed, ifN(x−i;xi,1/θi+
1/θ−i) and N (xi;b xi,1/b θi) are Gaussian distributions with mean and variance (xi,1/θi+1/θ−i)
and (b xi,1/b θi), which represent agent i’s true and reported estimate’s distributions, agent i’s ex-
pected score, which is given by:
S(x−i;b xi,b θi) =
Z ∞
−∞
N (x−i;xi,1/θi+1/θ−i)S(x−i|N (xi;b xi,1/b θi))dx−i (5.2)
26Given that the fused parameter depends on the precision of the agents’ estimates, if an agent claims that its
observation is very precise and reports an increased precision, the value of the fused parameter will be very close to
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will be maximised at b θi = θi +θ−i, since for that value of the reported precision, b θi, the two
distributions become identical.
Subsequently, an agent wanting to maximise its expected score (equation 5.2), will have to
report θi+θ−i instead of θi, which is impossible since it does not have access to other agents’
precisions (θ−i). However, given that the centre, when calculating the payments, has access to
both θi and θ−i, it can modify the strictly proper scoring rule so that the agent is only required to
report θi but the payment is calculated using θi+θ−i. Thus, we introduce the modiﬁed strictly
proper scoring rule, S(x−i;b xi,b θi+θ−i) and in the following theorem we show that it incentivises
agent i to report its true parameters (estimate and its precision).
Theorem 5.1. Truthful revelation of an agent’s parameters is a Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. Given that an agent i’s estimate is represented by the Gaussian distributionN (x0;x,1/θ),
under the modiﬁed strictly proper scoring rules, the score it expects to derive is the following:
S(x−i;b xi,b θi+θ−i) =
Z ∞
−∞
N (x−i;xi,1/θi+1/θ−i)S(x−i|N (xi;b xi,1/b θi+1/θ−i))dx−i (5.3)
whereN (x−i;xi,1/θi+1/θ−i) andN (xi;b xi,1/b θi+1/θ−i) are Gaussian distributions with mean
and variance (xi,1/θi+1/θ−i) and (b xi,1/b θi+1/θ−i) respectively, which will be denoted as Q
and R respectively. Now equation 5.3 takes the following form:
S =
Z ∞
−∞
Q(x−i)S(x−i|R(x−i))dx−i (5.4)
At this point it should be noted that S is a strictly scoring function, as deﬁned by Hendrickson
and Buehler (1971) and Savage (1977), with the strictly proper scoring rule, S(xi;b xi,b θi) and the
modiﬁed strictly proper scoring rule, S(x−i;b xi,b θi +θ−i) being two different expressions. The
key property of the strictly scoring function S(Q,R) is that its expected value is maximised
when Q = R.
Now, given the deﬁnition of Q and R, for b xi = xi and b θi = θi ⇒ Q = R. Therefore, for b xi =
xi and b θi = θi, a payment based on the modiﬁed strictly scoring rule, S(x−i;b xi,b θi +θ−i), is
incentive compatible, since an agent will maximise its expected payment if it reports truthfully
its parameters, assuming that all other agents also report their true parameters. The latter makes
truthful reporting a Nash equilibrium since an agent will maximise its utility, thus making this
strategy the optimal, if all other agents report truthfully their parameters too.
5.2 The Mechanism
Having deﬁned the modiﬁed strictly proper scoring rules, in this section, we extend the two-
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access to the actual outcome when calculating the payments to the pre-selected agents (Mech-
anism 3). To this end, in the ﬁrst stage the centre pre-selects M out of N agents and identiﬁes
their cost functions, while in the second stage it calculates their payments.
In more detail, the ﬁrst stage is a variation of the ﬁrst stage of Mechanism 2. However, in this
mechanism, instead of dividing the available agents into groups of n agents and then initiating
multiple reverse (m+1)th price auctions to pre-select M agents, the centre pre-selects them di-
rectly from the N available through a single reverse (M+1)th auction. This speciﬁc approach to
pre-selection is based on the empirical and theoretical results presented in Section 4.4. There-
fore, we modify the ﬁrst stage of this mechanism accordingly, so that the centre minimises the
total paymentit has to issue to the pre-selected agents, byperforming that pre-selection instantly,
and not through multiple, iterations.
In the beginning of the second stage, the centre initialises an iterative process by setting the
required precision equal to θr (Step 2.1). In Step 2.2, the centre randomly asks each of the pre-
selected agents to report their maximum precisions, until it achieves its required precision (Step
2.3). Each of the selected agents through the iteration of the previous steps, is asked to produce
an estimate at its reported maximum precision and the centre determines the scaling parameters
(Step 2.4). That is, for agent j, from that group, parameters αj and βj, now, are determined using
θ−j, the fused reported precisions of every agent besides agent j. The cost used in the scaling
parameters now is ﬁxed to cM+1, since for this mechanism, the centre implements a single
reverse (M+1)th price auction in the ﬁrst stage. In the ﬁnal step of this mechanism, each of the
agents selected in Steps 2.2 and 2.3 produces an estimate at any precision (and not necessarily
their reported maximum precision) and report its parameters to the centre. The centre calculates
their payments by using the scaled modiﬁed scoring rule. However, in this mechanism we deny
the centre of any such knowledge, therefore when agent j receives its payment, the centre uses
the fused reported estimates of all the other agents, instead of the actual outcome x0 that has
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Mechanism 3 The mechanism for dealing with the case where the centre does not have access
to the actual outcome:
1. First Stage
1.1 The centre asks N ≥ 2 agents to report their cost functions b ci(θ) with i ∈ {1,...,N}.
1.2 The centre selects the M, (1 ≤ M < N), agents with the lowest costs, associates the (M+
1)th cost with these agents and discards the remaining N−M agents.
2. Second Stage
2.1 The centre sets its required precision θ0 equal to θr.
2.2 The centre randomly selects one of the pre-selected agents and asks it to report its maxi-
mum precision b θc
k, with k ∈ {1,...,M}.
2.3 The centre sets θr = θr −min(θr,b θc
k) and if θr > 0 it repeats Step 2.2.
2.4 The centre asks agent j, belonging in the agents selected through the iteration of Steps 2.2
and 2.3, to produce an estimate at its reported maximum precision, b θc
j, and presents it with
a scaled strictly proper scoring rule. Scaling parameters αj and βj are now based on the
expected value of the modiﬁed scoring rule, S(b θc
j,θ−j), and its derivative. The parameters
are given by:
αj =
c0
M+1(b θc
j)
S
0(b θc
j,θ−j)
and βj = cM+1(b θc
j)−
c0
M+1(b θc
j)
S
0(b θc
j,θ−j)
S(b θc
j,θ−j) (5.5)
where, cM+1 is the (M+1)th cost identiﬁed the ﬁrst stage and θ−j is the fused precisions
of all the agents that are asked to produce an estimate except agent j and is deﬁned in
Equation 5.1.
2.5 Each of these agents produces an estimate xj with precision θj and reports b xj and b θj to
the centre, which in turn issues the following payment:
Pj(x−j;b xj,b θj +θ−j) = αjSj(x−j;b xj,b θj +θ−j)+βj (5.6)
with αj and βj already determined in Step 2.4.Chapter 5 A Mechanism for Dealing with the Centre’s Lack of Access to Knowledge of the
Outcome 84
5.3 Economic Properties of the Mechanism
Having detailed the mechanism, we now prove the incentive compatibility of the mechanism
with respect to the revealed maximum precisions and estimates. Note that truthful reporting of
the agents’ cost functions in the ﬁrst stage is still a dominant strategy and that this mechanism
is also individually rational, like all the previous mechanisms. We refrain from re-writing the
proofs of both incentive compatibility with respect to reported costs and individual rationality,
since they are identical to the proofs of Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 respectively as they do not depend
on the fused reported precisions and estimates. However, the same does not hold for the pre-
selected agents’ reported maximum precisions and estimates, as we have shown in Theorem
5.1, truthful reporting of an agent’s parameters is a Nash equilibrium. Putting this result in
the context of Mechanism 3, where pre-selected agents report their maximum precisions and
estimates leads to the following theorem:
Theorem5.2. TruthfulreportingofthemaximumprecisionsandestimatesisaNashequilibrium,
with the reported maximum precision being the actual precision of the estimate.
Proof. In the mechanism described above, when agent j reports its estimate, its reported preci-
sion, b θj, is equal to its reported maximum precision, b θc
j. Indeed, ˆ θj > b θc
j is not possible given
that the centre is already informed of the agent’s maximum precision, and ˆ θj <b θc
j would not be
in the agent’s best interest since under reporting its precision would lead to a smaller payment.
Therefore, ˆ θj = b θc
j. Now, given the scaling of the scoring rules described in Step 2.4, the ex-
pected utility of the agent, if it reports its maximum precision as b θc
j, and subsequently produces
an estimate of precision θj, which then reports with precision b θc
j, is denoted by U j(θj,b θc
j), and
given by:
U j(θj,b θc
j) =
c0
s(b θc
j)
S
0
f,j(b θc
j,θ−j)

Sf,j(θj,b θc
j,θ−j)−Sf,j(b θc
j,θ−j)

+cs(b θc
j)−ct(b θc
j) (5.7)
where Sf,j(θj,b θc
j,θ−j) is agent j’s expected score for producing an estimate of precision θ and
reporting to the centre, b θc and Sf,j(b θc
j,θ−j) is agent j’s expected score for producing and truth-
fully reporting an estimate of precision b θc
j. Furthermore, ct(.) is the true cost function of the
agent, and cs(.) is the (M+1)th lowest revealed cost which was determined in the ﬁrst stage.
Note that Sf,j is the expected value of the modiﬁed scoring rule S(x−j;b xj,b θj +θ−j), already
deﬁned in Theorem 5.1:
S(x−j;b xj,b θj+θ−j)=
Z ∞
−∞
N (x−j;xj,1/θj+1/θ−j)S(x−j|N (xj;b xj,1/b θj+1/θ−j))dx−j (5.8)
Now, taking the ﬁrst derivative of expected utility (Equation 5.7 ) with respect to b θc
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dU j(θj,b θc
j)
db θc
j
=
d
db θc
j
 
c0
s(b θc
j)
S
0
f,j(b θc
j,θ−j)
!

Sf,j(θj,b θc
j,θ−j)−Sf,j(b θc
j,θ−j)

+
+
c0
s(b θc
j)
S
0
f,j(b θc
j,θ−j)
S
0
f,j(θj,b θc
j,θ−j) (5.9)
We have already shown that truthful revelation is a Nash equilibrium for the modiﬁed scoring
rule, Sf,j (Theorem 5.1). Hence, when θj = b θc
j:
Sf,j(θj,b θc
j,θ−j) = Sf,j(b θc
j,θ−j) and S
0
f,j(θj,b θc
j,θ−j) = 0
and subsequently:
dU j(θj,b θc
j)
db θc
j

 

b θc
j=θj
= 0 (5.10)
Therefore, a preselected agent’s expected utility is maximised when it reveals as its maximum
precision, the precision of the estimate that it subsequently produces, given that all other agents
do the same.
We now show that it will actually produce an estimate of precision equal to its reported maxi-
mum precision. To this end, we note that when b θc
j = θj, the expected utility of the agent is given
by:
U j(θ) = cs(θj)−ct(θj) (5.11)
Since cs(.) and ct(.) and their derivatives do not cross or overlap, and their order is maintained,
U j(θj) is a strictly increasing function (given that U
0
j(θj) > 0. Thus the agent will maximise
its expected utility by producing an estimate at its maximum precision, and thus, θj = θc
j, and
hence, b θc
j = ˆ θj = θc
j, as required.
We have shown now that in our modiﬁed scoring rule based mechanism, truthful reporting of
maximum precisions and estimates is a Nash equilibrium. Although this result is signiﬁcant
as it proves a general property for this class of mechanisms (for any values of M and N and
any convex cost functions), it does not give any information regarding the performance of the
mechanism. That is, there is no information about the payment’s mean and variance, or how
they are affected as the parameters (M, N) of the mechanism change. This is critical infor-
mation, as it forms the foundation which will allow us to compare our mechanism with other
mechanisms in the literature, and see whether it outperforms them. In more detail, we can now
compare our mechanism with the mechanism introduced in the previous chapter (Mechanism
2) in order to see the effects of centre’s lack of knowledge of the outcome, and the ‘peer pre-
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limited maximum precisions) in order to compare different approaches in replacing the centre’s
knowledge of the observed event.
5.4 Empirical Evaluation
In this section we present empirical results for a speciﬁc scenario, in order to compare it with
Miller et al.’s peer prediction mechanism so we can demonstrate the differences between fusion
and peer prediction and identify which one is more appropriate for a centre that intends to
minimise the mean and variance of the total payment issued to the agents. In this scenario, like
the previous ones, the cost functions are represented by linear functions, given by ci(θ) = ciθ,
where ci are independently drawn from a uniform distribution ci ∼U(1,2). Also, the maximum
precisions of the selected agents, θc
i, are independently drawn from another uniform distribution
θc
i ∼ U(0,1) and, as before, the centre’s required precision, θ0, is equal to 1.7. Finally, as
before, we use the parametric family of scoring rules and set the parameter equal to 1.2. Within
this scenario our intention is to explore the effects of fusion and peer prediction in the pre-
selected agents’ payments and therefore we will compare the payments’ mean and variance,
while using as benchmark the case where the centre has access to knowledge of the actual
outcome (Mechanism 2 from Chapter 4).
For the purposes of this analysis, the peer prediction mechanism had to be slightly modiﬁed in
order to eliminate the assumption that the centre has knowledge of the agents’ costs. Hence, we
transform the peer prediction mechanism to a two-stage peer prediction mechanism, in which
the centre in the ﬁrst stage asks all agents, N, to report their cost functions and then pre-selects
M of them, while in the second it allocates the payments to the agents providing the estimates.
The ﬁrst stage is identical to the ﬁrst stage of Mechanism 2 presented in Section 4.2, while in
the second stage the centre calculates the payment to an agent not by using the fused reported
estimates, but by scoring that agent against each one of the remaining M−1 agents and then by
averaging over the M−1 respective payments.
To this end, for N = 7, we evaluate our mechanisms (both Mechanisms 2 and 3) and the two-
stage peer prediction mechanism and deﬁne the lower bound of the mechanisms’ payments
which is represented by the case where the centre has access to the agents’ cost functions (de-
noted as the ‘full information’ case) and thus can optimally allocate the estimate to the agent it
needs in order to achieve the required precision. In more detail, we simulate the mechanisms
106 times and for each iteration we record whether the centre was successful in acquiring its
required precision and the sum of the payments issued to the selected agents and we calculate
the mean and variance of that total payment (Figures 5.1 and 5.2). In Figure 5.1 we calculate
for M ∈ {1,2,3,4,5,6} the probability the centre has of achieving the required precision and
the total payment (we omit errorbars, since given the number of the iterations of the mechanism
the standard error in the plotted values is smaller than the symbol size), while in Figure 5.2 we
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outcome. Effectively this result shows that the uncertainty that has been introduced in our setting
due to the lack of knowledge of the actual outcome has no impact on the expected payments.
The explanation of this suspicious result lies within the properties of the mechanism itself. More
precisely, wehaveshownthatourmechanismisincentivecompatibleandthatthepaymentapre-
selected agent expects to derive is equal to the cost used for the scaling of the modiﬁed strictly
proper scoring rules. We provide the intuition behind this result in the following theorem, where
we calculate the total expected payment for the three evaluated mechanisms for the general case
of any convex cost function.
Theorem 5.3. The sum of the expected agents’ payments is independent of the knowledge of
the actual outcome for the three mechanism that elicit probabilistic estimates from multiple
suppliers with limited precisions and unknown costs.
Proof. In the mechanism in which the centre has access to the actual outcome, the payment
agent j expects to derive, after the centre observes the actual outcome, is the following:
Pj(θj,b θc
j) =
c0
s(b θc
j)
S
0
j(b θc
j)

Sj(θj,b θc
j)−Sj(b θc
j)

+cs(b θc
j) (5.12)
In this context, given that agents produce estimates with precisions equal to their reported max-
imum precisions (Theorem 4.1), θj = b θc
j. Thus, agent j’s expected payment is:
Pj(θj) = cs(θj) (5.13)
where cs(θj) is the scaling cost used for in the calculation of agent j’s payment.
Now, in the mechanism in which the centre has no access to the actual outcome, the payment
the selected agent j expects to derive is given by:
Pj(θj,b θc
j) =
c0
s(b θc
j)
S
0
f,j(b θc
j,θ−j)

Sf,j(θj,b θc
j,θ−j)−Sf,j(b θc
j,θ−j)

+cs(b θc
j) (5.14)
Thus, the payment agent j expects to derive, given that θj = b θc
j is:
Pf,j(θj) = cs(θj) (5.15)
Finally, in the peer prediction mechanism the centre scores agent j against every other agent in
pairs, and then calculates its payment after averaging over the M−1 payments that correspond
to each one of the selected agents. Miller et al. also modiﬁed the existing scoring rules in order
to maintain incentive compatibility. Hence, the payment agent j expects to derive in the peer
prediction mechanism is the following:
Pp,j(θj,b θc
j) =
1
M−1 ∑
i∈Mi
c0
s(b θc
j)
S
0
p,j(b θc
j,θi)

Sp,j(θj,b θc
j,θi)−Sp,j(b θc
j,θi)

+cs(b θc
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where Sp,j is the expected modiﬁed scoring rule S(xi;b xj,b θj +θi) which scores agent j only
against the estimate of another (agent i). Miller, Resnick and Zeckhauser (2007) have shown that
this scoring rule is incentive compatible, therefore Sp,j(θj,b θc
j,θi) = Sp,j(b θc
j,θi) when θj = b θc
j.
Hence, the payment agent j expects to derive is:
Pp,j(θj) =
1
M−1 ∑
i∈M−j
cs(θj) = cs(θj) (5.17)
Since the Pj(θj) = Pf,j(θj) = Pp,j(θj) = cs(θj), all three payments are equal as required.
Finally, regarding Figure 5.2, we show that the variance of the payments is lower when the
centre has access to the actual outcome, therefore it becomes apparent that there is an effect
in the payment due to the introduced uncertainty. Moreover, for M = 2 the variance of the
payments is the same in both mechanisms since our mechanism becomes identical with the peer
prediction mechanism, given that when the centre calculates the payment to the selected agent,
it has access to only one agent’s estimate. However, for M > 2 the variance of the payments the
centre issues in the peer prediction mechanism is much greater than the variance of payments in
our mechanism. This comes as a result of the peer prediction mechanism’s increased sensitivity
to the agents’ reported maximum precisions, as opposed to our mechanism, in which an agent’s
reported maximum precision is fused with the others and therefore its impact is dampened. In
more detail, after recording the payments after every iteration of the peer prediction mechanism,
we realised that the increased variance of the agents’ reported estimates, results in an increased
variance in the total payments. However, in our mechanism the estimates are fused and therefore
it is less likely for signiﬁcant variations to appear at the end of each iteration.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we provided a non-trivial extension to our previous mechanism (Chapter 4) by
eliminating the assumption that the centre has access to the realised outcome of the estimated
event when calculating the payments to the pre-selected agents. As a result of this, now the
centre uses the fused reported estimates of the pre-selected agents when calculating their pay-
ments. Therefore, in addition to all other requirements addressed also in previous mechanisms
(Chapters 3 and 4), we have addressed the ﬁnal research requirement regarding the information
buyer not being willing or able to evaluate the received observations in dynamic environments
of uncertainty. In so doing, this mechanism contributes to the state of the art by being the ﬁrst
mechanism that can elicit agents’ unknown costs and incentivise them to commit costly re-
sources to the generation of these estimates which, in turn, they report truthfully. This is the ﬁrst
mechanism with these properties that can cope with agents facing restrictions in the precisions
of the estimates they can provide, and with the centre not having external means to evaluate their
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Given this background, the mechanism introduced in this chapter can be applied in citizen sensor
networks where the information buyers either do not want to invest the necessary extra resources
needed in order verify the accuracy of the providers’ reports, or do not have the means to do so.
This contribution becomes more signiﬁcant for citizen sensor networks operating in dynamic
environments, where there is always a difference between the observed and the actual state of
the world used for the evaluation of the observation, due to constantly changing conditions. For
example, in a noise monitoring scenario, where members of the public measure the noise of their
surroundings and transmit it to a central agency responsible for planning and designing noise
level maps of a city, the sound levels constantly change as the environment constantly evolves.
Therefore, it is impossible for the information buyer, to verify the providers’ observations, since
even if it had sophisticated equipment to do so, the observed state of the world would change
immediately. Likewise, in a trafﬁc monitoring and planning service, a driver subscribed to this
service (acting as the information buyer) is not able to verify the trafﬁc reports she receives, and
even if at some point she is at the location of the reported trafﬁc observation it is very likely
that the conditions will have changed, speciﬁcally in a big city where unpredicted events such
as accidents, works and road blockages occur often.
To sum up, with this mechanism we have satisﬁed all the requirements set in Section 1.1 and
therefore in the following chapter we conclude and discuss future work.Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter we present an overarching view on the contributions of this thesis towards the
stated aim of designing robust and effective protocols to govern interactions among information
providers and buyers in next generation citizen sensor networks. To begin, in Section 6.1, we
initially summarise the research carried within each speciﬁc topic addressed in this thesis. In
more detail, we analyse the challenges that occur in current citizen sensor networks and those
that are likely to occur as citizen sensor networks evolve. In this context, we focus on the
issues associated with selﬁsh behaviour that are bound to appear in the future, as citizen sensor
networks ﬁnd more commercial applications and increase in size. After brieﬂy summarising key
parts of the related literature, we discuss our contributions to the state of the art and how they
satisﬁed the research requirements we set in Section 1.1. Then in Section 6.2 we outline some
general lines of future work that follow from this work which can be expanded in independent
lines of research.
6.1 Conclusions
The goal of this thesis was to address the selﬁsh behaviour that we expect to appear as citi-
zen sensor networks ﬁnd more commercial applications. We argued that selﬁsh behaviour will
emerge as the interests of those acting as information buyers, intending to purchase observations
or probabilistic estimates of an event, contradict with those generating the required observations
who in turn, act as information providers. In more detail, such selﬁsh behaviour can manifest
itself in two main forms: (i) the allocation of insufﬁcient resources on behalf of the citizens in
the generation of the observations; and (ii) the deliberate misreporting of the citizens’ observa-
tions. Now, current applications of citizen sensor networks do not focus on selﬁsh behaviour
as they mostly consist of voluntarily projects driven by the enthusiasm of those participating or
restricted to specialists with no intention of exhibiting selﬁsh behaviour. However, such systems
still have to face issues such as a lack of knowledge of the costs involved in the generation of the
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observations on behalf of the information buyers and the fact that providers generate observa-
tions of possibly low quality due to limited resources available. Finally, an additional challenge
is the information buyers’ lack of access to knowledge of the actual state of the world after re-
ceiving the observations due to their unwillingness or inability to invest in the extra resources
that would assist them in evaluating the observations they receive. This issue is magniﬁed,
when citizen sensor networks are applied in dynamic environments, where even if the informa-
tion buyers are willing to make such an investment, the reported observation cannot be veriﬁed
based on the current state of the world, as it is very likely that the conditions will be different
and the reported and observed states of the world will not match.
We argued that the effect of the above challenges, common in current citizen sensor networks,
will be further emphasised when they are considered in conjunction with selﬁsh behaviour. As
citizen sensor networks gain in popularity, increase in size and ﬁnd even more diverse applica-
tions, emerging selﬁsh behaviour may well degrade the efﬁciency and overall performance of the
citizensensornetworksunlessitisaddressed. Subsequently, wepositedtheneedforanapproach
that takes into consideration all these challenges appearing or likely to appear in future citizen
sensor networks. Hence, in Section 1.1 we identiﬁed four research challenges which should be
addressed in order to achieve robust and efﬁcient citizen sensor networks that are immune to the
effects of selﬁsh behaviour. Speciﬁcally, we consider: (i) how to elicit the unknown costs of the
information providers; (ii) how to address both aspects of selﬁsh behaviour given that the infor-
mation providers are expected to act on their best interest; (iii) how to deal with providers having
restrictions in their available resources and hence providing observations of limited precision;
and (iv) how to deal with information buyers that cannot evaluate the providers’ observations
based on knowledge of the actual state of the world.
With this problem in mind, we reviewed two lines of research regarding applications of citizen
sensor networks, citizen journalism and citizen science and brought up the lack of consideration
for the emergence of selﬁsh behaviour and its effects. Furthermore, we highlighted the link
between the appearance of selﬁsh behaviour in citizen sensor networks and the lack of trust
among information buyers and providers. Therefore, we reviewed the relevant trust literature
against our research’s requirements which were explicitly speciﬁed in chapter 1 (Section 1.1).
Speciﬁcally, after considering learning and reputation trust models, as well as models that com-
bine elements of both, it became apparent that they are not suitable for dynamic environments
due to their complexity, and that they do not address effectively all aspects of selﬁsh behaviour.
Furthermore, most of these models rely on assumptions of full knowledge of the costs involved
in the observations and the actual outcome of the observed event.
Therefore, we turned to applications of mechanism design, in which a set of rules can motivate
agents to be truthful, and hence, trust can be an intrinsic property of the system. However, many
of the existing mechanisms, although they had carefully selected incentive compatible payments
in order to motivate agents to be honest with their reports, contradicted several of our key re-
quirements. In particular, some of the reviewed incentive compatible auction-based mechanisms
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and not imprecise, they contradict our requirement regarding uncertainty. Furthermore, the few
mechanisms that do address the issue of interdependency, assume that agents will attempt to
complete the assigned task (i.e. an observation or a probabilistic estimate of an event) without
taking into consideration its cost. Moreover, the assumption that agents will ignore costs, con-
tradicts our assumption of selﬁsh behaviour in citizen sensor networks. Therefore we had to
consider other means of addressing both issues of selﬁsh behaviour in such networks, but still
within the general mechanism design context, as it can fully satisfy the requirements of self-
ish behaviour without the complexity of the approaches in trust in multi-agent systems already
reviewed.
In more detail, we turned to the notion of scoring rules, which to date have primarily been
used as a tool for evaluating probabilistic forecasting, and then we reviewed their applications
in mechanism design. Speciﬁcally, the use of strictly proper scoring rules based payments in
mechanisms, motivates agents to truthfully report their private observations or probabilistic es-
timates. Furthermore, an appropriate scaling of the payment can motivate participating agents
to invest costly resources for the generation of that observation. Now, while the reviewed appli-
cations of scoring rules were signiﬁcant contributions in the speciﬁc cases they considered, they
assumed that the costs involved in the generation of the observations were common knowledge
available to the information buyer.
We addressed this issue in Chapter 3, where we introduced a two-stage mechanism, based on
strictly proper scoring rules. That mechanism (Mechanism 1) motivated a single agent (acting
as the information provider) to make a costly probabilistic estimate at a required precision and
report it truthfully to the centre (effectively the information buyer). In this line of work, we
extended the state of the art by being the ﬁrst to deny the centre any knowledge regarding the
agents’ costs and hence satisﬁed the relevant research requirement (Requirement 1). Moreover,
by motivating the selected agent to invest sufﬁcient resources in the generation of the estimate
and report it truthfully, we addressed effectively both issues of selﬁsh behaviour and hence
satisﬁed the requirement regarding selﬁsh behaviour (Requirement 2). However, we made two
key assumptions. First, that the agent assigned with the task of providing the estimate will be
able to do so at any required precision by the centre. Second, that the centre will be able to
observe the state of the world upon receiving the estimate. Although, both these assumptions
hold in some applications of citizen sensor networks (i.e. networks with information providers
with enough resources to produce observations at any required precision, or information buyers
having the infrastructure to evaluate the providers’ reported observations), we consider them
unrealistic because of the amount of the required resources. Therefore, in the chapters that
followed, we relaxed both these assumptions.
The ﬁrst assumption was addressed in Chapter 4, where we contributed to the state of the art
by introducing a mechanism (Mechanism 2) that did not rely on a single agent to provide an
estimate at any precision. This satisﬁed the research requirement regarding the combination
of multiple observations of possibly low precision (Requirement 3). In more detail, in this
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and fuse them into one more accurate. Therefore, the centre in the ﬁrst stage had to pre-select a
number of agents, and then in the second stage ask them to generate an estimate at any precision
they could until it achieved its required precision. Mechanism 2 was a non-trivial extension of
the previous mechanism, as it deﬁned a class of mechanisms, depending on multiple options to
perform the pre-selection in the ﬁrst stage. Also, we described the concept of fusing estimates
of possible low precision in order to acquire one more precise.
Finally, in Chapter 5, we relaxed the assumption regarding centre’s knowledge of the realised
outcome by denying the centre access to such knowledge when calculating the payments to
the agents reporting their estimates. In so doing, we addressed the ﬁnal research requirement
(Requirement 4). Speciﬁcally, we contributed to the state of the art by initially modifying the
strictly proper scoring rules so they could incentivise agents to truthfully report their estimates
when they were expecting to be scored against the fused reports of all the other agents. Then,
based on these modiﬁed scoring rules, we introduced a novel two-stage mechanism, where the
centre for the ﬁrst time elicited multiple agents’ private cost functions and estimates, in a setting
where, ﬁrst, it had no access to knowledge regarding both the agents’ costs and the outcome of
the estimated event and, second, the agents faced restrictions in the precision of the estimates
they provided.
For all three mechanisms we provided both theoretical and empirical results. Speciﬁcally, we
proved that for all mechanisms truthful reporting of costs in the ﬁrst stage is a weakly dominant
strategy. However, the same does not apply for the reported estimates and their precision in the
second stage, as for Mechanisms 1 and 2 truthful reporting is a weakly dominant strategy, while
forMechanism3weshowedthatitisaNashequilibrium. Now, regardingtheempiricalanalysis,
we were the ﬁrst to thoroughly compare the quadratic, spherical and logarithmic scoring rules
with a parametric family of strictly proper scoring rules (also analytically), and identify a sub-
optimal value for the parameter k. Furthermore, by evaluating Mechanism 2, we compared
several approaches to perform the pre-selection, and identiﬁed one that minimises the centre’s
expected total payment. Indeed, we showed that forming one group of pre-selected agents in the
ﬁrst stage, and effectively performing the pre-selection in one iteration, instead of pre-selecting
the same number of agents in multiple iterations, the centre minimises its payment in the second
stage. Based on this result, we performed the pre-selection for Mechanism 3. With the empirical
evaluation of Mechanism 3, our contribution to the state of the art was completed, by showing
that the increase of uncertainty in our model, as introduced by the centre’s lack of knowledge of
the realised outcome, did not have an impact on the centre’s expected total payment, but it was
restricted only to the total payment’s variance.
Speaking more general, the work presented in this thesis contributes towards the design of pro-
tocols that will guide the interactions among information buyers and providers in present and
future citizen sensor networks, as they evolve and selﬁsh behaviour becomes a more prevalent
factor. We provided three mechanisms, each of which addresses speciﬁc issues that reﬂect on
current and expected challenges in citizen sensor networks. In this context, the three mecha-
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although Mechanism 3 is a generalisation of Mechanisms 1 and 2, both of them are contribu-
tions in their own right and would be used in preference to the more general one (Mechanism
3) in speciﬁc settings. Indeed, Mechanism 1 is the optimal choice in a setting where all agents
can provide estimates of precisions higher than the centre’s requirement (with out necessarily
being inﬁnite), and therefore the centre does not have to acquire multiple estimates. In that case,
the centre guarantees that it will receive an estimate of precision at least equal to its required
one, while in Mechanism 2 this is not certain, as the sum of the pre-selected agents’ maximum
precisions may be less than the centre’s requirement. Furthermore, in pre-selecting only one
agent, instead of multiple agents for an observation of equal precision, it minimises its expected
payment (as seen in Section 4.4). In addition to that, we have seen that there may be some ap-
plications of citizen sensor networks, where the information buyers have means of verifying the
reported observations based on knowledge of the observed event. In these cases, Mechanism 2
is more favourable since truthful reporting is a stronger solution concept (i.e. dominant strategy)
when compared to the ﬁnal mechanism, and the payments are more robust since their variance
is minimised.
The above described techniques are not restricted to applications related to citizen sensor net-
works. They can be applied in traditional sensor networks responsible for monitoring environ-
mental parameters. For example, there are many applications of sensor networks operating in
extreme environments, such as ﬂooded areas (Zhou and De Roure, 2006), glaciers (Martinez
et al., 2004) or volcanoes (Werner-Allen et al., 2005), where it is impossible to ascertain the
‘ground truth’ through external means. In this cases, sensors make imprecise and noisy measure-
ments with the possibility of emergence of selﬁsh behaviour which mainly manifests through
the investment of minimum resources in the generation of the measurements. This behaviour is
bound to appear since sensors face multiple restrictions in bandwidth and power as they have
to operate unattended for a large period of time and it is crucial to maintain a balance between
making and communicating a measurement so they can continue functioning.
In addition to that, the fact that in our thesis we model information as a traded commodity, which
involves a cost in generating it and a payment in acquiring it, makes it possible to link our work
to literature related to e-commerce applications. In more detail, the use of on-line markets for
trading items and services of any type has created the need for the evaluation of these items
or services. Now, we already documented this when reviewing reputation systems (Section
2.2.2), and although, in this thesis we do not focus on such applications (i.e. rating and ranking
mechanisms in on-line sites such as ebay.com and amazon.com), we identiﬁed the ﬂaws within
existing solutions and effectively showed how they can be addressed through the mechanisms
we introduced. Furthermore, as on-line markets expand, multiple websites that only rate and
rank services without necessarily selling them appear (examples include music rating sites such
as rateyourmusic.com and cinema pictures rating sites such as imdb.com). A key characteristic
of such systems is the emergence of selﬁsh behaviour which becomes a dominating factor due to
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ﬁnancial beneﬁts through concealed advertisement. Therefore, techniques which evaluate those
evaluating services are necessary.
To sum up, although in some cases we can apply directly the results of this thesis in the wide
application domains outlined above, it cannot be done without extending it so it can address
extra challenges which may also appear to some extent to the citizen sensor networks of the
future. Therefore, in the following section, we outline these research challenges that will appear
in extending this work to a wider set of applications and the corresponding directions of future
work which they represent.
6.2 Future Work
In the future there are three main directions the research covered in this thesis could take. In
particular, one direction would be to address the issue of an untrustworthy centre that uses a cost
function lower than the second lowest for Mechanism 1, or the (m+1)th and (M +1)th low-
est costs for Mechanisms 2 and 3 respectively, when calculating payments in the second stage.
In terms of citizen sensor networks, this means, that selﬁsh behaviour may not be restricted to
information providers. In some cases, information buyers may be inclined to select an agent
without taking its cost into consideration. Specially, when dealing with members of the pub-
lic, this issue becomes more important as an information buyer may exhibit favouritism over
particular providers. Additionally, an information buyer may choose to use a lower cost when
calculating the payments, than the one deﬁned by the reverse price auction in the ﬁrst stage of
the mechanism. A second direction would be to address the issue of collusion among informa-
tion providers that will appear in Mechanism 3, where the providers are expected to be paid for
their service based on other providers’ observations. In this case, according to Jurca and Falt-
ings (2007), truth telling is not the only Nash equilibrium, since the payments to the agents are
calculated based on the other agents’ reports. Finally, a third direction would be to modify the
existing model and mechanisms so the exchanged information is no longer modeled by continu-
ous distributions, but by discrete distributions (such as the recommender systems similar to the
ranking web sites introduced in Section 6.1). This extension will make it possible to ﬁnd wider
applications for our mechanisms and address similar problems in other domains (i.e. ranking
systems, environmental monitoring).
We will now discuss each one of these directions in more detail:
Information buyers’ dishonesty: In the future we intend to address one of the key problems
of second price auctions and consequently of the reverse second and (m+1)th price auctions
we use in the ﬁrst stage of the mechanisms in this thesis. As already seen in Section 2.4.2,
second price auctions, as opposed to English and Dutch auctions, cannot prevent the centre
(acting as the auctioneer) from lying. The same problem exists in our mechanisms, as the cost
functions are private information known only to each of the auction’s participants. Speciﬁcally
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and (m+1)th costs when calculating payments in the second stage of our mechanism, exactly
like the auctioneer in the standard second price auctions, who can ask for a higher price than
the second bid. In order to address this issue, in Section 2.4.2 we discussed two approaches:
the public blackboard by Hsu and Soo (2002) and the heavy encryption protocols by Suzuki and
Yokoo (2004). However, we dismissed them both as they were either not applicable in a citizen
sensor network, or introduced additional complexity through multiple layers of calculations.
Still, the combination of these techniques could be a starting point for future research, which
will relax some of these heavy restrictions. For example, a public blackboard system with
simpler encrypted methods which will guarantee the providers’ anonymity.
Information providers’ collusion: Jurca and Faltings (2007) have shown that when payments
are calculated based on other agents’ reported observations and not the observed actual outcome,
agents are expected to collude. This is the case in Mechanism 3 where the centre relies on the
agents’ reported estimates as it has no means of observing the state of the world when issuing
the payments. Now, by depriving communication among information providers we address this
issue, since the providers will not be able to know each others’ observations in advance and
therefore it will be impossible for them to collude. However, as citizen sensor networks evolve,
and the available technology advances, this may not be the case. Citizen journalism is partic-
ularly vulnerable to this issue, as members of the public may agree to misreport information
deliberately in order to achieve their goals. For example, the residents of a small town may
agree to fabricate news and use social networking websites to publicise them in order to attract
attention to their town and beneﬁt from the temporary attention. Now, in addressing this issue,
it is important not to introduce additional complexity to the network by employing specialists in
order to supervise the information providers and evaluate their reports, as opposed to what Jurca
and Faltings suggest. Such an approach would contradict the main purpose of such a mecha-
nism, which is to be applied in networks, where the information buyers do not have external
means to evaluate the providers observations, and therefore rely solely on them. A solution for
this issue, would be to try to use the possibility of collusion among providers for the buyer’s
beneﬁt by introducing the notion of cooperation among providers. For example, the informa-
tion providers could collectively produce an observation through sharing resources. However,
in so doing we also introduce the possibility of defection and we have to change the model and
mechanism drastically so it can cope with both these options. Initially, we have to modify the
fusion process to include a parameter that would measure the percentage of cooperation and
then calculate the providers’ utility functions in order to show whether the new mechanism will
remain incentive compatible.
Discrete Distributions: Finally, for our future work we would like to extend our model so it can
also include cases where the cost functions and estimates are modelled by discrete distributions.
In so doing, we will be able to apply the techniques introduced in this thesis in a wider set of
problems and not restrict to citizen sensor networks. The information observed and reported by
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by discrete probability distributions (e.g. ratings and rankings of services or items in recom-
mender systems (Adomavicius and Tuzhilin, 2005)). Therefore, it is important to develop the
processes to guide us towards effectively addressing issues such as selﬁsh behaviour, unknown
costs, observations of low quality and lack of access to the ground truth. However, in this case,
several of the assumptions we make regarding the order of the cost functions and their deriva-
tives, will not hold. Speciﬁcally, none of the conditions of Lemmas 3.2 and 3.1 in Chapter 3 will
hold, and consequently proving the economic properties of a new mechanism based on discrete
costs will be a challenging task. The complexity of this task lies within the difﬁculties involved
in linking the cost of producing an observation with its precision and the resources invested in
its generation. So an initial step, in dealing with discrete costs, is to design a model that will
link the cost to the effort of making an estimate or an observation. Speciﬁcally, this can be done
through a scheme where a contributor makes multiple attempts to generate an observation (i.e.
rate a service) prior to reporting it. Given that a certain ﬁxed cost can be assigned in making a
single observation, multiple efforts will show more resources being invested in the ﬁnal task of
reporting the overall observation.Bibliography
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